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Secessionist conflicts often begin in places abundant with resources and located far from the
centers of state power. These factors make it easier for rebels to form a functional state within the
borders of their territory following independence. Many regions that meet the necessary conditions
for sovereign governance in the world, but there are few secessionist conflicts. This relative paucity
of secessionist violence is the result of government preemption of potential separatist movements.
The secessionist conflicts we do observe are the result of government failure to adapt to changes in
outlying territories sufficiently quickly, allowing dissident groups to gain a foothold and initiate a
secessionist campaign. In extreme cases, governments may relocate large populations of the dominant
social group to minority territories to deter secession by diluting the minority’s power locally. I test
these arguments using cross-national geospatial data, and find that governments develop higher levels
of state capacity in more governable, and thus more secession prone, regions. I derive empirical
implications for government informational capability and conflict onset using an agent-based model.
Qualitative case studies show that governments engage in demographic engineering when they
fear secessionist ambitions, but highlight the risk of backlash sparking a low-level conflict. Taken
together, these dynamics suggest a pattern where the rebel groups that do emerge are not the most
capable of potential rebel groups as minorities that live in territories suited to secession are carefully
surveilled and managed by governments. Information plays a central role in both explanations of
how governments work to preempt conflict, and when these efforts fail. By focusing on the role of
information, this dissertation deepens our understanding of conflict onset, while suggesting ways
to improve our knowledge of conflict evolution and outcome. Improving information flows from
minority group territories may reduce the risk of violent secessionist conflict.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
When self-determination movements turn to violence in the pursuit of their goals, they sometimes
seek independence, but other times aim for greater autonomy under the authority of their existing
government. When the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional declared war on the Mexican
government in 1994, they did not demand independence, but rather autonomy within Chiapas.
The Papuans in the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua have fought for independence
or reunification with neighboring Papua New Guinea. The Bengali population of East Pakistan
successfully separated from the rest of Pakistan and formed the present-day state of Bangladesh. The
Kurdistan Democratic Party fought for increased regional autonomy in the First Iraqi-Kurdistan War
during the 1960s. While each of these movements sought to exercise increased local political power
with decreased external interference, they varied considerably in the degree of independence they
sought.
When self-determination movements turn to violence to advance their aims, why do some agitate
for secession and independence from their host states, while others are content merely to seek
increased autonomy under the authority of the state? If self-determination movements are frustrated
with their state of affairs to the point of willingness to employ violence, why stop short of a demand
for independence? Independence would mean freedom from having to deal with an uncooperative
government and the ability to organize the new state according to their ideals.
Groups fight for secession when they believe that governing as an independent state in the wake
of their victory will be feasible, and settle for increased autonomy when they believe that governing
independently would be less practical. The responsibilities that a group must take on in the wake of
a successful bid for independence are enormous, and if it believes that it is not equipped to carry
them out, then autonomy can be a more realistic and attractive goal. While aspects of a group like its
degree of internal cohesion or fragmentation clearly affect how able it will be to fulfill the duties of
governing, there are also important external determinants of how easy it will be to govern.
Modern nation-states are territorial political entities, and so group structure is only one half
of the equation for how well a group will be able to govern. The other half is how difficult it
will be to govern the specific territory that a group will control. The governability of a territory
can be influenced by numerous geographic factors such as the location and abundance of natural
resources, or how easy it is to move between population centers. Similarly, the human geography of
a territory can determine how governable it is for a specific group. Are people clustered in dense
urban populations, making the administration of the territory easier? Are there numerous other ethnic
groups in a territory that would be unlikely to submit to majority rule by the self-determination
group? The environment also plays a role by affecting how productive agricultural lands are and
what diseases a state’s citizens must contend with.
In this dissertation I focus on the latter dimensions of governability: those tied to attributes of
specific pieces of territory, rather than those that describe the groups seeking to rule them. This
definition encompasses geographic factors which are continuously distributed across a territory and
vary throughout its area. Groups will fight for secession when the territory that they occupy is more
conducive to their governance, and for autonomy when it is less so.
This focus on geography highlights the absence of the state in the theory as discussed thus far. If
geography affects how governable a group’s territory is, then geography also makes that group more
likely to pursue secession should it turn to violence. While governments may struggle to know and
comprehend the informal institutions of a nascent rebel group due to their secretive nature, they have
far less trouble knowing what type of territory that group inhabits. Geographic factors are slow to
change and more easily observable. The readily observable nature of geographic factors means that
governments are also able to identify the territories most suited to secession and therefore most likely
to secede. They then use this knowledge to act preemptively and prevent secessionist movements
from emerging in these areas.
However, states are not always able to successfully execute these preemption efforts. Preventing
the formation of secessionist movements requires directing the coercive apparatus of the state to areas
where they are most likely to form. When governments are slow to learn of changes in governability
in far-flung regions, they can be slow to update their level of preemptive activities. If they fail to
update quickly enough, this can give dissatisfied minorities the window of opportunity they need to
mobilize a secessionist movement.
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Finally, states are aware of this relationship and may take proactive measures to reduce the
likelihood that groups which turn to violence will seek independence and sovereign statehood instead
of more limited autonomy goals. States may encourage immigration by members of dominant ethnic
groups to a restive minority group’s territory, increasing its ethnic heterogeneity, and thus decreasing
the group’s ability to govern it independently. Even if this strategy ultimately fails to prevent a violent
self-determination movement from emerging, it can put governments in a favorable position from
which to combat it by entrenching the power of the state within the region.
I develop and test these theories with a multi method approach using large-N quantitative analysis,
agent-based models, and qualitative case studies. In different chapters I draw on a broad array of
data sources ranging from recent global geospatial data to narrative accounts of resettlement efforts
stretching back to the end of the 19th Century.
1.1 Significance
This dissertation addresses a topic of considerable significance in political science. Nationalism
is the foundation of the modern nation state, and by exploring how potential secessionist rebels
decide which battles to fight, it provides insight into how states handle constrained decision-making
problems. In doing so, it foregrounds the fact that rebels, and potential rebels, face the same set of
obligations and opportunities as states. They must satisfy their constituents while fighting to retain
political power.
Linking geography to state building offers important advances for both the study of contemporary
rebellion and preemption and the study of historical nation formation. Work on state building in early
modern Europe (Tilly 1975, Tilly 1992, North & Weingast 1989) or the colonial period (Acemoglu,
Johnson & Robinson 2001) tends to focus on political institutions and ignore the territories those
institution occupied. Adding geography to this story can help provide more complete explanations
for divergent outcomes in historical development.
Similarly, the contemporary civil war literature is very focused on conflict onset (Fearon &
Laitin 2003, Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Buhaug 2010, Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009, Cederman,
Wimmer & Min 2010, Siroky & Cuffe 2015, Hegre, Allansson, Basedau, Colaresi, Croicu, Fjelde,
Hoyles, Hultman, Högbladh, Jansen, Mouhleb, Muhammad, Nilsson, Nygård, Olafsdottir, Petrova,
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Randahl, Rød, Schneider, von Uexkull & Vestby 2019). While much work does treat conflict duration
(Fearon 2004, Cunningham 2006, Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009) and outcome (Cunningham,
Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009, Akcinaroglu 2012, Balcells & Kalyvas 2014, Schutte 2015, Greig,
Mason & Hamner 2016, Chu & Braithwaite 2018), these studies often operate in isolation. By
emphasizing the importance of post-conflict possibilities in explaining conflict prevention efforts,
this dissertation illustrates the necessity of considering all potential stages of a conflict when studying
onset. Rebel groups and governments are strategic actors, and failing to consider these possibilities
is akin to ignoring their capacity for strategic behavior.
By focusing on ways in which governments use geography to identify and thwart potential seces-
sionist movements, I shed light on the relative absence of successful self-determination movements
in recent times. While South Sudan gained independence in 2011, it is the only recent case of a
successful bid for independence. The theory of geographic governance and prevention encompasses
a range of strategies from beneficial to coercive to violent, explaining patterns in a broad variety of
cases across a spectrum of regime types.
The ways in which governments identify likely secessionist groups and act to frustrate their
ambitions are of exceptional relevance to policymakers. This logic can explain why governments
persist in supporting migration from populated areas to remote minority regions even when such
movements spark unrest and outrage locally. Furthermore, if more governable territories are more
prone to secession, then policymakers can help identify development and aid strategies that are less
likely to spur conflict down the road.
1.2 Literature Review
I begin by reviewing the literature on nationalism, self-determination movements, and independence
demands. Following this, I build on insights from the state formation literature as they relate to the
need for rebel groups to govern in the wake of a successful secession bid. To provide context for an
understanding of rebel groups as potential state-builders, I review the literature on space and conflict.
I note where existing work touches on the role of these elements in rebel strategic choice and where
it focuses more narrowly on their role in conflict.
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To develop a theory of how geographic factors affect the goals that rebel groups pursue, we need
to draw on insights from three distinct streams of research within the literature: work on nationalism
and self-determination, scholarship on state formation, and the spatial conflict research project.
Understanding the gravity and consequences of independence claims means we can confidently
separate groups which fight for secession and autonomy without worrying about the possibility
of strategic misrepresentation. The state formation literature is important because a successful
secessionist group will have to found a new state, so it is important to consider the demands and
opportunities facing newly emerged states. While it is primarily focused on explaining the onset of
conflict, the geographic conflict literature contains many insightful observations about the relationship
between violence and space, and groups take these realities into account when deciding how to fight
their battle against the state.
1.2.1 The Sincerity of Secession
The starting point for understanding territorial conflict is nationalism. Groups only engage in
territorial conflict — the struggle to create new and alternative political institutions within the
boundaries of a given territory — when motivated by nationalist desire. Ernest Gellner writes that
nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries
should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a
given state . . . should not separate the power-holders from the rest (1983, 1).
Thus, territorial conflicts represent an attempt to replace existing geographic political divisions
with ones that more closely support the “nationalist principle” (Gellner 1983) that the government of
a state should represent the interests of the “imagined community” of the nation (Anderson 1983) that
lives within its borders. This type of conflict hopes to alter the institutions within a specific territory
by either gaining more autonomy from the central government, or by withdrawing from the current,
non-representative, state and forming a new one (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg &
Strand 2002). These conflicts are less threatening to governments than governmental ones because
the group has no desire to overthrow or replace the existing government. Instead, a group’s aims
and ambitions are limited to changes within territory that is ‘theirs,’ by reducing or eliminating the
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influence of the government within this area. Focusing on territorial conflicts allows me to make
meaningful comparisons across different areas because groups are tied to their specific territories.
If territorial conflict encompasses both secessionist and autonomy-seeking civil wars, then it
is important to understand the distinctions between the two. Both will result in policies that more
closely align with the ideal point of the minority group that lives in the territory. However, autonomy
entails some degree of compromise; even if all of the policy demands of the group are met, they still
will not have their own state, in violation of the nationalist principle. Secession can be seen as the
more ‘extreme’ of the two forms of territorial conflict. This relationship implies a question: why do
some groups fight for autonomy and some for secession?
Research on self-determination groups more broadly – those both violent and nonviolent – may
hold the answer. These groups frequently change the extent of their claims. Erin Jenne views
secession and increased regional autonomy as two points along the spectrum of “demands” on the
government that minority groups can dynamically move between as part of their bargaining process
with the majority (2007, 39-41). As their bargaining leverage and capabilities increase or decrease,
groups will make more or less extreme demands of the majority. Donald Horowitz (1991, 13) concurs,
noting that
groups . . . are not born irredentist or secessionist. They can and do move back and forth
from integrated participation in the state of which they are part to a posture of secession
or irredentism.”
Empirically, the proportion of self-determination groups making secessionist demands varies signifi-
cantly over time, with individual groups making both types of demands over time (Cunningham 2014,
72). It is a logical extension to argue that groups which have already escalated to violent conflict
with the state also operate along this sliding scale, with shifts in demands reflecting changes in their
bargaining leverage. There is nothing fundamental that makes secession inherent to some groups and
autonomy inherent in others. Instead, the choice of goal is a function of the constraints that a group
faces and the strategic environment that it operates in. Stated goals, whether secession or autonomy,
are a reflection of what a group can reasonably hope to achieve.
An alternative possibility is that groups act strategically and make demands that are more extreme
than their actual desires as a bargaining technique. Anthony Smith (1982, 19) argues that it can be
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difficult to be sure whether a given strategy represents a sincerely held belief or is only a
tactic . . . it seems wiser to not make too sharp a distinction between autonomism and
secessionism.
If groups can credibly make maximalist demands, then they will have more leverage in negotiations
with the state. Secession is a more extreme demand than increased autonomy because it involves
challenges to “the integrity of the state itself” (Jenne 2007, 40), and as a result should give groups a
better bargaining position. If this is the case, why do all self-determination groups not clamor for
secession at all times?
The very fact that groups do not always advocate for secession should lead us to question whether
they make these demands strategically. According to Cunningham (2014, 72), the proportion of
self-determination groups calling for secession has never passed .55 since 1960. Groups sometimes
limit their demands because of the unique nature of secession and independence claims.
Self-determination groups that advocate a policy of secession may settle for autonomy if they
are unable to triumph on the field of battle or force the state to accept their terms. What they will
not do is turn down the possibility of secession if offered. Doing so would entail disappointing their
supporters and leaving their nationalist fervor unrequited. This unfulfilled nationalist desire would
generate significant audience costs for the group’s leadership. In effect, secession is an offer that
can’t be refused.
In order for a group which initially pushed for secession to successfully accept a lesser achieve-
ment of increased autonomy, its leadership must be able to convince its mass supporters that it
was unable to force the government to grant more concessions. If a group is strong and capable of
governing in the wake of independence, its supporters are likely to know this. A group which is able
to govern will not be able to turn down an offer of independence from the government because its
supporters will punish it for not securing as much independence as it could.
South Sudan’s short history since its independence in 2011 illustrates the pitfalls of pushing for
secession if a group is not prepared to take up the reins of government. Although 98.8% of South
Sudan’s population voted for independence in a 2011 referendum (Gettleman 2011), the young state
has been plagued by problems since then. After putting down an alleged coup in late 2013, president
Salva Kiir Mayardit’s government has been engaged in a civil war with the Sudan People’s Liberation
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Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) led by former Vice President Riek Machar (Johnson 2014).
Deep-seated cleavages between factions within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
resulted in a weak state that was unable to prevent a challenge from Machar (Rolandsen 2015), but
also unable to defeat him. The SPLM could likely have remained unified if South Sudan did not
become independent due to a common enemy in Khartoum. With hundreds of thousands of thousands
dead in the conflict to date (Reuters 2018), South Sudan is an example of what happens when leaders
miscalculate and pursue secession when autonomy may be a better goal.
Self-determination groups that advocate for secession may be willing to settle for autonomy.
However, no group that is unwilling or unable to accept secession as an outcome would agitate for
it. Why would any group not desire secession? Formal independence and the ability to forge a
functioning government within the territory of a new state are two very different things (Clapham
1996, Clapham 1998, Englebert 2000). Work which explains when groups push for secession has
typically focused on how capable groups are of defeating the government (Toft 2003), but this is only
half of the story. The following section explores the challenges of state-building, which provides
insight into why some groups may not be willing or able to accept secession.
1.2.2 Rebel Groups as (Potential) State-Builders
By focusing on territorial conflicts, I seek to explain why some groups seek increased autonomy
within the confines of existing states while others desire their own states. Answers to this question
have frequently concentrated on the group’s assessment of its outlook within the state:
Self-determination here may mean either democratic self-rule or the exercise of cultural
autonomy, depending on whether the national group in question believes it can achieve its
goals within the framework of an existing state or seeks a state of its own (Ignatieff 1994,
6).
Yet this ignores an equally important question: how possible would it be for the group to create a
new state?
The end goal of both independence and autonomy movements is political power, but the require-
ments that groups must meet to actually exercise this power are drastically different. Autonomist
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movements may not have to make any serious adjustments to be able to use their amplified political
voices. On the other hand, secession requires the creation of a new state from whole cloth.
As a result, each goal demands different levels of political capability for post-conflict success. A
group that is capable of administering an autonomous region may not be able to govern an entire
state. Rebels are cognizant of this fact:
a nationalist movement, to stand any chance of gaining sovereignty for its group, must
. . . begin the process of evolving organisations, cadres and institutions able to act as a
‘proto-state’ the moment independence is achieved. It must, as it were, prefigure the
polity it wishes to erect, by creating a counter ‘state with a state’ as part of the fabric
of the ‘movement,’ and train its followers in the political and administrative tasks they
must perform when power is assumed (Smith 1976, 7).
If a secessionist rebel group hopes to have any chance of success after securing military victory, it
must plan for and commence the process of state-building well before triumphing on the battlefield.
The need for rebel movements to begin building the institutions that will eventually become
those of a new state even in the earliest stages of a conflict means that they will be acutely aware of
how difficult this task will be for them. If it seems insurmountable given the context a group exists
within, then perhaps independence is not the most wise goal to pursue. Thus, the easier it would be to
create a new state, the more attractive this option will be to the rebels. Conversely, the more difficult
it will be to build a new state, the higher the chance that the group will seek increased autonomy
instead. Given the territorial nature of states, the nature of the territory that the group controls and
hopes to rule is one of the largest influences on how difficult this task will be.1
In order to understand what makes certain territories more or less conducive to the creation
of new states, I draw on the state formation literature. If specific factors helped or hindered the
formation of extant states, then we can reasonably argue that these same forces affect the creation
of new states, and in turn influence whether a given rebel group seeks to secede or is satisfied with
increased autonomy.
1Other factors such as the quality of political institutions (Lemke & Carter 2016) or the presence of external
financial support (Stokke 2006) obviously matter as well, but they have been more extensively studied. I
choose to focus on the effects of territory, while drawing on this literature to identify important controls.
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A state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1965, 2). Groups that challenge the monopoly on the
legitimate use of force fight governmental conflicts. Those that focus on the second half of Weber’s
definition, that the monopoly is exercised ‘within a given territory,’ fight territorial conflicts. I focus
on this latter group to facilitate comparisons between different territories.
In less extreme cases, a group can try to convince the existing government to grant increased
regional autonomy. While this approach involves the state ceding some level of control to local
authorities, the state still maintains the ultimate monopoly on the use of force. Consequently, groups
do not have to assume all of the duties of governance, and do not have to create a new state.
If the group can seize a piece of the state’s territory and drive out its agents, the group can exert
control over life within that territory. The group would control the monopoly of the use of force
and could govern according to its preferences. While this new entity may or may not enjoy legal
recognition from other states, and thus de jure sovereignty, it would have de facto sovereignty.
Take for example, Myanmar’s muslim minority Rohingya population, located in the country’s
Western region, which does not enjoy basic freedom of movement, is subject to arbitrary taxation, is
barred from receiving citizenship (Amnesty International 2004), and is not even recognized as an
ethnicity by the government (BBC 2014). They can attempt to force the existing Bamar dominated
government to cede some degree of control within their territory, allowing them to exercise cultural
and language rights. Alternatively, they can try to entirely remove government influence from their
subset of Myanmar’s territory, leaving them in control of this newly established political entity.
Both of these are territorial conflicts, but a victory means very different things for both the state
and the minority in each case. Victory in secession means that the state will have to give up some
of its territory, and all of the rents it generates, while the group will have to create a new governing
apparatus. A victory for an autonomy-seeking group means that the group will have to take on some
aspects of governance, but the state will sill provide some of these services.
As evidenced by the Rohingya, excluded minorities often live in areas that are neglected or
ignored by the central government. Given the limited scope of services provided in these areas
(Stewart 2008), what benefits do these groups enjoy that could make autonomy more attractive than
secession? The main public good that governments provide, even in overlooked minority areas is
national security. One of the primary purposes and goals of a state, is security (Waltz 1979). Even if
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governments are not responsive to the interests of a minority, they do not want the group’s territory
to be lost to another state. An important question for excluded groups considering secession is thus
whether the group can hope to protect itself from the predations of its new neighbors and former host
if it becomes an independent state.
1.2.3 Lessons from the Spatial Conflict Literature
While previous work on space and conflict has explored the role of factors such as population or
resources, it has typically done so by asking which factors make conflict more or less likely. Other
work has investigated how geographically distributed factors can shape the future of an ongoing
conflict at the micro level. However, very little work has asked how these factors can shape the
overall trajectory of the conflict by influencing which goals a group will pursue.
Some scholars have touched on this question by studying how the promise of future resource
rents may influence the direction a conflict takes, but often this work only looks at one piece of the
puzzle. For example, Sorens (2011) argues that rebels in areas with large resource endowments are
more likely to engage in territorial conflict because they hope to enjoy the benefits of these resources
in the future. However, to actually receive and be able to exploit these resource rents, rebel groups
must also be able to control and administer the territory they lie within. Precious metal deposits will
be of little use if there are no people who live nearby to mine them or no roads on which to transport
them. The possibility of future rents is not enough to encourage a secessionist strategy if actually
realizing them will be prohibitively expensive.
My arguments build on this existing work by exploring how multiple spatially varying factors
can affect the governability of a territory after conflict ends. A group which chooses a secessionist
strategy must first create the institutions and elements of a state before they can realize the benefits
of their new territory. Thus, it is not just the potential future revenues of a territory that determine
the expected value of a goal, but how easy it is to actually generate and collect those revenues.
The existing spatial conflict literature investigates the role of several geographic factors which can
determine the governability of territory.
The more powerful a state is, the farther from the capital a conflict is likely to begin (Buhaug
2010). Conflicts start farther away in powerful states because as distance increases, the state’s power
declines. Potential rebels located near the capital are overwhelmed by the state’s power, and so do
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not engage in conflict. Potential rebels located far from the capital may be able to withstand the
state’s limited reach in such remote locations. When a government and a rebel group’s ability to
project power overlap, there will be conflict.
This explanation is largely deterministic and treats politics as fixed. Rebels have goals that are
exogenously given, and when they are able to, they challenge the state. When their goals are not
achievable given their location, they do not act. They do not have a large amount of agency because
it is possible that they experience extreme exclusion, but because of their location, they will simply
endure this oppression.
Buhaug & Gates (2002) find that territorial conflicts are more likely to start farther away from
the capital. Although this study investigates the effect of incompatibility on conflict location relative
to the capital, it is easy to see the causal arrow potentially pointing the other direction with conflicts
beginning farther from the capital more likely to be territorial conflicts. Other studies have found
evidence of this relationship with location as an explanatory variable and conflict type as the response
variable (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009, 517).
Geography helps us explain choices of goal, and we can improve these explanations when we go
beyond the notion of geography as just distance (Beck, Gleditsch & Beardsley 2006). Population
concentration (Weidmann 2009), the location and amount of natural resources (Lujala 2010), and
the density of infrastructure (Zhukov 2012) can all influence rebel goals. Combining all of these
factors in one analysis requires careful theorizing about the mechanisms by which each affects the
governability of territory.
Higher population density lowers barriers to collective action, facilitating the organization and
execution of armed rebellion (Weidmann 2009). Once a conflict begins, individual locations are more
likely to experience rebel violence if they have high population density for the same reason (Raleigh
& Hegre 2009, Daly 2012, Braithwaite & Johnson 2015). The more tightly concentrated populations
are, the more feasible any political action becomes, suggesting that the post-independence process of
state-building may be easier in more densely populated areas.
There is a strong relationship between a country’s national level resource wealth and conflict
(Ross 2004b, Ross 2013, Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Fearon 2005, Fjelde 2009, Bell & Wolford 2015).
The location and availability of resources can also prolong a conflict once it begins (Lujala 2010, Ross
2004a, Englebert & Ron 2004) or affect the likelihood of recurrence after a conflict ends (Rustad &
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Binningsbø 2012). When rebel groups do not have strong ties to an organized ethnic group, they are
more likely to rove widely, not consolidating control in specific locations and utilizing the resources
there (Beardsley, Gleditsch & Lo 2015).
Differences in resource availability can also affect rebel group decisions. When groups do not
have access to extensive resources to recruit new fighters, they instead entice prospective supporters
by appealing to ethnic and social ties and promising future rewards to members of their in-group
(Weinstein 2005). Resources can directly influence the goal that a group chooses. Mineral resource
abundance encourages ethnic rebellions with territorial aims, but not rebellions with governmental
aims (Sorens 2011), because these groups hope to be able to extract rents once autonomy or
independence is achieved. Oil wealth decreases the likelihood of center-seeking civil wars because
governments leverage it to improve their coercive capacity (Paine 2016). Resources make territorial
conflict more attractive because they can be exploited by the group in the future, and because they
buttress the existing state, making direct confrontation more costly. They are a further motivation for
secessionist conflict because a successful group will no longer lose a share of their revenue to the
government.
Similarly, transborder ethnic kin (TEK) may influence both the likelihood of conflict and the
form it will take. The demographic size of TEK groups has a curvilinear effect on probability that
their co-ethnics abroad will initiate a civil war against their government because small groups have
no influence, and large groups have political power and do not need to turn to violence (Cederman,
Gleditsch, Salehyan & Wucherpfennig 2013). The geographic location of these TEK groups might
also guide their foreign relatives towards either secession or autonomy. When ethnic groups are
located near an international border, and have transborder ethnic kin who live directly across that
same border, secession might be more attractive due to the large pool of potential new citizens.
When potential rebel groups have access to a large supply of future citizens, secession may be more
attractive as the difficulties of future state-building will be lessened by the influx of citizens.
Even guerrilla insurgent groups rely on roads for movement and transportation of supplies
(Zhukov 2012). This suggests that for the immediate goal of fighting the state, the amount and quality
of roads should not have a significant impact in pushing groups towards either secession or autonomy.
Instead, roads may have their biggest impact on goal choice through their effect on what happens
after a conflict.
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If resources and population are both required to successfully found a new state, then infrastructure
may be just as important. Oil, timber, ore, and rare earth metals are next to useless if they cannot
be exploited and brought to market. If a newly independent state does not have the infrastructure
necessary to monetize these resources, then it will not be able to use their rents to fund the creation
and functioning of the new government. While each of these resources requires specific capital
investments to exploit, there is an even more basic necessity they all need to function: transportation
infrastructure. The better the infrastructure in a territory, the more attractive secession because the
easier it will be to fund a new state.
We know how the demographic and political requirements of forming a state can determine
which goal a group will choose, and now we need to develop an understanding of how the geographic
contexts that groups reside within play a role in determining the goals that rebels pursue.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
To answer the question of how geography shapes the goals of potential rebel groups, and how
governments use these dynamics against potential secessionist groups, this dissertation proceeds in
four parts.
In Chapter 2, I present my theoretical argument about the geographically distributed factors that
determine how governable territory is, and argue that rebels will be more likely to seek secession when
their territory is more governable. I use geospatial data from 1990-2013 to test the hypothesis that
groups are more likely to engage in secessionist conflict when their territories are more governable.
This test yields a null finding with no discernible relationship between territorial governability and
the goals that groups choose to pursue. This non-finding in the face of a carefully constructed theory
motivates the remaining empirical chapters of this dissertation.
In Chapter 3, I argue that the lack of relationship between territorial governability and group
goals is due to the fact that governments can also observe this governability and act preemptively
to stop secessionist campaigns from forming. Using the same geospatial measures of governability
from Chapter 2, I show that as the governability of a group’s territory increases, the government’s
efforts to develop its capacity within that territory increases. The same factors that make a territory
ripe for secession also attract the government’s attention and make secession more difficult.
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Chapter 4 answers the logical followup question of why we still occasionally observe secessionist
civil wars if governments use geographic information to identify and preempt likely cases. I argue
that preemption requires good information to accurately respond to the level of threat in a region.
If a region’s territorial governability has recently increased, as occurs when oil is discovered, a
government that is slow to learn of this development will be too late in trying to prevent secessionist
mobilization. I develop these dynamics into a coherent theory with an agent-based model and use
insights from the case of Aceh to demonstrate its validity.
Chapter 5 explores how governments that take the long view try to alter the territorial govern-
ability of secession prone regions by reshaping their human geography. Governments that choose
this strategy have two options. First, they can forcibly relocate entire populations to less governable
areas, an approach employed multiple times by the Soviet Union. Second, they can encourage their
supporters to move to the minority group’s territory, thereby diluting their local political power, as
Jakarta pursues a policy of Javanese migration to the predominantly Muslim province of Aceh on the
island of Sumatra. I use qualitative case studies of these and other cases to show how concern over
secessionist desires motivates these practices. Additionally, I argue that these dynamics provide an
explanation for why states engage in internal colonialism despite the risk of backlash and ‘sons of
the soil’ wars from local residents.
Finally, Chapter 6 draws together the arguments from the previous chapters and synthesizes them
into a geographic theory of secession and control. I discuss how geography constrains and directs
the political goals of ethnic groups, and the ways in which governments leverage these patterns to
preserve their territorial integrity. In doing so, I highlight the contribution of this dissertation to the
study of conflict, nationalism, and separatism.
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CHAPTER 2: GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINANTS OF REBEL GOALS
Secession and increased autonomy imply very different post-conflict trajectories in the event of
a rebel victory. A successful autonomy-seeking rebellion means that the former rebel group gains
some level of regional control over policy, but remains subordinated to the government. A victorious
secessionist movement must forge a new state. Each task brings unique challenges with it, and
potential rebels are aware of this when making their decision of which goal to embrace.
Knowing this, potential rebels confront the question of whether it will be easier to build a
legitimate, stable government from scratch in territory they control, or to limit their goals and accept
that they will have to operate within the structure of the existing state. While many factors influence
how easy a territory is to govern, my argument focuses on the role of spatial ones, specifically how
the geographic distribution of resources and populations determines the governability of a territory.
Groups fighting for secession hope to be militarily successful and then exercise sovereign control
after their victory on the field of battle. Sovereignty has two dimensions: internal capacity and
legitimacy, and external legal recognition (Lake 2003). They want to exercise political power, and to
successfully do so they will require both types of sovereignty. Unfortunately for rebel groups, they
have little control over their degree of external recognition and legitimacy (Jo 2015).
Rebel movements have enjoyed varying degrees of legitimacy on the world stage ranging
from groups like ISIS which receives no external recognition, to the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia which had natural resource concessions from multinational firms (Reno 1993), to the South
West Africa People’s Organization which was recognized by UN even while its territory was still
officially claimed by South Africa (United Nations n.d.), to the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
which coordinated extensively with NGOs on providing humanitarian aid to people in its territory
(DeMars 1994). This external standing is largely outside of groups’ control; if the other states do not
want to grant it, groups cannot force them to.
However, rebel groups can have a much larger influence over how much domestic legitimacy they
enjoy and control they can exercise. If the conditions in a group’s settlement area are not conducive
to easy governance, they may choose to accept increased autonomy instead of trying to fully govern
themselves. Conversely, if a group’s territory would be relatively easy to govern, then secession will
be more attractive.
What this theory needs to do is generate a coherent argument for what geographic configurations
of political factors make governance easier or harder. Existing theories of conflict can tell us when
ethnic groups are likely to take up arms, but we need a new theory to tell us which goals they will
aspire to.
Sometimes the choice between secession and autonomy is an easy one. Ethnic rebellions can
offer a particularly clear example of these dynamics. By comparing different ethnically based rebel
groups, we can gain greater insight into how geographic factors can push groups toward one strategy
or the other. Excluded minority groups are likely to engage in rebellion due to their lack of access
to the regular political process (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010), but the form this rebellion takes
varies significantly. In the following sections I present examples of ethnic groups that are similar
along certain lines but differ along others, and choose different goals as a result.
These groups are not commonly thought of as similar politically, but they can be compared along
geographic dimensions that are often overlooked in existing work. Delving into their experiences can
shed light onto how these factors affect the political decision-making of rebel groups. The rest of this
chapter develops a conception of governability that is tied to specific territory and influenced by the
characteristics of that territory. It then advances a theory that groups that inhabit more governable
territory will be more likely to fight for secession due to the needs of post-independence state building.
I test this argument using a global sample of ethnic groups from 1990-2013 and geospatial data
to measure governability. This analysis fails to find evidence of a consistent relationship between
governability and rebel group goals. The failure to find a relationship despite the plausible theory
motivates the study of government preemption that forms the remainder of this dissertation.
2.1 A Geographic Theory of Governability
The starting point for understanding territorial conflict is nationalism. Groups only engage in
territorial conflict — the struggle to create new and alternative political institutions within the
boundaries of a given territory — when motivated by nationalist desire to ensure that “ethnic
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boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner 1983, 1). Thus, territorial conflicts represent
an attempt to replace existing geographic political divisions with ones that more closely support the
“nationalist principle” (Gellner 1983) that the government of a state should represent the interests of
the “imagined community” of the nation (Anderson 1983) that lives within its geographic borders.
This type of conflict hopes to alter the institutions within a specific territory by either gaining
more autonomy from the central government or by withdrawing from the current, non-representative,
state and forming a new one (Gleditsch et al. 2002). These conflicts are more limited in aims than
governmental ones because the group has no desire to overthrow or replace the existing government.
Instead, a group’s aims and ambitions are limited to changes within territory that is ‘theirs,’ by
reducing or eliminating the influence of the government within this area.
One explanation for the emergence of secessionist conflict is that groups will push for indepen-
dence when they believe that they have sufficient bargaining leverage to force the state to accede
to their goals (Jenne 2007, 39-41). But why not push for secession in all cases to start from a more
extreme negotiating position? Empirically, this does not occur as the percentage of self-determination
groups calling for secession has never passed 55% since 1960 (Cunningham 2014, 72). The fact that
groups “are not born irredentist or secessionist” and can change move from conventional politics to
secession and back again (Horowitz 1991, 13) suggests that bargaining with the government is only
part of the story.
2.1.1 Rebel groups as (potential) state-builders
Formal independence and the ability to forge a functioning government within the territory of a
new state are two very different things (Clapham 1996, Clapham 1998, Englebert 2000). Work
that explains when groups push for secession has typically focused on how capable groups are of
defeating the government (Toft 2003), but this is only half of the story.
If the process of state building seems insurmountable given the context a group exists within,
then secession will be a difficult goal to pursue. Given the territorial nature of states, the features of
the territory that the group controls and hopes to rule is one of the largest influences on how difficult
this task will be. Other factors such as the quality of political institutions (Lemke & Carter 2016)
or the presence of external financial support (Stokke 2006) obviously matter as well, but they have
been more extensively studied. The political processes of state formation can be tumultuous in newly
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independent territories (Lemke 2011) and can have long-term effects on the welfare of such states
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001), so secessionist movements will be most likely to emerge
where territory is most favorable to them.
In order to understand what makes certain territories more or less conducive to the creation
of new states, I draw on the state formation literature. Specific factors such as strong extractive
institutions (Tilly 1992) or external military threats (Tilly 1985) that helped or hindered the formation
of extant states continue to affect the creation of new states today (Thies 2006, Thies 2007). Despite
the legacy of colonialism faced by many states that have emerged since the end of World War II, these
classical state-building dynamics still appear to be at play (Cohen, Brown & Organski 1981, Lemke
& Carter 2016). Since these mechanisms still matter today, we can ask whether other factors that
affected the difficulty of state formation in the early European context influence whether a given
rebel group seeks to secede or not.
Work on state formation and secession has primarily focused on institutional explanations.
Roeder (2007) argues that separatist movements are most likely to credibly challenge the state,
and attain independence, when they represent “segmented-states,” or subnational administrative
jurisdictions where ethnic groups enjoy some level of local political power. Empirically, political
leaders only eppear to initiate self-determination crises (nation-state crises in Roeder’s terminology)
when they are prepared to confront the requirements of sovereign governance, given the importance
of segment-states in predicting the onset of these crises. However, despite the emphasis on segmented-
states as territorial units within the larger common state’s territory, Roeder focuses mainly on the
“segmental institutions” of segmented states, rather than the territory of those states. If we expand our
attention to the role of territory in secession and post-independence state-building, a natural topic to
explore is the function of resources in this process.
The role of resources in conflict has been extensively studied and can offer many insights for
how they matter for secession. The greed-grievance debate (Berdal, Academy.— & Malone 2000)
highlights the opportunities for personal enrichment that may motivate rebel leaders or supporters
(Collier & Hoeffler 2004). Often this work only looks at one piece of the puzzle. For example,
Sorens (2011) argues that rebels in areas with large resource endowments are more likely to engage
in territorial conflict because they hope to enjoy the benefits of these resources in the future, while
Hunziker & Cederman (2017) similarly find that oil reserves increase the likelihood of secession.
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However, to actually receive the benefits of these resources, rebel groups must also be able to control
and administer the territory they lie within. Precious metal deposits will be of little use if there are
no people who live nearby to mine them or no roads on which to transport them. The possibility
of future rents is not enough to encourage a secessionist strategy if actually realizing them will be
prohibitively expensive.
My argument builds on this existing work by conceiving of resources more broadly. A group
which chooses a secessionist strategy must first create the institutions and elements of a state before
they can realize the benefits of their new territory. While self-interested leaders could extract enough
capital for personal enrichment from an incomplete state, self-determination movements that wish to
establish independent homelands will find themselves stymied without a functioning state apparatus.
Thus, it is not just the potential future revenues of a territory that determine the expected value of a
goal, but how easy it will be to actually generate and collect those revenues.
The Biafrans chose to fight for secession in the Nigerian Civil War because their Southern corner
of Nigeria contained extensive resources that they could use to bankroll their new state. The territory
they inhabited within the country’s Eastern Region was responsible for 65% of total oil production
(Uche 2008, 111-123). Early in the conflict the Biafrans secured these oil reserves in the hopes of
using them to finance the conflict. However, if the Biafrans had been successful in seceding, this
oil would also have served them well in the creation of their newly independent state. The Biafrans
could also draw on the extensive agricultural sector in the region (Stremlau 1977, 218). While this
agriculture could be used to help feed troops during the conflict, it would also help to support a large
population in a future independent state, broadening the tax base its government would be able to
draw on. Biafran territory contained a network of high-quality asphalt roads and the only rail line in
the region, making the transportation of troops and equipment much easier (de St. Jorre 1972, 155).
However, just as oil could be beneficial during and after the war, this transportation infrastructure
could serve multiple roles as well. A hypothetical independent would have been easier to consolidate
and administer thanks to this transportation network than a state that which would have to develop
this infrastructure from scratch. These factors illustrate how resources can make conflict more likely
by providing resources for fighting can also make secession more attractive by offering resources for
a new state.
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Knowing this, potential rebels confront the question of whether it will be possible to build a
legitimate, stable government from scratch in territory they control, or whether it is better to continue
to endure unrepresentative or hostile rule. While many factors influence how easy a territory is
to govern, my argument focuses on the role of spatial ones such as population, infrastructure, and
geography.
Groups fighting for secession hope to be militarily successful and then exercise sovereign control
after their victory on the field of battle. Sovereignty has two dimensions: internal capacity and
legitimacy, and external legal recognition (Lake 2003). They want to exercise political power, and to
successfully do so they will require both types of sovereignty. While rebel groups can try to achieve
international legitimacy by signing international agreements (Jo 2015), they ultimately have little
control over their degree of external recognition and legitimacy. What they do have control over is
their domestic legitimacy, as the following quotation about the SPLM/A in South Sudan illustrates:
The relative success of the SPLM/A in recent years presents it with a dilemma. It is
caught between the need to create a ‘quasi-state within a state’ in order ensure the support
of the people of the south, with all the responsibilities and expenses for administration,
judiciary and welfare this implies, and the need to sustain itself as a rebel force that
can defeat the government. It does not want to end up with all the disadvantages of
statehood and none of its advantages in terms of recognition (Bradbury, Leader &
Mackintosh 2000, 23).
Given the requirements a group needs to meet to enjoy domestic legitimacy, dissidents are more
likely to launch a secessionist conflict when the territory they wish to rule is easier to govern.
Unlike the simple costly lottery model used in many studies of war e.g. (Fearon 1995, Powell
2006), the game doesn’t end with the group’s victory. If the entire purpose of fighting a civil war is to
secure political power, then groups reasonably believe that they must be able to govern and exercise
that power after the end of a conflict. The success or failure of secession is not limited to defeat or
victory on the field of battle. Whether the group is able to assemble and successfully manage a new
state is just as important. When a group’s situation is not conducive to forming a new state, it may
opt instead to fight for increased autonomy.
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2.1.2 Geographic Governability and Group Goals
The governability of a given territory influences the goals that a group decides to pursue in a relatively
straightforward manner: the more governable a territory is, the more attractive secession is. If a
group can successfully secede, it need no longer share the rewards of its territory with a distant and
potentially adversarial central government.
Recent work on civil war onset has focused on ethnic groups because the shared identity of an
ethnicity can channel grievances in a manner that overcomes barriers to collective action (Cederman,
Buhaug & Gleditsch 2013). In addition, using ethnic groups as the unit of analysis enables us to
observe both groups which do and do not turn to violence, allowing us to avoid making biased
inferences by selecting on the response variable.
This approach has added benefits for the study of geography and conflict goals. Since many
ethnic groups have defined settlement areas, they also have a natural homeland to create a new state
in, should they decide to secede (Toft 2003). If a group wishes to secede, it needs “a potential
independent nation” and so
there must be some core territory in which the group is concentrated and is sufficiently
high a proportion of the total population for it to be credible for élites to claim the region
as a national homeland (Orridge 1982, 46).
When trying to decide which strategy will lead to an easier post-victory political existence, ethnic
groups take the geographic contexts of their homelands into account.
More importantly, we can use these varying geographies to explain patterns of goal choice across
groups. If a group’s territory is well suited to governance, then it should be more likely to push for
secession. If it is less accommodating, then the group should be more likely to settle for autonomy.
This is clearly a simplification of how wars are actually fought since rebel groups are rarely
able to secede with just their preferred territory. They may only be able to liberate a subset of their
homeland, or they may end up holding onto conquered territory they did not originally desire. Groups
which are more or less successful will tear larger or smaller amounts of territory away from the
preexisting state.
While these changes will result in groups holding more or less territory than they planned to,
they can still use these estimates as starting points. Comparisons between groups’ initial territory, as
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represented by their settlement areas, are a useful heuristic for understanding what territories must
contend with after a conflict.
In short, when ethnic groups decide that conventional politics are no longer an acceptable
strategy, they must also decide how to wage their campaign of violent conflict with the state. In
doing so, they weigh two different factors. First, how easy will it be to achieve a stated goal, given
the constraints that the group faces. Second, if the group can be successful, will it be easier to govern
its territory independently or as an autonomous region within the state? The Ejército Zapatista de
Liberación Nacional (EZLN) is a leftist revolutionary group, but is primarily composed of local
indigenous Mexicans. Although it is located in the southernmost state of Mexico, Chiapas, the group
has never agitated for secession. Instead, it has pushed for autonomy from the federal government
and increased self-governance (Manaut, Selee & Arnson N.d., 141-142). Like the Biafrans, the group
is located far from the centers of state power, on Mexico’s border with Guatemala. However, unlike
the Eastern region in Nigeria, Chiapas lacks significant industry and economic power. Agriculture
is the main industry, and although there are sizable oil reserves (Collier 1994, Barreda 2001), the
territory lacks the necessary infrastructure to successfully exploit them (Rivas N.d.). Faced with
these constraints, the EZLN would have considerable difficulty funding the creation of a new state,
so the group’s choice to pursue autonomy within the Mexican state makes sense.
This logic is based on the assumption that ethnic groups have a connection to their traditional
settlement areas and that, if they decide to fight a territorial conflict (whether for autonomy or
secession), they will try to establish control over their settlement area. Ethnic homelands are special,
and not exchangeable with other similar pieces of territory, due to their importance in group myths
and identity; the possession and control of homelands can even be seen as essential to the group
members’ understanding of identity (Toft 2003, 20). Accordingly, when ethnic groups try to secede,
they attempt to take their traditional settlement areas with them. Similarly, groups which fight for
autonomy will try to win more political control inside of their territory within the larger state. For
instance, Syrian Kurds claim to fight for an autonomous region inside of Syria, and have made no
claims beyond traditionally Kurdish areas (Davies 2012, Barnard 2016). Groups seek to end up in
control of their ethnic homelands, so they can make judgments about which goal to pursue based on
how difficult they expect their territory to be to govern.
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While different geographic configurations of population and resources can make rebellion more
or less difficult, they can also make governing in the wake of successful rebellion easier or harder. If
secession and autonomy are both ways to increase the political power that a group wields, then rebels
must also consider how easy it will be to exercise that power after victory. The more geographically
dispersed a population, the more difficult it will be for former rebels to impose their authority. If an
ethnic group inhabits a sparsely populated region within the state, then it makes more sense to fight
for increased autonomy for this region because the distribution of population would make governing
independently more difficult.
Thus, groups face two geographic concerns when deciding whether to secede or seek increased
local autonomy: which strategy of rebellion will be more effective given their location, and whether
that location is suited to independent governance or requires some assistance from a central govern-
ment. Many factors can affect the answers to these two questions, but geography plays a large role.
Explaining group goals solely as a function of how difficult it is to challenge the state as Buhaug
(2006) and others do means that we are not considering the full range of circumstances that rebels
face. Whether a group can directly confront the state ignores the question of what happens after a
conflict.
If we assume that all groups want as much self-rule as possible, then we can think about how
differences in territory can lead to different utilities for increasing political control. The returns
to increased control will be monotonically increasing for groups which inhabit more governable
territories as the benefits of control will outweigh the costs of governance. Conversely, groups which
inhabit less governable territories may experience an increase in utility as their level of control
increases, followed by a decrease as the marginal cost of governance surpasses the marginal gain in
benefits from increased control. Groups whose territory falls into the latter category may be willing
to settle for increased regional autonomy while those in the former will push for secession and as
much control as possible.
Rebels want to be able to successfully govern in the wake of a civil war, and their beliefs about
how feasible this governance will be shape their decisions of which goal to pursue. Not all rebel
groups are identical, and not all societies are identical, so there are wide variations in how likely
groups are to be successful in governing after the conflict.
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We cannot directly measure the governability of territory. We can quantify and compare the
factors which we think matter for governability, but there is no way to explicitly measure this
latent concept. Instead, we must rely on the observable implications of territorial governability.
More governable territories should lead to more secessionist conflicts, so we need to see if groups
which live in areas that have attributes we think contribute to governability are more likely to
engage in secessionist conflict. If this correlation between the supposed geographic determinants of
governability and secessionist conflict holds, then we can be more confident in this theorized causal
relationship.
Existing efforts to measure governability as a concept have done so at the state level. Measures
like relative political capacity (RPC) (Kugler & Domke 1986, Arbetman & Kugler 1997, Kugler
& Tammen 2012) capture the effectiveness of a government more completely than GDP as they
include elements like black markets and informal economies. RPC includes three subcomponents
that measure the ability of governments to extract tax revenue, direct their citizens towards the
government’s ends, and efficiently allocate resources. Similarly, Hendrix (2010) combines multiple
indicators to estimate three latent dimensions to state capacity. Unfortunately, these measures cannot
be used to measure governability in this analysis because they do so at the state level and thus cannot
be used to explain the decisions of individual ethnic groups.
Further, they use institutional factors to measure the governance of a state, and my argument is
oriented around the governability of a hypothetical future state located within and ethnic group’s
territory. As these institutions do not exist before a successful independence campaign, it would
be impossible to use them to measure the governability of a potential state. Geography, however,
exists both before and after independence and is unlikely to change significantly in the interim. As
researchers this means we can observe geography before a successful secession campaign. Groups
themselves have more confidence in their knowledge of geography than potential future institutions,
as the latter have yet to exist, so the former may play a larger role in their decision-making processes.
The demographics of a territory can determine how easy it is for a rebel group to rule following
a civil war. If the group inhabits a territory where it is the clear majority, then secession would allow
it to control a nation-state that is in alignment with Gellner’s nationalist principle. However, a group
confronted with an ethnically diverse territory may choose to pursue autonomy for a number of
reasons. First, the coexistence between the groups in its territory may be easier if they are all excluded
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groups dominated by a distant majority. Second, if the group were to secede, the minorities in the new
state might be emboldened to demand greater concessions from the temporarily weak government in
the wake of independence, potentially precipitating further secessionist crises. Autonomy requires
less capacity to exercise, so the group would be better able to fend off challengers.
2.1.2.1 Internal Governability
While there is significant evidence of this positive relationship between population and conflict
onset, the connection between population and goals is less clear. The historical experiences of state
formation also suggest that population density plays a role in which goal a rebel group will choose.
Societies where people were concentrated in specific geographic areas were able to consolidate faster
and develop more robust institutions due to the lower cost of administering centralized populations.
Given that secession requires militarily successful rebels to create and run a state in their newly won
territory, ethnic groups with populations that live in close quarters may prefer this goal due to the
benefits this compact distribution will bring in implementing their post-conflict agenda.
Importantly, this moves beyond the traditional focus on population density as merely a catalyzing
factor in collective action (Daly 2012, Raleigh & Hegre 2009, Weidmann 2009, Zhukov 2012,
Braithwaite & Johnson 2011), which cannot predict which type of conflict is more likely. By
comparing population density across territories inhabited by potential rebel groups, we can get an
idea of how it influences the choice of goals. Groups whose settlement area is more densely populated
will have an easier time governing it, and groups whose territory is more sparsely populated will
have a harder time governing it.
The ethnic homogeneity of a group’s territory also plays a large role in how attractive secession
is. Groups who choose secession and inhabit relatively homogeneous regions will find governing in
the wake of victory easier, because there will be fewer excluded ethnic groups in the new state.1 The
only way an ethnic group can make its territory ethnically homogeneous is if “it either kills, expels,
or assimilates all non-nationals” (Gellner 1983). The more likely it is that a victorious group would
have to carry out ethnic cleansing and population transfers, or accommodate dissatisfied minorities
in their new state, the less likely they are to pursue secession.
1When there are a large number of other groups in an ethnic homeland, a secessionist victory could, ironically,
recreate the conditions of political exclusion that led to the initial conflict.
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The Partition of India displaced over 10 million people and killed at minimum several hundred
thousand (Talbot & Singh 2009), so rebel groups may choose not to pursue secession if doing
so might result in a similar outcome. While members of other groups may not feel welcome in
autonomous regions, they are not as threatening to the majority. They are not viewed with as much
concern as minorities in a state because they do not violate the ‘nationalist principle;’ the majority
group within that territory is already deprived of their own state, so individual members of different
groups represent a lesser transgression against nationalist sentiment. Having to govern territory with
significant minority populations will require more accommodation than less diverse areas.
Resources are also especially attractive to groups with secessionist aims rather than simply
desiring more autonomy. Seceding requires the creation of a new state, which is an expensive
process. Natural resource endowments can provide the funding necessary to kickstart this new state.
Such resources can also motivate secession due to a desire to profit from their exploitation. While
increased autonomy will increase the share of revenue a minority group receives from local resources,
secession will free them from revenue sharing altogether. When these resources are absent, autonomy
is a more feasible goal because it does not require as much capital as forming a new state, and
the government may still provide limited investment. Similarly, the returns from escaping revenue
sharing arrangements with the state will be smaller when a group’s territory contains fewer resources.
One of the most important factors affecting the governability of a given piece of territory is the
degree to which the government is able to impact the lives of its citizens. This concept has been
explored before at the state level with the idea of political penetration (Kugler & Tammen 2012).
However, these measures are insufficient for explaining the goals that a rebel group will pursue
because territorial groups are only interested in part of a state’s territory. Instead, we need a way to
measure the degree of government reach in any part of a state’s territory.
If we cannot directly measure political reach and penetration in a systematic, cross-national
manner, we can turn to the next best thing: how physically easy it is for agents of their government
to travel its territory. Just as physical inaccessibility hampers counterinsurgency efforts (Tollefsen &
Buhaug 2015), it can hinder government efforts to police and administer territory during peacetime.
If governments are unable to physically reach parts of their territory, or are only able to do so
exceedingly slowly, then they will face difficulties winning the support and cooperation of their
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populace. More accessible territory will be easier for the leaders of newly independent states to
govern.
When the population is physically difficult for agents of the state to reach, tax revenues will
be lower, and acceptance of government policies may be more difficult to obtain (Herbst 2000).
In extreme cases, people may not even be aware of changes in government policies. Similarly,
higher levels of transportation infrastructure reduce the cost economic activity in a number of
ways (Hansen 1965), making more revenues available for state-building purposes, thus making
independence more feasible.
While population magnitude and diversity, natural resources, and accessibility are all geographic
features of terrain that impact governability, I choose to focus on population in this dissertation. I
make this choice for several reasons. First, population is easily observable in a cross-national time-
series manner due to the availability of geospatial data. Many of the other elements of governability
discussed above have data that is cross-national or time-series, but not both. In subsequent chapters I
harness this variation to explore how governments respond to changes in governability and try to
shape governability to their own ends. Second, people are one of the most fundamental resources
that a government relies on to accomplish its policy objectives. While a small number of petrostates
are able to function with relatively small populations, they suffer from low levels of bureaucratic
capacity. Population is thus a more direct indicator of how governable a territory is than the resources
it may contain. Future work should pursue these other components of territorial governability and
develop a more comprehensive measure of the concept.
Given that I limit my analysis of the population based aspect of territorial governability, my
hypothesis for the relationship between governability and rebel groups goals is as follows:
Hypothesis 1a Groups whose territories are more populous are more likely to pursue secession
This hypothesis represents a test of my argument that when nascent rebel groups choose their
goals, their paths are shaped by the geographic determinants of governability in their territory.
However, there is a final geographic dimension of governability that I have not addressed yet: the
preexisting government. Where factors like population and resource endowments get at the internal
governability of territory, the influence of the state – embodied in the ubiquitous distance-from-
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the-capital measure – is an aspect of governability separate from the characteristics of the territory
itself.
2.1.2.2 Location, Location, Location
However, there is another geographic dimension of secession that I have not addressed yet: the
preexisting government. Where factors like population and resource endowments get at the internal
governability of territory, the ability of the state to project power into a group’s territory is an aspect
of governability separate from the characteristics of the territory itself.
The distance from the nexus of state power affects the governability of territory as something
outside of it. Assuming they are capable of resisting, governments are unlikely to tolerate an
alternative source of political authority so close to their own. Thus, it will be harder for successful
rebels to create a new territorial political entity close to the center of the previous one from which
they emerged. When separatist conflicts are fought far from the capital of a state, then victorious
rebels will be more successful in setting up a new state because their former masters in the original
state’s capital will be either too far away to effectively contest the new state’s authority, or will view
it as less of a direct challenge to their own authority. The farther from the centers of state power a
group is located, the harder it will be for the state to exert control there, and the easier it will be for
the group to uncontestedly govern and administer a new state.
Secession threatens “the integrity of the state itself” (Jenne 2007, 40), and so governments will be
more resolved to defeat these movements than those fighting for regional autonomy or policy change.
If groups are located closer to the capital, the government will be more able to impose costs on the
group due to this distance as the ability to project power declines with distance (Boulding 1962).
Accordingly, ethnic groups located more remotely should be more likely to fight a war of secession,
as they will be more protected from the state’s retaliation (Schutte 2015). Many studies have found
that secessionist conflicts are likely to start farther from the capital (Buhaug & Gates 2002, Buhaug
& Rød 2006, Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009), but have not investigated whether this distance can
have a conditioning effect on the influence of other geographic factors. If an ethnic group is located
extremely close to the capital and major economic centers of a state, trying to create a new state so
close to the capital would be impossible. The group would either have to conquer enough territory to
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reach to an international border with a neighboring state, or it would have to govern a state entirely
landlocked by the former host state.
It will be harder for successful rebels to create a new territorial political entity close to the center
of the previous one from which they emerged. When separatist conflicts are fought far from the
capital of a state, then victorious rebels will be more successful in setting up a new state because
their former masters in the original state’s capital will be either too far away to effectively contest the
new state’s authority, or will view it as less of a direct challenge to their own authority.
The farther from the centers of state power a group is located, the harder it will be for the state
to exert control there, and the easier it will be for the group to uncontestedly govern and administer
a new state. Given this reality, if creating a new state is at all feasible, groups will prefer to do
so. Choosing secession over autonomy allows groups to keep all the benefits of their territory’s
production, which they will prefer to do as the state will be unable to effectively challenge them.
While settling for autonomy requires sacrificing a degree of political control within a group’s
territory compared to secession, it will not arouse as much hostility from the government. Secession
is more achievable the farther from the sources of state power a group is located. However, actually
ruling this territory may be less feasible. In exceptionally remote locations, the effect of the
geographic determinants of governance will be larger, as the increasing remoteness of the state makes
secession more feasible.
Taken together, these observations suggest a conditional relationship where the effect of any
given factor on rebel goals is dependent on where the group is located in relation to the sources of
state power. Secession becomes more feasible the farther from the capital a group is located, so the
geographic dimensions of a territory’s governability should have a larger effect on a group’s choice of
goal farther from the capital. As groups are located farther from the capital, secession becomes more
attractive, so the marginal effect of territorial governability on the likelihood of a group choosing to
fight for secession will be higher:
Hypothesis 1b The marginal effect of territory’s governability on the probability of a group
fighting for secession increases as distance from the capital increases
The internal characteristics of a territory can make it more or less governable, and these differ-
ences in governability can lead rebel groups to pursue different goals as a result. When population is
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large and therefore favorable for governance, groups will be more likely to choose secession. When
it is smaller and less promising, they will choose autonomy. However, this relationship is conditional
on the location of the territory; when groups live far from the capital, a less governable territory will
be more attractive for secession due to the difficulties the state will face in stopping secession. A
distantly located group which inhabits a supremely ungovernable territory may still elect to seek
autonomy, but in most cases this distance will push the group towards secession.
These same forces operate dynamically once a conflict has begun. Groups are not locked into
pursuing their initial goal, and may alter them as conditions change. If their territory becomes more
densely populated or new resources are discovered, then groups may decide to pursue secession
because creating a new state has become more feasible. However, this analysis does not look beyond
the start of a conflict to explore how these dynamics unfold over time.
2.2 Data and Methods
I test my argument about the effect of territorial governability on rebel group goals on a sample of
all new ethnic territorial conflicts from 1990 to 2013. The population data begin in 1990 and the
geospatial ethnic group data end in 2013. Below I discuss these data sources in more detail.
2.2.1 Geospatial Data
In order to measure the territorial governability of different ethnic group territories, I draw on several
geospatial data sources. Each of the four components of territorial governability – population density,
population composition, natural resources, and accessibility – can be captured using spatial data
sources.
2.2.1.1 Ethnic Groups Territory
In order to measure the territorial governability of different ethnic group territories, I use the GeoEPR
(Wucherpfennig, Weidmann, Girardin, Cederman & Wimmer 2011) dataset, which is a geocoded
extension of the EPR data (Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Cederman, Hunziker & Girardin 2015). Each
ethnic group with a defined territorial settlement pattern has a polygon in the GeoEPR data.2 To
2The exclusion of groups without defined geographic settlement patterns does not bias my analysis because
the proposed causal mechanism could not function for geographically dispersed or nomadic groups.
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facilitate studying civil wars in which ethnic groups rebel against central governments, I use the least
aggregated level of observation, which splits ethnic groups along state borders. For example, the
GeoEPR data have polygons for Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, so each of these group-state dyads
are a separate entry in the data. I use territory-years because population varies yearly, as do many
control variables.
Although this sample necessarily involves omitting potential non-ethnic conflicts from my study,
there is significant evidence that the ascriptive nature of ethnic identity channels political grievances
in a more effective manner than other identities such as class or ideology (Cederman, Buhaug &
Gleditsch 2013) and lowers barriers to collective action (Lichbach 1995), so focusing on ethnic
conflicts is appropriate because they are likely to follow qualitatively different causal pathways than
non-ethnic ones. Empirically, secession is almost purely an ethnic phenomenon, so focusing on
ethnic groups allows me to uncover the effects of territorial governability on government preemption
efforts. I exclude groups with a monopoly on political power, because by definition they are in power
and thus will not attempt to secede without first losing political power.3
2.2.1.2 Population
To measure the population of a group’s territory, I rely on the Gridded Population of the World (GPW)
data. These data have been collected by NASA’s Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center
(Center for International Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia University; United
Nations Food and Agriculture Programme - FAO; Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical -
CIAT 2005, Center for International Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia
University 2015). The data contain quinquennial estimates of population density for the entire
world at the 30 arcsecond level, which is approximately 1km2 at the equator.4 For each territory,
I follow the ‘cookie cutter’ approach (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009, Cederman, Weidmann &
Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann 2015) of using the territory polygon to capture all
3I keep groups whose political power is dominant or who are senior partners in a government, because these
powerful groups may still rebel if they have recently had their political power downgraded (Cederman,
Wimmer & Min 2010). Monopoly groups are excluded because by definition as the top category they cannot
rebel.
4The farther from the equator, the greater the distortion in latitude.
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values of all nightlights cells that fall within the group’s territory, accounting for overlapping group
polygons when necessary.5.
As these data are only available in five year intervals, I linearly interpolate the data for the
intervening years. While a rather blunt method of imputation, there are two main reasons that
this approach is appropriate. First, measuring population on a yearly time scale already involves
significantly loss of accuracy. Second, a parametric imputation approach that uses variables observed
in all years would either only be able to use country level variables, or would require the collection of
significant amount of data at the subnational level, which is prohibitively time consuming. In either
case, such an approach is unlikely to improve sufficiently over linear interpolation to justify the time
and effort.
2.2.2 Model
There are numerous potential strategies that can be used to analyze the relationship between territorial
governability and initial rebel group goal. The simplest would be to estimate a logistic regression
of goal choice as a function of territorial governability and a set of control variables. However, this
approach risks producing biased inferences because it represents a type of selection bias due to
omitting groups which do not turn to violence (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 129-136). A better
approach is to include the lack of violent conflict as a possible outcome in the model. As there is no
natural ordering of the set of outcomes {nonviolence, secession, autonomy}6, multinomial logistic
regression is the best way to estimate these relationships (McFadden 1984).
Unfortunately, multinomial logistic regression is subject to the independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption, which states that the odds of one alternative over another are inde-
pendent of the presence or absence of any other irrelevant alternatives (Arrow 1963, 26-28). Given
the potential costs and gains associated with militarily confronting the state, nonviolence cannot be
treated as an irrelevant alternative to secession and autonomy.
To deal with this violation of the IIA assumption, I employ a nested logit model (McFadden 1978),
which is akin to a selection model (Heckman 1979) but is used when all outcomes are discrete.
5See Section A.2 for a discussion of this process.
6I use the term nonviolence instead of status quo because there are a multitude of ways that self-determination
groups can work for change without employing violence against the state(Chenoweth & Stephan 2011,
Cunningham, Dahl & Frugé April 1,3 2017), and status quo implies an acceptance of the current conditions.
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Nested logistic regression is appropriate when clusters of alternatives are likely to share unobserved
attributes (Fischer & Aufhauser 1988), and can be thought of as analogous to multilevel models which
account for dependence caused by unobserved factors at the group level (Gelman & Hill 2007). As
secession and autonomy-seeking civil wars are both forms of violent conflict, they are likely to share
several unobserved attributes. The structure of a nested logit can absorb much of this dependence,
freeing me from the need to try and include every relevant variable they have in common, leading to
a more parsimonious and interpretable model (Achen 2002).
A further advantage of the nested logit model for my analysis is the ability to include different
predictors across choice sets, and for the decision between choice sets. This allows me to use
variables such as horizontal inequality (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Buhaug
& Gleditsch 2013) and demographic balance (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009) to explain the decision
to engage in violent conflict or not, and then, conditional on a group turning to violence, the effect of
territorial governability on the choice between secession and autonomy.
Equation 2.1 presents the general form of the nested logit model, where i indexes observations,
j indexes alternatives, and m indexes the choice sets that alternatives are nested under. The vectors y
and c denote the alternatives chosen by each observation, and the choice sets that they fall within.
The matrices Z and X represent the predictors that determine which choice set an observation falls
into, and the choice of alternatives within that choice set, respectively. The model can have different
predictors Zm within different nests m, but as written below, it uses the same predictors within each
nest. Iim is called the inclusive value and represents the expected utility for all alternatives within
choice set m. The parameter λm is approximately equal to 1 - the correlation between observations







Figure 2.1: Generalized Nested Logit Model
yi ∼ categorical(πij|m) (2.1)






exp(ηim + λm + Iim)∑M









δijm = γzi (2.6)
ηim = βxi (2.7)
λm ∈ [0, 1] (2.8)
Figure 2.1 presents a graphical representation of the nested logit model. Although this structure
appears sequential, the nested logit model is not a sequential model. Instead, a nested logit relaxes
the IIA assumption embedded in multinomial logistic regression. IIA holds within choice sets, but
not between, as discussed above.
As there are only three outcomes that I am interested in, I reduce the generalized nested logit in
equations 2.1-2.8 to a simplified version with one choice set containing the alternatives {secession,
autonomy} and a degenerate choice set containing only the alternative {nonviolence}. This modeling
choice means that because violence is the omitted category in the upper logit, the coefficients on the





Figure 2.2: Rebel Group Goal Nested Logit
Figure 2.2 presents the graphical representation of this simplified nested logit that I use to model the
choice of rebel group goal.7
2.3 Results
Due to missingness in the explanatory and control variables, I multiply impute the missing data.8 I
generate five imputed datasets, run four chains on each and perform inference on all 20 chains pooled
together, averaging over the uncertainty in different imputed values (Little & Rubin 2002, 217-218).9
I run each chain for 2,500 warmup iterations followed by 2,500 sampling iterations. All inference is
based on the sampling iterations. Standard diagnostics indicate good convergence of the chains.10
Table 2.1 presents the results from Model 1. Estimates in the goal columns represent the effect of
a predictor on the log-odds of choosing secession over autonomy, conditional on selecting violence.
Estimates in the onset columns indicate the effect of predictors on the log-odds of a group remaining
nonviolent instead of pursuing a conflictual strategy.
Very few parameters are likely to be different from 0. The credible interval for almost all
parameters contains zero, which means that there is less than .95 probability that the parameter value
is not zero. Inspection of the marginal effect of territorial governability components on group goal in
Figure 2.3 reveals a similar lack of meaningful results.
7A full mathematical presentation of this simplified nested logit model is available in Section A.4.
8See Section A.1 for a full discussion of missing data and imputation procedures.
9For a full discussion of the estimation procedure, see Section A.5.





[−0.70; 0.71] [−0.42; 0.31]
Capital Distance 0.81∗ 0.07
[0.01; 1.79] [−0.36; 0.54]
Population × Capital Distance −0.22
[−0.58; 0.07]
Area −0.73 −0.27














[−38.56; 0.39] [−0.36; 15.19]
Polynomial Time X X
Observations 11529
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table 2.1: Nested logit results for the onset and choice of goal in territorial civil conflict. Onset
coefficients represent the effect of a variable on a group remaining peaceful. Goal coefficients
represent the effect of a variable on a group fighting for secession over autonomy, conditional on
choosing violence.
However, it is possible that this lack of evidence for a relationship is due to measurement or
specification error. The following sections present results from models using alternative measures of
both governability and rebel group goals, as well as models from different specifications
2.3.1 Alternative Governability Measure
One possible explanation for these null results could be that the dispersion of a population matters
more than the magnitude for territorial governability. While I include the area of ethnic group
territory to try to control for this potential relationship, I also test it more directly by reestimating















Figure 2.3: Marginal effects of population on rebel group goal.
Gini index of population for each group’s territory.11 This index captures how unequally population
is distributed on average, meaning that group’s with a higher population Gini have more of their
population concentrated in smaller geographic areas like cities. In contrast, a group with a low
population Gini would feature people relatively evenly dispersed across its territory with no major
population centers.
Table 2.2 presents the results from Model 2, which uses population concentration instead of
magnitude as a measure of territorial governability. Estimates in the goal columns represent the
effect of a predictor on the log-odds of choosing secession over autonomy, conditional on selecting
violence. Estimates in the onset columns indicate the effect of predictors on the log-odds of a group
remaining nonviolent instead of pursuing a conflictual strategy.
Very few parameters are likely to be different from 0. The credible interval for almost all
parameters contains zero, which means that there is less than .95 probability that the parameter value
is not zero. Inspection of the marginal effect of territorial governability components on group goal in
Figure 2.4 reveals a similar lack of meaningful results.
11See Section A.2.1 for how this measure is calculated and why it is the best way to measure population




Population Gini −0.01 −0.04
[−0.71; 0.56] [−0.41; 0.24]
Capital Distance 0.59 −0.01
[−0.01; 1.61] [−0.40; 0.50]
Population Gini × Capital Distance −0.10
[−0.40; 0.14]
Area −0.53 −0.16














[−36.60; 0.40] [−0.29; 16.28]
Polynomial Time X X
Observations 11529
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table 2.2: Nested logit results for the onset and choice of goal in territorial civil conflict. Onset
coefficients represent the effect of a variable on a group remaining peaceful. Goal coefficients
represent the effect of a variable on a group fighting for secession over autonomy, conditional on
choosing violence.
2.3.2 Alternative Response Variable Coding
It is possible that the lack of evidence of a relationship between territorial governability and group
goals is due to measurement error in the data collection process for the response variable. To
allay these concerns, I reestimate the models above using data from the FORGE (Braithwaite &
Cunningham 2019) dataset instead of my coding of rebel group goals. The data contain many
potential goals that groups can fight for, including territorial autonomy and independence, which I
use as a replacement for my coding of these goals.
Results in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.5 are similarly null to those in Table 2.1, with slightly less
uncertainty at extreme large distances from the capital (the 95% credible interval ranges from -0.5 to 1






























Figure 2.5: Marginal effect of population on rebel group goal using FORCE coding of rebel group
goals.
between territorial governability and rebel group goals in territorial conflict is less likely to be due to
measurement error in my data collection process.
I also estimate a multinomial logistic regression model using my coding of rebel group goals
which fails to find a significant relationship between territorial governability and rebel group goal as
well.12 This consistent lack of evidence for a relationship between territorial governability and rebel





[−0.94; 0.51] [−0.59; 0.16]
Capital Distance 0.05 −0.29
[−0.41; 1.00] [−0.63; 0.15]
Population × Capital Distance −0.22∗
[−0.58; −0.01]
Area −0.67 −0.18














[−33.10; 0.09] [−0.35; 15.03]
Polynomial Time X X
Observations 11529
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table 2.3: Nested logit results for the onset and choice of goal in territorial civil conflict. Onset
coefficients represent the effect of a variable on a group remaining peaceful. Goal coefficients
represent the effect of a variable on a group fighting for secession over autonomy, conditional on
choosing violence.
goals is puzzling considering the consistent relationship between population, capital distance, and
conflict onset in the literature.
2.3.3 Predictive Accuracy
Notions of statistical significance (whether frequentist or Bayesian), are not the sole metric by
which to evaluate models. Predictive accuracy can be used to assess how well a predictor captures a
given phenomenon when it does not reach conventional threshold of statistical significance. Before
assessing the predictive power of individual features, it is standard practice to evaluate the predictive
accuracy of the model as a whole. Diagnostic tools such as Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve plots (Bradley 1997) and separation plots (Greenhill, Ward & Sacks 2011) can be
useful in this process, they are best-suited to binary rather than categorical outcomes. In multiclass
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classification problems, a confusion matrix is often the most useful tool for assessing model fit
(Townsend 1971, Ting 2017). Table 2.4 presents a confusion matrix constructed from predictions






















d Nonviolence 11,384 25 87
Autonomy 7 5 2
Secession 11 5 3
Table 2.4: Confusion matrix of actual and predicted outcomes.
The positive predictive value (PPV) for nonviolence is 0.99 while the PPV for autonomy
and secession are 0.36 and 0.16, respectively. In other words, 99% of the predicted instances of
nonviolence are actual nonviolence, while only 36% of the predicted instances of autonomy are
actually autonomy and 16% of the predicted instances of secession are actual secession. The high
PPV for nonviolence is unsurprising given that it is the modal outcome, but this is also unimpressive
as it is barely distinguishable from a model that simply picks the modal category for every observation.
The predictive accuracy of Model 1 is especially low for the outcomes of interest. Within the subset
of violent outcomes, Model 1 performs worse than flipping a coin, but focusing on the bottom right
cells of Table 2.4 obscures the extent of the problem. Of the 127 instances of actual violence in the
data only 15 are correctly predicted to be some form of violence (autonomy or secession), while 112
are incorrectly predicted to be nonviolence. Model 1 thus predicts only 12% of violence correctly.
While predicting conflict onset is a notably difficult task (Kennedy 2015, Colaresi & Mahmood
2017, Cederman & Weidmann 2017, Hegre et al. 2019), these results are particularly bad. The
lack of robust relationships for the key explanatory variables combined with the abysmal predictive
performance suggests that the model simply does not fit the data well.
While absence of evidence is not evidence of the absence of a relationship between territorial
governability and rebel goals, there are multiple potential possible explanations for this lack of evi-
dence. Measurement and specification error are unlikely due to the multiple measures of population,
rebel goals, and alternative models employed. Another possibility is case selection bias, but by
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including all territorially based ethnic groups, I have attempted to capture all groups relevant to
the causal mechanism of territorial governability and nationalist self-determination demands. I am
limited to the post-Cold War period by data availability and this may influence the findings, but
cross-national high resolution data on population are only available beginning in 1990. To try and
bypass this limitation, Chapter 4 explores how changes in territorial governability affect rebel goals
while Chapter 5 uses multiple qualitative case studies, all of which begin before 1990, to examine
how territorial governability, rebel ambitions, and government preemption are related.
2.4 Conclusion
Given that measurement and specification errors are likely not at fault, these null findings could
be evidence of a flawed theory. However, given the body of knowledge assembled by conflict
researchers, this seems unlikely. How can factors such as group population, remoteness from the
state, and lost political autonomy that have robust and well known effects on the onset of conflict, but
have no bearing on the goals these conflicts are fought for? Furthermore, anecdotal evidence provided
by quotations from rebel leaders suggests that there is some relationship between the governability of
a territory and the goals that a group will fight for.
One potential explanation for this lack of evidence is that the stochastic component of the
relationship overwhelms the deterministic component in explanatory importance. If “war is in the
error term” (Gartzke 1999) and difficult to predict even a posteriori, then it logically follows that the
goals groups fight for in these conflicts could be equally difficult to predict. This framing shifts the
area of inquiry from how rebels choose the goals to fight for in territorial civil wars, to why these
conflicts are so difficult to predict.
Thus far I have referred to the state as merely something that inconveniences potential rebels by
reacting to their secessionist aspirations. By introducing agency to the state in this causal story, we can
begin to answer the question of why we cannot observe a relationship between territorial governability
and group goals. More importantly, by investigating how states work to prevent secessionist conflict,
we can gain further insights into the relationship between territorial governability and goals in civil
war.
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CHAPTER 3: THE CURSE OF GEOGRAPHY
The Nigerian military maintains a significant presence in the petroleum rich Niger Delta region.
While the threat of secession is significantly lower than it was during the height of the Ogoni
self-determination movement in the 1990s or the Nigerian Civil war in the 1960s, the government
is apparently still worried given the frequency of military operations against rebels in the region
(Walker 2009, BBC 2016, Owolabi 2017). This concern is not misplaced; loss of the oil revenues
generated by the Niger Delta would severely hinder the government’s ability to meet its obligations,
and militant attacks on oil facilities (Uguru & Faul 2016) have led to up to 30% reductions in
production (The Economist 2016). Regular military exercises anger local residents who say that the
government should “change its military approach” and “address the developmental challenges facing
the region,” instead (Akwagyiram 2017).
At first glance, this belligerence may seem puzzling. Gone are the demands for secession and
independence of the Biafrans; in their place, Ijaw groups call for “federalism and self-determination”
(Opejobi 2017). Why the heavy hand if separatism is less of a concern today? One possibility is that
the government is unwilling to tolerate the income loss a revenue sharing agreement would entail.
Another is that the region’s petroleum reserves are so valuable that the government is not willing to
risk any chance of losing them to a successful secessionist movement.
In fact, acquiescing to the region’s demands for development could make secession more likely.
Modern nation-states are territorial political entities, defined by their borders with other sovereign
states, and encompassing the territory within those borders. As such, the administrative competence
and institutional capacity of a group is only part of the equation for how difficult governing will be
after achieving independence. The other is how burdensome it will be to govern and control the
specific territory that a group will control.
The governability of a territory can be influenced by numerous geographic factors such as the
location and abundance of natural resources, ease of accessibility, and quality of infrastructure.
Similarly, the human geography of a territory can determine how governable it is for a specific group.
Are people clustered in dense urban populations, making the administration of the territory easier?
Are there numerous other ethnic groups in a territory that may be unwilling to submit to majority
rule by the self-determination group?
Improving infrastructure, paving roads, and expanding electrification would all decrease the
difficulty of governing the Niger Delta if it were an independent state. While developing the Niger
Delta might satisfy activists in the short-term, the improvements to the region could decrease the
difficulty of governing it sufficiently that they may decide independence is a feasible goal. Investing
without addressing local grievances, the flow of oil revenues from the Delta to Abuja, could raise
raise the risk of secession by reducing the amount of post-independence state-building required while
not removing the desire to escape the state’s control.
If geography influences a region’s suitability for independent governance, and thus likelihood of
secession, then this gives states a powerful source of information they can use to head off potential
secessionist movements. If an excluded ethnic group inhabits territory that is particularly well suited
to sovereign governance, and therefore secession, then the state may take pains to discourage the
group from considering secession by increasing their coercive capacity within the group’s territory.
This attention will manifest as increased levels of state capacity relative to less governable areas.
Yet secession is a strategic process and Chapter 2 has largely ignored the role the state plays in
this dyadic phenomenon. Unsurprisingly, states are not content to sit idly by and let groups try to
secede with swathes of their territory. The decisions states make in the face of this dilemma can
explain why we do not observe more secessionist conflict given the plethora of aggrieved minority
groups, and why governments often appear to prefer dealing with low level violence to meeting
groups’ demands for regional development.
Understanding when governments will choose appeasement instead of preemption is beyond the
scope of this project, but one plausible explanation is that more politically excluded groups are less
likely to be appeased because they are less important for governments to maintain winning coalitions.
Regime type could also constrain the government’s choice of strategy with coercive preemption less
palatable to a larger electorate.
It is important to conceptually disaggregate state capacity for this argument. State capacity
entails both ensuring a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Weber 1965, Tilly 1985, Olson 1993)
and maintaining political institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001). Improving a region’s
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infrastructure could increase the attractiveness of secession by providing more tools for a hypothetical
future state. Conversely, increasing the policing and surveillance capabilities in a region deters
secession by increasing the costs of militarily challenging the state. Grievances are related but
orthogonal, as public goods provision may decrease grievances if they are driven by disparate
outcomes but may do little alleviate them when they arise from political exclusion.
The puzzling consistent lack of evidence for a relationship between governability an goals in
Chapter 2 becomes less puzzling when we take a step up the causal chain. Secessionist conflicts often
begin in places abundant with resources located far from the centers of state power. These factors
affect the likelihood of secessionist conflict because dissidents will only rebel when they expect to be
able to form a functional state within the borders of their territory following independence. Given the
large geographic component of governability, governments use this information to target the groups
most likely to secede for preemption efforts. In effect, attempting to find a relationship between
governability and goals will end in failure because doing so ignores the effect of government on this
relationship.
To test this argument, this chapter proceeds as follows. I argue that states are aware of the
role of territorial governability in secession and use their knowledge of different territories within
their borders to identify the most likely candidates for secession and proactively work prevent
such movements from emerging. I conduct a cross-national test of this argument using geospatial
data to measure both governability and local state capacity. Results indicate that governable areas
geographically far from the center have elevated levels of state capacity compared to similar areas
located closer to the capital. This pattern suggests that governments are deliberately cultivating a
presence in these areas despite the cost of doing so. I close by discussing how this strategy can
explain many of the patterns we observe in civil conflict throughout the world.
3.1 Keeping a lid on it
Secessionist conflicts are mostly likely when marginalized ethnic minorities who suffer from discrim-
ination at the hands of the state (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010) are located far from the capital
(Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009). Secessionist conflicts are almost purely an ethnic phenomenon as
ethnicity can more easily whip up the nationalist fervor such efforts require than other identities such
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as class or religion (Cederman, Buhaug & Gleditsch 2013). The empirical distribution of the location
of excluded minority groups suggests that we should observe more secessionist conflicts than we
do. Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of the distance from ethnic group to the capital, divided by
political status. Excluded groups are much more represented in the right side of the distribution.
Despite the frequency of excluded groups located far from the capital, the prevalence of secessionist
conflict is relatively low.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of the distance from ethnic group territories to the national capital (log-
transformed and standardized) by group political status in 2013.
This pattern is only puzzling if we think that the process of secession stops as soon as the
government concedes and allows the group to leave with some of its territory. While victory on the
battlefield may signal the end of a secessionist movement, it is just the beginning of a new state, and
the two entities share a leadership. The following section explores the challenges of state-building,
and provides insight into why some groups may be unwilling to engage in secessionist civil war.
The shortage of secessionist conflicts may mean that governments preemptively stop conflicts
from occurring in the areas most prone to secession. If this is the case, we should observe governments
paying extra attention to these regions and developing their coercive capacity to prevent unrest from
escalating into armed conflict. This strategy can be carried out by either providing elevated levels of
public goods such as medical clinics or government jobs, or by increasing the repressive capacity of
the state, as China has done in Xinjiang recently.
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Armed with the information that ethnic groups that attempt to secede will try to take their
homelands with them (Toft 2003), governments can act decisively to prevent large-scale secessionist
violence. The actions of China in Xinjiang in the second decade of the 21st Century provide an
illustration of how this process can play out. After riots between Muslim Uyghurs and Han Chinese in
the city of Urumqi killed almost 200 people in 2009 (Wong 2009), the Chinese government executed
nine people it claimed were responsible for the violence (Demick 2009). However, this was just the
beginning of the government’s response. As a first step, Xinjiang’s “security forces doubled between
2009 and 2011 to more than 11,000 people” (Coca 2018). The government advertised over 84,000
security positions in the space of one year between 2016 ans 2017, indicating a continuing increase
in security force presence (Gan 2017). The government has built “convenience police stations” at
major intersections in cities throughout Xinjiang, which allow police officers to more easily monitor
people (Wen 2017).
In addition to the increased presence of security forces, China has initiated a massive surveillance
operation in the region. Cameras on streetlights utilize facial recognition technology to track the
movement of people throughout the region (Millward 2018), and in Urumqi, people must use
their government IDs and submit to a facial recognition scan to buy gasoline (Chin, Bürge &
Marchi 2017). Government databases are so comprehensive that the system can alert authorities
if someone wanders more than 300 meters from their home or workplace (Phillips 2018). The
government has deployed this immense security apparatus to identify potential dissidents, and UN
human right experts believe that potentially up to a million Uyghurs have been detained in reeducation
camps (Cumming-Bruce 2018).
Why has China dedicated so much money and human capital to a remote and underdeveloped
region? While Xinjiang has never experienced a widespread armed secessionist movement, there are
long-simmering desires for self-determination in the region (Bovingdon 2010). The East Turkestan
Islamic Movement has demanded independence for Xinjiang’s Uyghur population since the 1990s
(Gunaratna, Acharya & Wang 2010, 47-88). Given these tensions, the Chinese government has
decided that the risks of full scale secessionist conflict justify the expense of the surveillance effort
and “indoctrination campaign, which aims to eradicate . . . any yearning for an independent Uighur
homeland” (Buckley 2018). This effort is part of a shift in policy towards ethnic minorities from a
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soviet style model that accommodates minority rights to one based on “assimilation” of groups into a
single Chinese identity (Elliott 2015).
Xinjiang has all the makings of a potential secessionist conflict. It has a relatively large population
for its location and is situated far from the centers of state power in Beijing. The story of Xinjiang may
be replicated elsewhere and be responsible for why we do not observe more secessionist conflicts.
When the population is physically difficult for agents of the state to reach, tax revenues will
be lower, and acceptance of government policies may be more difficult to obtain (Herbst 2000). In
extreme cases, people may not even be aware of changes in government policies. Developing state
capacity in physically remote areas is a costly process, and so when governments do so, it is likely
the result of a strategic decision where the costs of administering and monitoring this remote territory
are worth paying to deter potential secessionists.
The more governable a territory is, and the farther from the reaches of the state it is located, the
more suited to secession it will be. The effect of governability is conditional on distance from the
existing state’s centers of power because newly independent states located near the previous host
state will face significant harassment. We should see an increase in government attention devoted to
a group’s territory as it becomes more governable and farther from the state.
Lacina (2015) argues that secession is less likely in areas where the government is willing to
pay high costs to defend its territory. She operationalizes this theory by assuming that governments
will fight hard to defend territory occupied by the dominant ethnic group, so groups whose territory
overlaps the dominant group’s will be deterred from launching a secessionist campaign, and finds
support for this prediction among excluded groups (Lacina 2015, 701-703). I extend her logic to
argue that governments are also more willing to fight for valuable territory, and work to actively
deter separatist claims within that territory. I also provide a more direct test of the mechanism of this
deterrence by focusing on how governments develop their capacity in these secession prone regions.
While this theoretical argument depends on myriad factors that contribute to territorial gov-
ernability and encompasses many different aspects of state power that the government can use to
preempt secessionist movements, empirically testing it necessarily entails a degree of simplification.
Testing it in a cross-national manner over multiple years requires a larger degree to simplification.
For the purposes of this manuscript, I limit my analysis to the broadest possible implications to
facilitate the inclusion of as many cases as possible. This distillation leads to my hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2 The effect of territorial governability on state investment should be positive and
increasing in distance from the capital
In the following section I discuss my operationalization of governability and present the statistical
test of my argument using cross national geospatial data.
3.2 Data and Methods
I test my argument that governments work to deter secession in the most high risk areas on a sample
of all ethnic group territories from 1990 to 2013 due to the role of ethnic identity in this type of
conflict. My unit of analysis is the ethnic group, so my universe of cases is all ethnic groups that
have defined territories between these dates. Recent work on civil war onset has focused on ethnic
groups because the shared identity of an ethnicity can channel grievances in a manner that overcomes
barriers to collective action (Cederman, Buhaug & Gleditsch 2013). Since many ethnic groups have
defined settlement areas, they also have a natural homeland to create a new state in, should they
decide to secede (Toft 2003). If a group wishes to secede, it needs “a potential independent nation”
with a territory that could serve as a “national homeland” (Orridge 1982, 46), which allows me to
make comparisons across ethnic group settlement areas.
Governments cannot rely on geographic information as strongly when trying to prevent center-
seeking governmental conflict because the qualities of the territory that a group inhabits are less
relevant when their goal is to overthrow the government and capture the entire state. Focusing on
territorial conflicts allows me to make meaningful comparisons across different areas because groups
are fighting for their specific territories. While the territory that a group controls at the start of a
governmental conflict might shape the dynamics of the conflict, that territory is not the end goal of
the conflict.
I use geospatial data on population to measure the governability of each ethnic group’s specific
territory, which reflects the human resources that a group can draw on. Ethnic separatist desires are
much more likely to escalate to a secessionist crisis when the group’s population is larger relative to
the rest of the state’s population (Roeder 2007, 259-289), so population is a major component of
a territory’s governability. More populous territories are more governable because the people who
50
inhabit them represent a source of capital via taxation, and labor for achieving the new government’s
ends.
The effect of population is moderated by the territory’s distance from the capital because seces-
sion is infeasible if the new state is located right next to the previous state’s centers of power. States
do not take secession lightly, and any new state would have to contend with constant interference
from its previous host. As such, the effect of population on risk of secession should be stronger as
distance from the capital increases.
By maintaining a large military presence in an excluded group’s territory, the state may be
able to deter a secessionist uprising. Similarly, the government can forcibly relocate populations to
less governable areas, as the Soviet Union frequently did in the mid 20th Century. Governments
can also encourage members of dominant ethnic groups to migrate to secession-prone remote
territories inhabited by minorities, like the Javanese migration to Aceh. I use the fact that nighttime
light emissions correlate strongly with government activity to conduct a cross national test of this
hypothesis. If governments are indeed trying to make secession too costly, then more governable
territory should also have higher levels of nightlights.
3.2.1 Universe of cases
In order to measure the territorial governability of different ethnic group territories, I draw on
geospatial data. I use the GeoEPR (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011) dataset, which is a geocoded
extension of the EPR data (Vogt et al. 2015). Each ethnic group with a defined territorial settlement
pattern has a polygon in the GeoEPR data. As I am interested in preemption of secessionist conflict,
I use the least aggregated level of observation, which splits ethnic groups along state borders. For
example, the GeoEPR data have polygons for Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, so each of these
group-state dyads are a separate entry in the data. I use territory-years because population and
nightlights vary yearly, as do many control variables.
Although this sample necessarily involves omitting potential non-ethnic conflicts from my study,
there is significant evidence that the ascriptive nature of ethnic identity channels political grievances
in a more effective manner than other identities such as class or ideology (Cederman, Buhaug &
Gleditsch 2013) and lowers barriers to collective action (Lichbach 1995), so focusing on ethnic
conflicts is appropriate because they are likely to follow qualitatively different causal pathways than
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non-ethnic ones. Empirically, secession is almost purely an ethnic phenomenon, so focusing on
ethnic groups allows me to uncover the effects of territorial governability on government preemption
efforts. I exclude groups with a monopoly on political power, because by definition they are in power
and are not worried about themselves seceding.1 While governments may not deploy extensive
surveillance infrastructure against politically powerful groups, they may still provide them with
elevated levels of public goods if they are located in areas prone to secession.
The more governable a territory is, and the farther from the reaches of the state it is located,
the more suited to secession it will be. More populous territories are more governable because the
people who inhabit them represent a source of capital via taxation, and labor for achieving the new
government’s ends. The effect of population is conditional on distance from the existing state’s
centers of power because newly independent states located near the previous host state will face
significant harassment. We should see an increase in the level of nightlights in a group’s territory as
it becomes more populous and farther from the state.
3.2.2 Government attention
One of the most important factors affecting the governability of a given piece of territory is the degree
to which the government is able to impact the lives of its citizens. This concept has been explored
before at the state level with the idea of political penetration (Kugler & Tammen 2012). However,
these measures are insufficient for explaining the goals that a rebel group will pursue because
territorial groups are only interested in part of a state’s territory. Instead, we require subnational data
to measure the degree of government reach into specific ethnic group territories.
To accomplish this, I data on use nighttime light emissions. While nightlights are a reliable
proxy for economic activity in a given area (Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann 2015, Kuhn &
Weidmann 2015, Weidmann & Schutte 2016), they are also an indicator for state capacity in an area.
Electrification is often a tool used by the government in developing states to extend their reach into
rural areas (Kale 2014). Similarly, nighttime lights correlate with tax revenue and state capacity at the
municipal level (Harbers 2014), as well as the number of government employees or medical clinics
1I keep groups whose political power is dominant or who are senior partners in a government, because these
powerful groups may still rebel if they have recently had their political power downgraded (Cederman,
Wimmer & Min 2010). Monopoly groups are excluded because as the top category, they cannot have been
recently downgraded.
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in a district (Koren & Sarbahi Forthcoming). Nightlights are a globally available method to measure
government activity, which means they can be used even for countries with poor or nonexistent data
(Chen & Nordhaus 2011), which are also the countries most at risk for civil conflict. Further, they
are largely immune to government incentives to misrepresent economic statistics. The higher the
capacity of a state in a given territory, the more nighttime light will be observable.
If nightlights are a proxy for state capacity, then they can also indicate the degree of attention
that a government invests in a specific region. Figure 3.2 shows how China’s investment in Xinjiang
is visible as relatively bright nighttime light emissions despite its comparatively low levels of
population.
(a) Population (b) Nightlights
Figure 3.2: China in 2013. Panel (a) displays (log) population and Panel (b) displays nightlights. The
gray dashed line denotes the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, while Beijing is represented by
the blue diamond.
The specific dataset that I use to measure nighttime light emissions is the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP) Operational Linescan System (OLS) (Elvidge, Erwin, Baugh, Ziskin,
Tuttle, Ghosh & Sutton 2009), which measures average light emissions over the course of a year at
30 arc-second grid cells (approximately 1km × 1km at the equator). For each territory, I follow the
‘cookie cutter’ approach (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009, Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch 2011,
Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann 2015) of using the territory polygon to capture all values of all
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nightlights cells that fall within the group’s territory, accounting for overlapping group polygons
when necessary.2.
3.2.3 Territorial governability
As in Chapter 2, I use the population of an ethnic group’s territory to measure its governability. I
likewise use the geographic concentration of this population as an alternative measure of governability
to address concerns about total population as a measure of governability.
3.2.4 Capital distance
As in Chapter 2, the remaining spatial measure, which conditions the effect of population, is the
distance from a group’s territory to the capital and is obtained from the CShapes dataset (Weidmann,
Kuse & Gleditsch 2010) on the geography of states which provides the geographic location of capitals
for all major states from 1945 to the present. Combining these data with ethnic group locations from
EPR allows me to measure the distance between the centroid of a group’s territory and the capital.
3.2.5 Control variables
In order to account for other important causal forces, I include a number of non-spatial control vari-
ables, which I refer to as political controls. Many of these capture aspects of a group’s organizational
structure or capabilities. Politically excluded groups are more likely to be shut out from public goods
(Cederman, Buhaug & Gleditsch 2013), so I code a group as excluded from political power if their
political status is ‘state collapse,’ ‘self-exclusion,’ ‘discriminated,’ or ‘powerless’ according to EPR.
I also include a measure of whether a group has lost autonomy in the past five years because these
group are the most likely to start a secessionist conflict (Siroky & Cuffe 2015), and thus the most
likely to receive elevated state attention.
I also include a number of regime based controls to reflect the fact that groups do not make
these decisions in a vacuum. Factors such as regime type and age (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2014),
monetary resources, and military capability (Singer 1988) all influence the government’s ability and
willingness to inflict costs on rebels if they choose the more extreme goal of secession. To account for
2See the Section B.3 for a discussion of this process.
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these effects, I include measures of polyarchy from V-Dem (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning,
Teorell, Altman, Andersson, Bernhard, Fish & Glynn 2017) which captures the degree to which
electoral democracy is realized in a country and GDP per capita (World Bank 2018) to proxy for
overall state capacity.
3.2.6 Model
As nightlights are a continuous outcome variable, I analyze them with linear regression. To account
for unobserved similarities in the data, I use a model with random intercepts α by country. This
controls for the possibility that some countries are more likely to deploy resources in certain
areas than others. I also include random intercepts γ by year to account for unmodeled temporal
heterogeneity. Equations 3.1-3.5 present this model, along will all priors and hyperpriors. I employ
diffuse regularizing hyperpriors on all parameters in the model to avoid overfitting the data. The
response variable is the total amount of luminosity recorded in a group’s territory in a given year,
which represents the amount of state capacity in that territory, and thus the level of attention the
government has devoted to maintaining control of that territory.
Y ∼ N (α + Xβ, σ2) (3.1)
β ∼ N (µβ, σβ) (3.2)
α ∼ N (µα, σα) (3.3)
µα, µβ ∼ N (0, 5) (3.4)
σα, σβ, σ ∼ half-Cauchy(0, 2.5) (3.5)
3.3 Results
I estimate four models using the data described above. The first two include only population and
capital distance, the third includes and their interaction and the size of a group’s territory, while the
fourth includes all political control variables discussed above.3
3Standard diagnostics indicate good convergence of the chains and are available in the Supplemental Informa-
tion.
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[−0.13; 0.32] [−0.21; 0.12]
σα 0.60
∗ 0.92∗
[0.53; 0.68] [0.82; 1.02]
σγ 0.50
∗ 0.12∗
[0.37; 0.68] [0.09; 0.16]
WAIC 11675.11 26382.74
5-fold RMSE 0.63 0.63
Observations 13854 13854
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table 3.1: Linear models of nightlights as a function of ethnic group population and capital distance.
The standard deviation of the country and year random intercepts are represented by σα and σγ ,
respectively. Continuous variables logged and standardized.
The bivariate relationships between population, capital distance, and nightlights are unsurprising.
The correlation between group population and nightlights is 0.59 and the correlation between capital
distance and nightlights is -0.09. More people means more state penetration, while governments are
less likely to have a presence in areas far from the capital. However, a bivariate correlation does not
account for unobserved heterogeneity in the data due to the dependent nature of observations across
country-years. Table 3.1 presents the results of the Bayesian linear model with random intercepts
by country and year, which results in a substantially more negative association between capital
distance and nightlights. The logged and scaled nightlights variable ranges from -1.67 to 2.17, so the
-0.49 effect of a one unit increase in logged and scaled capital distance on nightlights represents a
substantively meaningful -12.78% decrease.
However, the theoretical argument about the relationship between geography and state penetration
into ethnic group territories states that this penetration should be higher when the risk of a group
seceding is higher. This again implies a conditional relationship in the statistical model. Territory
is most suited to secession when it is more governable and located farther from the reach of the
state. Using the population of an ethnic group’s territory as a measure of its governability, and hence
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viability as an independent state, this argument implies that the effect of population on nightlights
should be increasing in distance from the capital.
Model 3 Model 4
Population 0.73∗ 0.72∗
[0.71; 0.75] [0.70; 0.74]
Capital Distance −0.15∗ −0.15∗
[−0.17; −0.14] [−0.17; −0.14]
Population Total × Capital Distance 0.03∗ 0.03∗
[0.02; 0.03] [0.02; 0.04]
Area 0.05∗ 0.05∗
[0.04; 0.07] [0.04; 0.06]
Excluded −0.02
[−0.04; 0.00]









[−0.15; 0.25] [−0.22; 0.18]
σα 0.60
∗ 0.48∗
[0.54; 0.68] [0.42; 0.54]
σγ 0.46
∗ 0.43∗
[0.34; 0.64] [0.32; 0.59]
WAIC 11207.09 11113.22
5-fold RMSE 0.36 0.36
Observations 13854 13854
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table 3.2: Linear models of nightlights as a function of the interaction between ethnic group
population and capital distance. The standard deviation of the country and year random intercepts
are represented by σα and σγ , respectively. Continuous variables logged and standarized.
Table 3.2 presents results from this conditional specification. Model 3 includes geographic
variables measured in each group’s territory, while Model 4 includes country level variables to
control for regime type and state capacity.4 The introduction of country level control variables does
4Omitting groups with a monopoly on political power, or who dominate the political system within a country
(Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch 2011) does not substantively affect the results of the analysis. Neither
does limiting the sample to politically excluded groups. See Section B.4 for these results.
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not significantly affect the estimates for the effect of capital distance and population, suggesting that
they are strongly related to the level of nightlights within a territory.
Model 3 Model 4
























Figure 3.3: Marginal effects of ethnic group population on nightlights, conditional on distance to the
capital.
Figure 3.3 presents the marginal effect of population on nightlights from Models 3 & 4. In both
models, the marginal effect of population on nightlights is positive and increasing in capital distance.
The maximum marginal effect in Model 3 is 0.80, so the effect of a one unit shift in logged and
scaled population represents a 14.70% shift in the outcome variable. The maximum marginal effect
in Model 4 is 0.79, which corresponds with a 14.61% shift in the outcome variable. This effect is
substantially larger than the effect of any control variables in Model 4, suggesting that the suitability
of territory to independent governance plays a significant role in government decisions to invest in
a given area. The combination of population and capital distance has a substantively meaningful
effect on the level of nightlights within a given ethnic group’s territory. Moving from two standard
deviations below the mean of capital distance to two above results in an increase in the marginal
effect of population on nightlights of 0.11, which corresponds to a 2.02% shift across the observed
range of nightlights.
Exclusion’s negative estimate makes sense given that excluded groups are often shut off from
access to state resources. However, groups that have lost regional autonomy have a higher nightlights
value, which suggests that states are paying special attention to those groups because they are at the
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highest risk of secession due to their combination of grievances and governing experience (Siroky &
Cuffe 2015). Similarly, groups whose territory overlaps the dominant group’s have higher levels of
nightlights, reflecting the government’s interest in these regions (Lacina 2015). GDP per capita and
Polyarchy are also both positive, which aligns with our expectations.
Comparing the fit of Models 3 & 4 shows that the inclusion of country and group level control
variables mildly improves the in-sample predictive accuracy of the model. The Watanabe-Akaike
information criteria (WAIC) is akin to the Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information
criterion in likelihood based models (Gelman, Hwang & Vehtari 2013). Interpretation is the same as
AIC and BIC, with lower values representing a better fitting model. Similarly, WAIC penalizes the
inclusion of extra parameters, so Model 4 better explains the data than Model 3, despite increasing
the number of free parameters. However, the change in WAIC from Model 3 to 4 is smaller than the
change from Models 1 & 2 to 3, suggesting that geographic factors explains more of the variation in
nightlights than political ones do.
However, WAIC is a measure of in-sample fit, and we must assess out of sample fit as well. I
perform k-fold cross-validation on Models 1-4 with k = 5, computing the root mean squared error
(RMSE) for each fold, and present the average RMSE for all 5 folds in Tables 3.1 % 3.2. Model 2
has the worst RMSE, followed by Model 1, and Models 3 & 4 have the lowest RMSE. The addition
of the political control variables in Model 4 does not substantially improve out-of-sample accuracy.
The marginal difference in 5-fold RMSE between Models 3 & 4 suggests that territorial governability
drives much of state resource allocation decisions.
3.3.1 Robustness to Alternative Measures
To assess the robustness of the results, I evaluate the relationship between territorial governability
and government investment using an alternative measure of territorial governability. Above I have
measured governability as a function of the total number of people within a group’s territory, based
on the argument that the larger the stock of human capital a potential government can draw on,
the more attractive secession will be. However, human capital can be difficult to leverage if it is
widely dispersed across a broad area, as accessing and serving these populations will prove difficult.
To address this criticism, I reestimate the models in Table 3.1 and 3.2 using the Gini measure of
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population concentration detailed in Section 2.3.1 instead of total population. Table 3.3 presents
these results.
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Population Gini 0.41∗ 0.16∗ 0.15∗
[0.40; 0.42] [0.15; 0.17] [0.14; 0.16]
Capital Distance −0.39∗ −0.34∗
[−0.41; −0.38] [−0.36; −0.33]
Population Gini × Capital Distance 0.01 0.02∗
[−0.00; 0.02] [0.01; 0.03]
Area 0.51∗ 0.43∗
[0.50; 0.52] [0.42; 0.44]
Excluded −0.28∗
[−0.30; −0.26]








(Constant) 0.11 −0.03 0.03
[−0.00; 0.24] [−0.14; 0.09] [−0.07; 0.14]
σα 0.68
∗ 0.68∗ 0.58∗
[0.61; 0.77] [0.60; 0.79] [0.51; 0.65]
σγ 0.09
∗ 0.11∗ 0.08∗
[0.07; 0.13] [0.08; 0.15] [0.06; 0.11]
WAIC 24506.12 16451.09 15532.70
5-fold RMSE 0.59 0.44 0.42
Observations 13854 13854 13854
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table 3.3: Linear models of nightlights as a function of ethnic group population concentration and
capital distance. The standard deviation of the country and year random intercepts are represented by
σα and σγ , respectively. Continuous variables logged and standarized.
The relationship between population Gini and nightlights is similar to that of total population.
Effect sizes are smaller, and model fit is worse when comparing WAIC and RMSE. However, the
relationship remains positive as demonstrated by Figure 3.4.
Population concentration is an equally valid measure of territorial governability and exhibits the
same relationship with government investment as total population. This similarity suggests that the
results are not simply an artifact of the choice of variable used to measure territorial governability.
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Model 6 Model 7























Figure 3.4: Marginal effects of ethnic group population concentration on nightlights, conditional on
distance to the capital.
3.3.2 Robustness to Nonlinearities
While marginal effects plots can improve our understanding of interactive regression models
(Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006), they only provide part of the picture. Another way to improve
interpretability is to estimate Ŷ for a wide range of values and then observe the relationship between
the components of the interaction term and the outcome. Figure 3.5 presents the predicted value of
nightlights as a function of capital distance and population, which allows us to get a more complete
sense of the relationship between them. Predicted nightlights values are highest when capital dis-
tances are lowest and population is highest, which makes sense as territory close to the capital is
often inhabited by ethnic groups in power and the state if frequently capable there.
At first brush, we would expect the level of state involvement to decline with distance from the
capital as it becomes more difficult for the agents of state to travel to various locations. While distance
still has a negative effect on state presence within a group’s territory, highly populated territories
have higher levels of state attention than similarly populous territories located closer to the centers of
state power. Given the increasing cost of government activity in these more remote locations, this
relationship suggests that there must be a particularly compelling reason for governments to make

































Figure 3.5: Predicted nightlights as a function of capital distance and population.
However, the smooth prediction surface highlights the simplification entailed in the model
and emphasizes that it may not reflect more complicated relationships between capital distance,
population, and nightlights. To address these concerns, I fit a random forest model to the data. A
random forest is an ensemble of regression trees (Breiman 1984), each trained on a subset of the data
(Breiman 2001). While random forests are designed to maximize predictive accuracy, they can also
be used to detect nonlinearities in the relationship between variables and outcomes (Breiman 1984).
Figure 3.6 presents a partial dependence plot (Friedman 2001, Greenwell 2017) of the relationship
between population, capital distance, and nightlights.5 A slight nonlinearity is observable in the
lower 2/3 of the plot, where areas with lower population have higher nightlights close to the capital
and very far away. This pattern supports my argument that states are increasing their capacity in
areas most prone to secession because similarly populated areas at a middling distance from the
5This model includes population, capital distance, and the size of a group’s territory as predictors. For full


































Figure 3.6: Partial dependence of nightlights on capital distance and population.
capital have lower nightlights values. State capacity is naturally high in areas close the the capital,
and strategically high in areas far from the capital and more governable.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The marginal effect of population on nightlights is positive and increasing as distance from the capital
increases. The magnitude of the effect is substantively meaningful, which means that remote areas
with high populations receive more government attention than comparably populated areas closer
to the centers of state power. One interpretation is that governments strategical deploy resources
to regions that are more likely to secede. This forward thinking behavior explains why we fail to
observe more secessionist conflicts despite the abundance of aggrieved minorities living in governable
territory.
These findings highlight an important disconnect that is often overlooked in studies of space
and conflict. Geography is static when compared with the dynamism of politics. While the political
fortunes of ethnic groups may shift quickly, the territory they inhabit remains largely unchanged.
63
This means that all actors involved in a conflict have relatively equal information about the geography
within a country and can use this knowledge to their benefit. Since governments can devote their
considerable resources to shutting down secessionist movements in the most likely places, then the
ones that do arise may originate in territory that is less suited to secession. The prominent place of
oil as a cause of secession also suggests that secessionist violence is most likely when the resources
at stake can contribute to discontinuous shifts in the balance of power between governments and
dissidents.
This theory also explains multiple phenomena internationally. Governments may strategically
keep secession prone regions underdeveloped in order to deter self-determination movements from
launching wars of independence. While underdevelopment may lead to political grievances and low
level violence, states are taking a calculated risk that it is better to keep these regions unhappy but
dependent than to inadvertently give them the tools for governance and spark a secessionist conflict.
Similarly, while we know that ‘sons of the soil’ conflicts can drag on indeterminately (Weiner
1978, Fearon 2004), we know less about why states engage in the internal colonization practices that
often trigger the them (Fearon & Laitin 2011). One possibility is that they are the result of people
in highly governable regions chafing under military controls or responding to the influx of majority
group members such monitoring efforts entail (Bhavnani & Lacina 2015). Such conflicts are not
particularly costly to fight, and keeping the military close at hand ensures that dissidents do not have
the space to mobilize a mass movement for secession unchallenged. As such, governments may
prefer the risk of sparking a low intensity sons of the soil conflict over the possibility of losing a
secessionist civil war.
Government efforts to preempt secession are often successful because territory is relatively fixed
in comparison to the political processes responsible for civil conflict. While populations change as
people migrate and cities grow, these changes typically occur at a glacial pace, so governments have
the same information as rebel groups. Given this relative informational symmetry, governments can
act preemptively to try and prevent territorial conflicts from erupting. Given the graver threat that
secessionist conflicts pose, governments should be more willing to commit resources to preventing
them than autonomy seeking ones. Population has a positive effect on nightlights conditional on
distance from the capital, which means that nightlights are higher in highly populated areas farther
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from the capital than closer ones. This suggests that government are concerned about secessionist
conflicts and devote more resources to suppressing them where they are more likely.
This pattern implies that the same thing that makes a territory suitable for secession also makes
the government more inclined to work to retain it. While guerrillas and counterinsurgents fight for
hearts and minds as a way to win the war, they are also engaged in a struggle for the population’s
support in the post-conflict period. Each side wants to attract and retain supporters as people are
necessary for a state to function.
Since both governments and rebel movements are competing for the same pool of people, there
are strong selection effects at play in the onset of civil wars. This suggests that we need to move
beyond thinking about selection processes at the national level, as many studies do, to thinking about
them at the subnational level.
The ability of states to preempt potential secessionist movements in the regions where they are
most likely to succeed highlights an important power asymmetry we must consider when thinking
about the effect of geography on conflict. While governments and rebel groups are likely to have
similar levels of knowledge about geography due to its relatively static nature, governments will be
better able to exploit this knowledge due to their disproportionately larger resources.
When drastic changes occur due to internal displacement from conflict, deliberate relocation
campaigns, or local population booms in cities, groups may capitalize on these discontinuous shifts in
population to launch secessionist campaigns. However, these rapid shifts will be largely obscured in
cross-national yearly data, which may explain why these data fail to find a strong relationship between
territory and group goal. The discovery of petroleum reserves can often trigger a discontinuous shift
in the power of a minority group, which may explain why there is a link between oil and secessionist
violence. The secessionist conflicts we do observe are likely to result of governments’ inability to
adapt quickly enough after a sudden change in the governability of an excluded group’s territory.
Another possibility is that the delay between changes in the governability in a group’s territory and
the state learning about these changes could give the group a narrow window to act before the state
increases its commitment to the area.
The observed pattern of states directing more attention to more secession-prone areas highlights
the very real relationship between territorial governability and secession. However, the data used
to test this argument cannot conclusively determine why states engage in this behavior. Nightlights
65
are a rough proxy for state capacity, and governability is determined by many more factors than just
population. Further, while the use of country and year random intercepts in the statistical model
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across observations, it does not result in causal identification.
To try to overcome the limitations of these data and this cross-national research design, I proceed
by directly investigating the mechanisms at play in two different empirical implications of this
theory in Part ??. Chapter 4 explores when government preemption strategies are most likely to
fail and highlights the importance of information flows in this process; if nightlights, and thus
government investment, are driven by demographic factors unrelated to secession concern, then a
lack of information should not be responsible for the conflicts we do observe. Chapter 5 investigates
the motivations of states that take drastic preemption measures by relocating entire populations.
By assessing when these measures are successful, it provides insight into how the mechanisms of
secession preemption function.
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CHAPTER 4: WHY GOVERNMENTS SOMETIMES FAIL TO PREVENT SECESSION AT-
TEMPTS
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began its violent campaign for an independent Aceh in 1976,
but by the end of 1977, efforts to establish a new nation on the island of Sumatra were declared
a failure. The government no longer considered the group a threat (Schulze 2004, 76), and the
conflict ended. However, the group reemerged in 1989 and posed a more serious threat that took
longer for the state to defeat. One of the main motivations for this second incarnation of GAM was
popular grievances over the distribution of revenue from the booming oil and gas sector, as well as
the growing manufacturing sector (Ross 2005, 42-4). A rising level of economic development may
have been a major cause of GAM’s successful return to active operations.
The pattern of events in this story highlights a dynamic that plays out throughout the world where
economic resources can spur secession. Oil was similarly a root cause of the attempted secession of
Biafra from Nigeria, with the region only turning to violence after the threat of losing oil revenues
as a result of redrawing state borders (Uche 2008). These resources make a tempting prize for
secessionist groups as they can be used to finance the startup costs of building a new state after
winning independence. Given the risk of losing access to these rents, governments work to preempt
such actions.
However, the Acehnese case illustrates an important part of the puzzle that makes this task much
more difficult. Territories change over time, and can become more or less suited to secession and
independent governance as a result of these changes. While Jakarta was aware of the industrial growth
in Aceh, it may have been less aware of the effect this growth had on the local population. Resentment
over lack of equal revenue sharing provided the motivation to seek more political autonomy and
secede, while the resources themselves promised to make independence less costly to achieve.
In this chapter, I explore this dynamic systematically using an agent-based model to identify
relationships between government-level characteristics and the risk of conflict as a function of
changes in ethnic groups territory. I include natural resources, industrial bases, agriculture, and the
human capital of a population in a single conception of ‘governability’ that describes how easy it will
be to build a new state in the territory inhabited by an ethnic group. Many government characteristics,
such as resource level or military superiority, have expected relationships with the probability that a
secessionist conflict occurs. The main result that emerges from the model is that conflict is likely
in the wake of an exogenous shock to a territory’s governability when the government is at an
informational disadvantage.
The importance of information means that exogenous shocks to governability in isolation are
not sufficient for conflict. If governments had perfect information, then they could simply reallocate
resources to pacifying or placating the newly more governable territory. A very large exogenous shock
could overwhelm preemption efforts by a resource-strapped government under perfect information,
but this is not necessary when governments have poor information gathering abilities. A resource-
rich but informationally challenged government may have a large enough treasury to offset modest
governability increases in minority territory, but if they learn about the changes too late they may not
increase their preemption efforts quickly enough.
4.1 Slow on the Uptake
If governments work to preempt secession attempts by deploying the coercive apparatus of the state,
then this should prevent most, if not all, secessionist conflicts from emerging. However, governments
confronting multiple peripheral minority groups must decide how to allocate their finite resources
among the groups. Unless an ethnic group comprises a significant plurality of a state’s population,
they are unlikely to overcome the full attention of the state’s coercive and surveillance apparatus.
Yet government confronting multiple groups must choose what fraction of their capabilities to direct
towards each group.
Assuming that the system begins in equilibrium, with the government successfully suppressing
all secessionist sentiment, there needs to be some pertubation to trigger a war of independence. The
geographic factors that determine governability — natural resources, human geography, agriculture,
infrastructure — often change at a glacially slow pace. Other factors, such as distance from the
centers of state power, are functionally unchanging. Despite this relatively static picture, things can
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change; oil or rare earth metals are discovered, irrigation improvements can increase crop yields, or
population booms can increase the size of the tax base.
If governments are able to perfectly update their information about these changes, they can likely
shift the allocation of coercion among groups and maintain the status quo. Under perfect information,
secession will only occur if one group’s territory experiences a massive shift in governability that
outstrips the government’s total resources. This scenario seems highly unlikely.
A more reasonable explanation for secession is imperfect information. Central governments
must collect information about all of the marginal ethnic groups within their borders. This task
becomes more difficult the more remotely a group is located, and is only exacerbated if the country’s
transportation infrastructure is poor (Herbst 2000). Secessionist civil conflict is more likely farther
from the capital (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009, Buhaug 2010), and more inaccessible areas are
more likely to experience episodes of violence within ongoing conflicts (Tollefsen & Buhaug 2015).
The more inaccessible an area, the harder it is for agents of the central government to operate there.
There is no reason why this dynamic should only apply once a conflict has begun, so governments
should possess lower quality intelligence about less accessible areas.
While accessibility affects the efficacy of government monitoring efforts, more capable gov-
ernments are less susceptible to this decline. With larger domestic security budgets, governments
can afford to employ more local informants, invest in better information-gathering technology, and
develop professionalized security agencies to aggregate and act on all of this information.
However, factors other than just surveillance capacity also affect the quality of information
that governments possess about events within their borders. Regime type can play a large role
in determining the amount and accuracy of information that governments receive. In hybrid and
authoritarian regimes, elections serve as an important source of information about public attitudes
towards the regime (Eisenstadt 2004, Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007, Blaydes 2011, Malesky
& Schuler 2011, Little 2017).This electoral channel of information can be especially important
as autocracies may be especially prone to intentional manipulation of local economic statistics
(Wallace 2016). Local elections specifically can offer information about the political situation in
remote regions, which local elites provide in exchange for clientelist rewards (Lust 2009, 132).
In stable authoritarian regimes, governments are able to use the information gleaned from these
elections to modify policy programs to bring them more in line with popular demands (Miller 2015).
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In counterinsurgency campaigns, language differences can serve as a barrier to gathering the
information necessary to effectively combat the insurgent forces (Gwynn 1934, Galula & Nagl
2006, Gompert & Gordon 2008) (Byman 2006, 87-8). These communication difficulties can also
operate outside of an active conflict, reducing the flow of information from remote regions where
the population speaks a different language than the politically empowered majority. Anecdotally,
Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Nigeria, and India are the most linguistically diverse countries in the
world (Eberhard, Simons & Fennig 2019), and all have experienced violent separatist conflicts at
one point or another. This pattern suggests that central governments may find it difficult to obtain
reliable updates about the governability of remote ethnic group territories if they are unable to recruit
coethnics as part of their information gathering efforts (Lyall 2010).
Similarly, information communication technologies (ICT) can ease the flow of information from
ethnic homelands back to the centers of power. The use of cellphones and the internet allows agents
of the state to rapidly communicate local developments to the central goverment. ICT can provide
valuable information to regime forces in active conflicts (Shapiro & Siegel 2015), and can also detail
the strength and disposition of the opposition in authoritarian regimes (Goebel 2013), so states with
higher levels of ICT penetration should be better appraised of the governability of ethnic group
territories.
As the proposed mechanism of government surveillance capacity is difficult to observe in a
global cross-national manner, I rely on simulation based approaches. Agent-based model allow
researchers to observe interactions between actors that may be difficult or impossible to capture
empirically, and too complex to solve analytically using traditional formal models (Axelrod 1997).
They are especially useful when interactions between numerous individual agents yield complex
emergent behaviors (Schelling 1971). Drawing on the patterns identified above, I construct an
agent-based model which puts all of these dynamics in interaction with one another. Running many
simulations with many different parameter values will yield empirical predictions that reveal how
informational capability affects the relationship between territorial change and conflict onset.
Agent-based models have been used to study many aspects of conflict including alliance forma-
tion when states are faced with multiple potential allies and adversaries (de Marchi 2005, 90-109),
the diffusion of norms (Axelrod 1986), competition between governments and insurgencies for the
support of the population (Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau 2010), the spread of democracies throughout
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the international system (Cederman & Gleditsch 2004), the role of self-sorting in determining the
level of violence in an insurgency (Weidmann & Salehyan 2013), and how the density of connections
between villages influences the willingness of local actors to support larger combatants within a
conflict (Weidmann 2016). More relevant to this study of secession, they have also been used to
study the formation and dissolution of nation states from smaller terriorial units (Cederman 1997),
and how the spread and adoption of cultural traits affects the emergence of polities with shared values
(Axelrod 1997).
Cederman (1997) is concerned with the long-term emergence of political actors and the formation
of ethnic identities, so he allows groups to absorb others and then split again. I am more concerned
about the state’s role in this process, so I fix the number of peripheral ethnic groups in each simulation.
In addition, both Cederman (1997) and Axelrod (1997) model the spread of national identities or
cultural norms, and how they lead to the formation of new political units or their splits into smaller
ones. However, I am interested in the short term, day to day management of independence-minded
minority groups than the construction of the nationalist identities that motivate them. As such, I
assume that all peripheral ethnic groups would prefer to secede if possible. Accordingly, this model
can be viewed as a ’worst case’ scenario where a government confronts several groups that wish to
secede, and those that are satisfied with inclusion into the state are omitted from the model.
4.2 A Dynamic Model of Territorial Change and Conflict Prevention
The model I develop to study the success and failure of secession prevention attempts is a relatively
simple one. Without specifying a functional form, the probability of a secessionist civil war can be
given by:
Pr(secessiong) = f(γg, αg)
where γ refers to the governability of a group g’s territory, and α represents the government’s security
investment in that territory. The rest of the model is built off of this starting point, and consists of
a single central government and multiple peripheral ethnic groups. The government must allocate
limited resources, ρ, to preventing the emergence of a viable independence movement within each
group’s territory. To explore how conflicts emerge, the model simulates the interactions between
the government and the groups in discrete steps, or iterations. At each iteration, the government
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divides its resources between the groups proportional to their threat of secession, which is calculated





which yields an allocation αg = ρτg.
A group’s threat of secession, τ , is a function of the governability of its territory, γ, and how far
it is from the capital, δ: τ = γδ. However, the government’s inability to perfectly observe the state of
a group’s territory means that it may not know the true value of γ. Instead, it uses its own assessment
ι instead, such that τ = ιδ. Initially, γ = ι, as the model begins in a peaceful state. However, at each
iteration, there is a 5% chance that a group’s territory will experience a shock to its governability. If
a shock does occur, it is distributed Cauchy(0, 0.5), but cannot reduce the territory’s governability
below 0.
To capture the imperfect information that states possess about remote areas of their territory, at
each iteration of the model the government updates its estimate of the governability of a group’s
territory by the difference between the current estimate and its true governability i.e. γ − ι. However,
information gathering is a costly and time-intensive process, so this update is downweighted by the
surveillance capability of the government, σ, so that:
ιi+1 = ιi + (γi − ιi)σ
with higher levels of σ representing governments with better intelligence-gather capabilities that can
more quickly update their information assessments in response to changes.
The final component of the model is conflict, defined above as f(γg, αg). A group decides to




1 if γ > φα
0 otherwise
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φ can be viewed as either the risk aversion of the ethnic groups, or the military superiority of the
government’s forces as higher values of φ require the group to stand to gain more from successfully
obtaining independence.
Symbol Meaning Range
G Number of peripheral groups {1, 2, 3, . . .}
ρ Government resource level (0,∞)
σ Surveillance capability (0, 1]
φ Capacity difference {1, 2, 3, . . .}
Table 4.1: Model-level parameters
Table 4.1 presents the parameters which govern the global state of the simulation. I refer to these
as model level parameters, and they are the parameters that I vary in different simulation runs. By
repeatedly running the simulation with the same model level parameters, I am able to estimate the
average relationship between each one and the likelihood of secessionist conflict.
Symbol Meaning Range
δ Distance from capital (0,∞)
γ Actual governability of territory (0,∞)
ι Perceived governability of territory (0,∞)
α Government allocation of resources (0, ρ]
Table 4.2: Group-level parameters
Table 4.2 presents the group level parameters, which are unique to each group. With the
exception of δ, they evolve dynamically over the course of an individual simulation. The group level









which is then used to set the initial allocation of resources to each group’s territory αg = ρτg.
Below, I describe the components of each iteration of the model. A more technical treatment is
available in Appendix C.2
1. First check whether γg > φαg ∀ g ∈ G. If yes, end the simulation as a civil war has occurred.




3. Using the new value of τ , the government allocates its resources to monitoring each group
proportional to its threat αg = ρτg ∀ G.
4. With probability .05, each group g experiences a shock to γg drawn from a Cauchy(0, 0.5)
distribution. Shocks cannot reduce the value of γg below 0.
5. The government updates ιg for each group by adding the difference between its current
perceived governability and the actual governability, modified by its surveillance capability
ιgi+1 = ιgi + (γgi − ιgi)σ
4.2.1 Strategic Interaction
Both the government and ethnic groups possess private information, and the ability to act on this
private information results in strategic interactions between the two. Ethnic groups have information
on the true governability of their territory, γ, while the government’s assessment of governability, ι,
is privately held as well. In addition, groups know how much greater their territory’s governability
must be than the government’s allocation to make conflict an attractive option. As governments
do not know their capacity advantage φ relative to the group, they are unable to know whether a
chosen allocation αg will be sufficient to deter secession by group g. This uncertainty would persist
in the model, even if governments exactly knew the governability of each individual territory i.e.
ιg = γg∀G.
Governments hold their own private information as well. Each ethnic group is unaware of the
status of the other groups, so they only know their own γ. While governments inaccurately perceive
γ as ι, they have an ι value for all groups, which they use to construct the threat level, τ . In the
model, ethnic groups are unable to coordinate with one another, and their are unaware when the
governability of another group’s territory spikes, so they cannot initiate a conflict preemptively in
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preparation for the government to divert resources to the knewly ascendant group. Instead, they must
wait for the government to reduce α below γ/φ before they can start a secession attempt. Ethnic
groups are also unaware of the level of resources that the government has to work with, as they only
ever observe α, so all they can conclude is that ρ ≥ α.
Both δg and αg are known to both agents in each government-ethnic group dyad. Thus the main
sources of uncertainty from the ethnic group perspective are the secession risks of the other groups,
and the total resource level the government possesses. The government’s main source of uncertainty
is whether or not γ has changed significantly and ι is now an out of data assessment. Below, I detail
extensions to the model that introduce additional sources of uncertainty in an attempt to better reflect
the dynamics of secession and prevention.
This agent-based-model allows us to observe the relationship between each parameter and
the probability of secessionist conflict. In doing so, it will allow us to derive empirically testable
implications while also identifying important confounding factors that must be accounted for in an
empirical analysis.
4.3 Predictions
To evaluate the relationship between government surveillance capability, while also accounting for
the role of other factors, I conduct a systematic parameter sweep. This entails selecting a number of
values for each parameter, and then running simulations using all permutations of these values. For
each unique combination of parameter values, I run the simulation 1,000 times for 1,000 iterations
each time. For all models, I use 25 values of σ evenly spaced between 0 and 1 to approximate the
effect of continuously varying government surveillance capability. Table 4.3 presents the values for
G, ρ, and φ that I consider. This yields a total of 675 combinations of parameter values.
Parameter
G ρ φ σ
3 30 2 0
6 60 4
...
9 90 6 1
Table 4.3: Parameter space for the baseline model.
75
There are two quantities of interest we obtain from the simulations. First, whether or not
a given simulation experienced civil war, and second, how long the simulation lasted before it
either experienced civil war or reached 1,000 iterations. I present results for whether a simulation
experienced a civil war in this section, and results for the duration of simulations in Section C.1. In
presenting the results of these simulations, I present the results from all 675 combinations of the four
model-level parameters. All group-level parameters are randomly initialized in each simulation run
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Figure 4.1: Probability of secessionist civil war onset in the baseline model. Results from 1,000
simulations at different parameter combinations, marginalizing over all parameters except number of
groups, government resources, and informational capabilities. The line represents the average number
of simulations that experience civil war, while the shaded region represents the 95% confidence
interval.
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Figure 4.1 presents the probability of secessionist civil war onset, with the probability of onset
monotonically decreasing as surveillance capability increases. The more groups a government must
monitor, the higher the probability of civil war onset. Higher levels of government resources also
decrease the probability of conflict onset. While these results are not surprising given the assumptions
of the model, they are in line with the theoretical expectations which lends support for empirically
testing the implications of the model. The results also conform with previous findings that as the
resources of the center increase, the probability of secession declines to 0 (Cederman 1997, 197-201).
By varying the number of groups that governments must contend with, the model allows us to
account for complex behavior as the number of minority groups increases. When the government
must only manage three groups, a change in the governability of one group’s territory is less likely
to lead to misallocation of resources as there are only two other groups they can be diverted from.
The more groups a government faces, the more likely that a small reduction in the resources directed
towards each one will fall below a given group’s onset threshold. Further, the more groups a
government must manage, the higher the changes of two groups experiencing positive shocks within
a short time of one another.
While the relationship between informational capability and probability of conflict onset is
affected by factors including the number of peripheral groups a central government must monitor
and the government’s military superiority, it is a clear one. In every panel of Figure 4.1 except the
top right, maximum information capacity (σ ≈ 1) is associated with virtually zero risk of conflict
onset. This strong relationship suggests that informational capacity is a very important component of
conflict prevention efforts.
4.4 Discussion
This information-based theory of conflict onset is more dynamic than existing theories of onset. By
relying on explanations like political exclusion (Cederman, Buhaug & Gleditsch 2013), demographic
size relative to the dominant group’s population (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009), or horizontal
economic inequalities (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch 2011), these theories do not allow for gov-
ernment efforts to preempt conflict based on their knowledge of the situation. It seems unreasonable
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that governments would be unaware of the approximate population size of an ethnic minority group
or its political status.
Some explanations do allow for dynamic interaction between minorities and governments such
as the argument that groups that have lost political power (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010) or
regional autonomy (Siroky & Cuffe 2015). In these cases, governments may be aware of the risks
they are taking but misjudge the danger of violent response. However, the informational theory
developed in this chapter provides an explanation that does not rely on inaccurate predictions or
concede that war is in the error term (Gartzke 1999). Even though governments are aware of the
strengths or limitations of their information gathering abilities, they cannot know whether a group
has experienced a small or large shock to their governability.
As with any mathematical model of empirical phenomena, it is important to discuss the assump-
tions that underlie the model as they support the conclusions it reaches. The strongest assumption
in the model is that all groups wish to achieve independence if possible. This may be unrealistic as
ethnic groups who enjoy access to political power, even if they are not the dominant group, may be
satisfied with their status in society. A natural extension would be to add grievances to the model as
a group-level parameter. The higher the level of grievance, the smaller the difference between the
territory’s governability γ and the government’s allocation α needed to trigger secessionist conflict.
This reflects the fact that groups will be willing to pay higher costs of conflict, or take bigger risks
in conflict, the worse their status quo outcome. Conversely, satisfied groups must face a large gap
between allocation and governability to consider violent conflict as their status quo outcome is largely
acceptable to them. If a group has minimal grievances, then a temporary misallocation is less likely
to trigger conflict. In contrast, more aggrieved groups will require more investment to placate as the
risk of a temporary mismatch is higher.
Another way to view the model is that the number of groups G merely represents the number
of aggrieved groups in a polity. While the government likely cannot know precisely the level of
grievance each minority group holds, it does know which groups are excluded or repressed and
which are included. From this perspective, ρ actually represents the resources that the government
has dedicated to preventing conflict among aggrieved groups, rather than the total pool of resources
it has to distributed to all groups living within its borders. This setup would require assuming that
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the selection of ρ from the government’s total resources is non-endogenous, which is a rather strong
assumption.
Explicitly modeling grievances has another key advantage in that it provides a way to include
both carrots and sticks in the government’s toolbox of prevention. If grievances make conflict more
likely in the event of an underallocation to a group, then reducing their level of grievances is a smart
conflict prevention strategy. However, the public goods needed to reduce grievances can also increase
the governability of their territory, requiring more effort to prevent secession. Explicitly modeling
this balancing act could provide insight into when governments rely on each type of prevention
strategy.
Another potentially problematic assumption is treating informational capacity as a government-
level parameter. Doing so assumes that governments receive updates on the status of all minority
group territories with equal accuracy. This decision may be unrealistic as different groups speak
different languages and governments may have more or fewer personnel who speak each language.
However, it elections are an information gathering mechanism, then modeling this phenomenon at
the national level would make sense. Future work should explore different information gathering
mechanisms and theorize about how different ones contribute to government intelligence estimates.
The assumption that capital distance δ raises the threat of secession is well supported by literature
that finds remote conflicts are more difficult for governments to win (Herbst 2004, Buhaug, Gates &
Lujala 2009, Schutte 2015). The construction of the information updating mechanism is reasonable
because in the absence of subsequent shocks after an initial shock, the government’s estimate ι of
a territory’s governability will asymptotically approach its true value γ. This reflects the fact that
given sufficient time, governments should be able to gather complete and accurate information on the
governability of all of their territory.
While the model does contain some strong assumptions, most of them can be relaxed without
seriously altering the goal of the model. Future work can investigate the effect each of these
alterations has on the predictions generated by the model.
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4.5 Conclusion
The theoretical contributions of this combination of information and shocks outweigh these potential
shortcomings. The theory explains why conflicts still occur despite government preemption efforts.
Even if the theory advanced in Chapter 3 is incorrect in some respects, it seems reasonable to assume
that most states engage in some form of preemptive management of disgruntled minorities designed
to head off violent conflict. The combination of shocks and slow to update information can explain
the occurrence of conflict even if governments do not use territorial governability to allocate their
efforts and shocks to governability are not what drive groups to rebel. However, it can offer less of
an explanation for governmental conflicts as they are less driven by territorial concerns.
The model explains the trajectory of the Free Aceh Movement well. The province of Aceh is
physically separated from Jakarta, occupying the farthest corner of the island of Sumatra, and there
is a language barrier between the Acehnese and Javanese. While the government obviously knew
that hydrocarbon extraction was occurring in Aceh, they clearly underestimated level of grievance
over lack of local control over revenue and the level of support GAM enjoyed. The Acehnese case
thus fits the current model while also providing further motivation to incorporate grievances into the
model. It also suggests that just as governability may be imperfectly observed by the government,
grievances may also be subject to imperfect observation.
If government investment at the local level is driven by demographic factors unrelated to secession
concern, then information should play a minimal role in investment allocation. Consequently, a lack
of information should not be responsible for the conflicts we do observe. The strong relationship
between information and conflict onset in the model suggests otherwise. This informational theory
thus gives more support to Chapter 3’s argument that government investment in remote minority
territories is driven by a desire to prevent secession and not by alternative explanations.
The next chapter more directly investigates the motivations of states that engage in secession
preemption by exploring when they turn to large-scale population manipulation in service of these
aims. While information does not play a central role in its theoretical argument, it does feature
prominently in the narratives of the cases.
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CHAPTER 5: DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING AS A CONFLICT PREVENTION STRAT-
EGY
The Indonesian government in Jakarta maintains a longstanding policy of encouraging migration
by Javanese Indonesians to the remote province of Aceh that has sparked considerable local backlash.
The province, located on the Northern tip of the island of Sumatra and home to the Muslim-
majority Acehnese people, also contains extensive hydrocarbon reserves, which can explain why the
government would pursue this policy despite the risk of sparking a ‘sons of the soil’ conflict where
native Acehnese turn to violence in response to their loss of status and livelihood. This chapter seeks
to answer the question of why governments engage in internal migration policies that can spark sons
of the soil wars given the potentially protracted nature of these conflicts.
Secession is attractive to marginalized and aggrieved groups when they inhabit areas that are
suited to independent governance. Chapter 3 outlines the ways that in which governments use
information on the geographic components of territorial governability to identify minorities that
pose a secession risk and work to stifle these nationalist desires. These strategies raise the costs of
collective action by increasing the personal physical risk of participating in secessionist plotting or
buying off potential supporters via public goods, increasing the opportunity cost of participation if
arrested. Both of these approaches entail increasing the flow of state resources to the area the group
lives in. However, there is another, more drastic option, available to states that involves targeting the
demand side of secession. There are two broad categories within this approach, and each focuses on
a different half of the secession equation. The first deters secession by simply removing the people
from the governable territory they inhabit. The second entails lowering the independent governability
of the group’s territory.
While much of the research on forced displacement in the conflict literature focuses on population
transfers as a counterinsurgency tool in active conflicts, it can also be used as a conflict prevention
strategy. By separating an ethnic group from their governable territory, the state can make secession
less attractive. While this displacement will generate extensive grievances and almost certainly
increase the appetite for an independent national homeland, it can greatly reduce the feasibility of
these desires. The relocated group must either fight a war of migration to return to their original
territory and win independence from the state, or they must try to forge an independent state in their
new location. Governments are strategic in their choice of new locations for relocated groups, often
placing them in barely livable regions such as Siberia or the Syrian Desert.
Lowering the governability of a group’s territory could be accomplished by drastic environmental
means such as manipulating water flows upstream to reduce the agricultural productivity of land.
However, it is much simpler to reshape the human geography of a territory by inducing migration
from the center to the periphery. Such ‘internal colonialism’ involves encouraging members of
dominant social groups to relocate to remote areas inhabited by minority groups (McGarry 1998). In
doing so, the government increases the diversity of people within a group’s territory. This increased
heterogeneity makes secession less attractive because if the minority were to win independence, they
must either accommodate demands from the majority in their new state, or engage in an expulsion
campaign to increase their share of the new state’s population.
Both of these strategies involve manipulating whole populations, and can thus be termed instances
of demographic engineering. I limit my investigation to the latter for two main reasons, which I
will discuss in more detail in Section 5.1.1. First, forced relocation can be difficult to disentangle
analytically and empirically from eliminationist policies (Valentino 2004) as with the Armenian
Genocide. Second, forced relocation has become increasingly less common over time while internal
colonialism continues to be a popular policy. Forced relocations experienced their height as a tool
of state-building in the interwar and post-WWII period where they were used to construct more
ethnically homogeneous states (Özsu 2015), and in the Soviet Union where they were used to prevent
uprisings or punish rebellious minorities (Werth 2010). Since then, population transfers have fallen
out of fashion in Europe (Frank 2017), and the forced resettlements that do occur in the developing
world tend to be displacements due to large infrastructure projects (Mathur 2006, Housing and Land
Rights Network 2014) rather than deliberate relocations of a group from one location to another.
In the following sections I use historical examples of these phenomena to illustrate how concerns
about secession can underlie their use. I draw on scholarship about demographic engineering to
situate these secession-related actions within the broader scope of demographic engineering, and
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develop a theory of preemptive demographic engineering. I then explore this theory using qualitative
case studies of internal colonialism.
5.1 Politically Motivated Population Manipulation
A demand side approach to deterring secession seeks to remove or reduce the factors that lead groups
to push for secession. As I argue in Chapter 2, groups are most likely to push for secession when their
territory contains all of the prerequisites for sovereign governance and independent administration.
If a minority agitates for secession because their territory contains extensive mineral wealth, a
government could deter secession by removing them from the land. Or the government could extract
all or most of the ore in the group’s territory, leaving it without the resource endowments necessary
to fund a new state. In each case, the government seeks to reduce the amount of resources available
to the group for funding a hypothetical future state.
The process of population growth and movement is a relatively slow one, but it can happen much
more rapidly than changes in the other factors such as mineral abundance and soil arability are likely
to occur. While some natural resources like timber can be developed, this happens on a very long
time horizon. Others like fossil fuels or metallic ores cannot be intentionally created at all. Even if a
government seeks to deny these resources to a group, plundering all of them in a timely manner can
be nigh impossible. Similarly, the infrastructure that determines accessibility such as roads and ports
is costly and time-consuming to build. However, there is one element of geographic governability
that is much easier to alter on a short time-scale: population.
Given the relative ease of manipulating population compared to natural resources or the built
environment, governments often turn to demographic engineering schemes to try to quash secessionist
desires. Minorities can be removed to less governable territory, or members of the dominant group
can be relocated to minority territory, thus diluting their political power and raising the cost of
secession. Below I detail how governments have used both strategies throughout history and develop
a theoretical argument for when we expect to see governments engage internal colonialist practices
to ward off secessionist conflict.
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5.1.1 Forced Displacement as a Preemption Strategy
Forced population transfers have been enacted in service of a multitude of political goals throughout
history. As early as 1000 BCE the Assyrian Empire used population transfers as a way to pacify
conquered populations, with an estimated 4.5 million people relocated over a 400 year period
(Oded 1979, 5-6). The pre-Colombian Incan empire dispersed conquered populations throughout
their territory in order to fragment local identities and hinder the formation of potential rebellious
movements under the policy of mitma(D’Altroy 1992). Similarly, the Ottoman Empire frequently
expelled populations from newly conquered territories (Şeker 2013). Sometimes forced relocation
goes hand-in-hand with genocidal crimes, as with the relocation of Jewish populations to urban
ghettos before transportation to concentration camps by Nazi Germany. The Armenian Genocide
was billed as a relocation of untrustworthy minorities to the Syrian Desert where they would not pose
a national security threat, but they were drastically undersupplied (New York Times 1916), leading
to between 800,000 and 1.5 million deaths (Akcam 2006). Forced migrations also tend to occur after
territory transfers. Sometimes this occurs after conflict, like with the expulsion of ethnic Germans
from territory captured by the Soviets after the end of WWII (Zayas 2006, Douglas 2012). Other
times it follows nonviolent change in the status of territory, as happened when India and Pakistan
were partitioned after independence. This last case illustrates an important aspect of mass relocation:
its violence. Despite the peaceful agreement to partition India and Pakistan, the actual process of
population transfer involved many local sporadic clashes that in sum left hundreds of thousands dead
(Talbot & Singh 2009).
Previous work on resettlement and conflict has focused on population transfers as a counterin-
surgency tool once a guerrilla conflict has already begun. Guerrilla movements rely on the support
of sympathizers and supporters, with practitioners often referring to the need for guerrillas to move
among the population like ‘fish in the sea’ (Mao 1961). Forced resettlement can deprive insurgent
groups access to sympathetic civilians (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004, Valentino 2004) and
reduce the effectiveness of their fighting capability (Zhukov 2015).
However, population relocation can also be used as a preemptive measure to influence the
direction that a conflict may take. While the Chechen deportation in 1944 is largely agreed to be
a response to the 1940-1944 Chechen insurgency, many argue that the deportation of the Crimean
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Tatars in 1944 was justified under false pretenses of collaboration (Pohl 2010) to remove a potentially
rebellious minority and secure Soviet strategic aims (Williams 2001, 375). The former incident is a
clear case of resettlement as a punishment or counterinsurgency tool, while the latter can be seen as a
conflict prevention or mitigation one. If a conflict subsequently erupts after relocating a group, it
will likely pose a less effective challenge to the state. Not only will the rebel organization have less
familiarity with the local environment, they will likely be forced to make do with fewer resources as
groups are often relocated to desolate areas such as Siberia. Similarly, while the Armenian Genocide
occurred during WWI, the Ottoman Empire rounded up Armenians across its territory and not just
near the front (Akçam 2012), indicating that it was at least partially a preventive measure.
States prefer to fight autonomy-seeking groups instead of secessionist ones because secession
represents a threat to the territorial integrity of the state (Zacher 2001, Anstis & Zacher 2010). If
they can strategically relocate self-determination groups to areas which will lead the group to seek
increased autonomy instead of independence, this may be an attractive option. The relationship
between territorial governability and group goals means that states will try to relocate groups to less
governable territory, as any conflict which begins after relocation would have a higher chance of
being for autonomy rather than secession. Governments can also simply disperse minorities across
broad swaths of territory to frustrate the collective action needed to organize a secessionist campaign.
This latter strategy may be more attractive more resource-strapped governments. In extreme cases,
governments may be able to relocate people to territory so ungovernable that the forced migrants
will not engage in any kind of organized challenge to state authority.
When standard preemption tactics such as increasing the presence of security forces or deploying
extensive monitoring efforts are insufficient or prohibitively costly, government may resort to drastic
measures and try to reshape the human geography of the territory that a group inhabits. A dramatic
example of this behavior is the Soviet deportations of groups such as the Chechens and Crimean
Tatars to Central Asia in the 1940s. When a group’s territory is exceptionally governable, and
thus suited to secession, forced relocation solves the secession problem by simply removing the
population to a less governable area, blunting the risk of secessionist civil war.
Relocating entire populations is a costly process, but states may still prefer it to increasing their
investment in a minority’s territory for two reasons. One, relocations become considerably less costly
when concern for the safety and welfare of the migrants is not a primary concern. Transporting
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hundreds of thousands of people is a complicated logistical problem, but becomes significantly easier
if not all transportees need to survive the journey. Second, a heightened security force presence or
increased public goods provision is a long-term financial commitment, requiring continued funding
to achieve its goal. If a group is relocated to a sufficiently ungovernable territory, then they will
require minimal attention, and thus money, from the government going forward.
While forced relocation as a conflict prevention strategy is less common today, it does still occur
in connection with large scale development projects. The construction of the Three Gorges Dam on
the Yangtze River displaced over a million people whose former homes were flooded by the new
reservoir or were deemed at risk to mudslides due to changes wrought by the immense engineering
project (Chao 2004, BBC 2007). Many of these people were relocated by the Chinese government to
other areas within the country. While this type of relocation has no apparent connection to conflict
prevention, it does share many other similarities with a collection of demographic engineering
strategies that do play a role in conflict prevention.
5.1.2 Internal Colonialism
While I use the phrase internal colonialism to denote government efforts to increase government
control of territories primarily inhabited by ethnic minorities, it has a rich use in scholarship from the
mid-20th Century onward. This scholarship covers a broad diversity of disciplines including history,
anthropology, diaspora studies, critical legal studies, and many more. With such a broad array of
disciplinary approaches comes an even broader range of definitions of internal colonialism.
One stream of internal colonialism theory is characterized by a focus on “underdevelopment
and dependency” where minorities who live in distinct regions are not afforded full membership
in a society and suffer disparate outcomes in education, health, and livelihood due to a lack of
access to public goods provided by the state (Hind 1984, 556). This understanding is typified by the
observation that
the developed sections inside the underdeveloped world — in the capital and on the
coast — are a curious species of imperialist power, having internal colonies, as it were
(Mills 1963, 154).
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Examples of this perspective include analysis of the relationship between Blacks and Whites in
South Africa (Wolpe 1975). Reece (1979, 284-285), highlighting the extractive nature of internal
colonialism, notes that while the rail infrastructure within Brittany consists of various incompatible
narrow gauge systems making internal commerce difficult, the rail lines that connect Brittany to the
rest of France are a uniform gauge facilitating the flow of goods to the national economy.
Work in this vein has examined the status of African Americans in the United States (Blauner
1969). Another studies how settler governments in Latin America worked to disperse European
customs and cultural practices to indigenous communities within their borders (Epstein 1971). This
more historically based vein of literature is concerned with how governments extended their reach
into territories that they claimed, but did not have significant interactions with before. Yet more
literature explores how contemporary ruling elites in the Global South seek to develop their extractive
and productive capacity by exploiting resources in peripheral regions of their territory (Calvert 2001).
This last conception of internal colonialism best describes the Indonesian government’s actions in
Aceh.
Exploiting gas reserves offers clear benefits to the Indonesian government, but does not require
the concerted migration effort it concurrently supports. Why engage in this behavior if such outmi-
gration risks sparking “sons of the soil” conflicts (Fearon 2004) in response? In keeping with this
dissertation’s emphasis on preemption and prevention, I argue that governments are trading the risk
of a low-level conflict in the immediate future for the hope of preventing a secessionist movement
in the long-term. When states engage in internal colonialism after gaining independence from a
colonial power, a primary goal is to legitimize their control over areas within the borders defined by
the colonizers but practically under control of a minority (Nithiyanandam & Gounder 2004, 218-219).
In doing so, they seek to reduce the legitimacy of any future secessionist claims, just as internal
colonialism can dampen neighboring states’ territorial ambitions by altering the “demographic facts”
of the territory (McGarry 1998, 616).
Some scholars do not include a geographic component in their definitions of internal colonialism,
often focusing solely on the presence of a large exploited group without access to political power
and poor social mobility, and a smaller group that does enjoy these benefits (Havens & Flinn
1970). A definition of internal colonialism as “a geographically based pattern of subordination of
a differentiated population with geographically separate territory as a distinct colony” (emphasis
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original) (Pinderhughes 2011, 251) aligns with the focus on government-ethnic group dyads and
the territories of these groups. Internal colonialism is frequently used to explain patterns of uneven
development within countries (Orridge 1981) where a more developed core exerting political control
over the periphery and overseeing unequal economic relationships that resulted in a flow of wealth to
the center (Hechter 1999).
While internal colonialism has myriad different definitions from numerous analytical traditions,
in this chapter I focus on the specific act of relocating members of the dominant social group or
groups from areas firmly under the government’s influence to peripheral regions where minority
groups are the dominant local political authority. Thus, when I discuss internal colonialism or internal
colonization I refer to the specific demographic engineering strategies that government employ and
not frameworks for understanding or explaining this behavior.
Internal colonialism can be difficult to distinguish from conventional nation-building projects.
While the construction of a hydroelectric dam may provide increase electricity to citizens throughout
a state, it can also have profound impacts on the lives of locals. Whether local labor is hired has a
large impact on the local economy, and governments that hire permanent employees from elsewhere
in the country can dilute the strength of local identities. By relocating members of the dominant group
to remote communities to maintain this infrastructure, the government gains several advantages.
First, it increases the flow of information from the periphery to the center. Governments are
often unaware of what goes on in the hinterlands (Herbst 2000) due to the difficulty of transmitting
information. While the rise of telecommunications has lowered this cost, communication takes
two parties. Remote minorities may have very little interest in keeping the state appraised of local
developments. Members of the nationally dominant group may be much more inclined to share this
information with the government due to their identification with it, doubly so if they are employed
by government funded or controlled projects. If out of date information can prevent governments
from nipping secessionist movements in the bud as argued in Chapter 4, then internal colonialism
can level the informational playing field in favor for the government.
Secondly, it can serve as a signal to a restless minority that secessionist ambitions will not be
tolerated. Schelling famously paraphrased Dean Acheson’s response to the question of what good
seven American divisions would be against the Soviets as:
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what those seven divisions can do is not defend Western Europe, but can guarantee
that if they are destroyed and captured the American people will not let the war stop
there. These are hostages of fortune, they are there to be threatened, to die or be captured,
and escalate the war.
A similar dynamic can play out domestically, with governments using their supporters as ‘hostages
of fortune’ to guarantee that any violence against them by a secessionist rebel group will instigate
a costly conflict. Groups that share territory with the socially dominant group are less likely to try
and secede due to the central government’s willingness to protect members of the dominant group
(Lacina 2014, 701-703). Internal colonialism demonstrates the central government’s attachment to
the territory. This commitment may make secession-minded group leaders think twice about starting
a conflict as they fear bringing down the wrath of the regime by harming its supporters.
Finally, demographic engineering can lower the governability of a hypothetical future indepen-
dent state. More ethnically diverse territory entails more competing demands and requires more
careful balancing and accommodation of competing demands. If a minority inhabits a territory where
it constitutes all or almost all of the population, then an independent state in that territory would
satisfy Gellner’s nationalist principle that governments reflect the interests of the nation within the
state (1983). The more ethnically diverse this hypothetical state’s population, the more likely it is
that there will be conflicting policy preferences the government must adjudicate between. For a
politically excluded minority that yearns for its own state where it can govern in line with its interests,
the prospect of divided constituencies in the future state lowers the attractiveness of secession. This
prospect is particularly concerning for the leaders of the potential future state as members of the
dominant group in the current state will experience a precipitous drop in societal standing, and
groups that have had their status downgraded are especially likely to rebel (Cederman, Wimmer
& Min 2010). The Polish government expropriated minority owned land in the newly established
Western and Eastern frontiers after WWI and settled Polish communities their to try and quash the
irredentist ambitions of ethnic Germans and Ukrainians who found themselves no longer citizens of
their respective countries (Prażmowska 2010, 114-115).
Only this last mechanism acts on the demand side of secession, but all three work to dampen
secessionist ambitions. Forced relocation reduces the demand for secession by relocating groups to
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less governable territory but may simultaneously increase this demand in response to the injustices
that accompany forced relocations. If anything, forced relocations have the opposite informational and
signaling effects as internal colonization. Governments typically relocate restless minorities to remote
resource-poor areas, so they will not receive the increased information that flows from members of
the dominant group living with the minority. Minorities are relocated to poorly governable territories
to deter their secession, so governments will not be committed to defending these marginal areas.
The multiple conflict prevention mechanisms of internal colonialism provide yet another reason to
omit forced relocation from my study of demographic engineering.
Governments have a number of tools at their disposal to accomplish their internal colonial goals.
To facilitate such “directed migration,” states have offered free or subsidized land (often expropriated
from the local minority), housing (newly constructed or similarly expropriated), free relocation,
guaranteed jobs, tax breaks, exemptions from military service, and infrastructure to connect the
settlement to existing majority communities (McGarry 1998, 619). These policies have the effect
of making relocation to the minority group’s territory appealing to less economically successful
members of the dominant group. Migrants who take jobs in the settlement serve to make relocation
attractive to even successful members of the dominant group by providing social services and
education in the language of the dominant group (McGarry 1998, 619). Additionally, governments
can use the military as a tool of internal colonialism by garrisoning soldiers in minority group
territory. While the above techniques are available to all governments, more totalitarian regimes have
additional options they can draw on. The Soviet Union sometimes compelled graduating students
to serve in areas strategically chosen by the government to prevent conflict and there is evidence
that China has forced Han Chinese to relocate to remote minority areas (Connor 1984, 317-329).
Similarly, the Ottoman Empire decreed in 1572 that one of every 10 families in several provinces
would relocate to Cyprus, which the Empire had recently captured from Venice (Schechla 1993, 244)
Just as Jakarta has long supported Javanese people moving to the restive region of Aceh, Beijing
encourages the large-scale relocation of Han Chinese families to Xinjiang (Côté 2011) over concern
that the region’s developing economy might inflame longstanding secessionist desires among Uyghur
leaders. In each case, governments hope to reshape the demographics of the region and reduce its
governability from the minority’s perspective.
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While internal colonization offers numerous conflict management benefits, it is not without
its drawbacks. It can risk provoking a backlash from the region’s current residents. The influx of
new residents can upset longstanding balances in the community, and the new arrivals may inspire
resentment for all the government benefits they enjoy. This is especially likely if they occupy land
expropriate from longtime local residents. Yet, states may prefer to fight extended sons of the soil
wars with groups that demand limited autonomy (Fearon 2004, Fearon & Laitin 2011) than risk
defeat in a secessionist conflict which sees some of their territory lost to the newly independent state.
Another less drastic drawback of internal colonization is their cost. Every incentive detailed
above costs the state either capital or foregone tax revenue. These high costs suggest that states may
be motivated by security concerns when they engage in internal colonialism. These policies would
be difficult to justify economically if they did not provide short-term returns, but security is often
worth any cost.
These expenses and risks suggest that governments are only willing to engage in such demo-
graphic engineering when the benefits outweigh the substantial costs. McGarry (1998) argues that
governments manipulate populations when they face security threats. However, many sons of the
soil wars are sparked by members of the dominant group migrating to remote minority territory, so
it seems peculiar to argue that the primary reason for engaging in internal colonization is security
concerns. While security clearly plays a role, as I’ve argued internal colonialism is a tool to prevent
secessionist conflict, security as a whole is too broad of a concept.
Governments are likely to engage in internal colonialism when they are worried about the
potential for secessionist agitation. There are many ways to reward supporters with increased local
development that do not risk setting off sons of the soil wars. Given the cost and potential risks
associated with government support to encourage members of the dominant group to migrate to
minority areas, there must be a concern beyond simply increasing the welfare of their supporters.
When governments fear the threat of secession, then the downsides of internal colonialism become
less of an obstacle.
Hypothesis 3 Governments are more likely to engage in internal colonization when they fear a
group poses a secession risk
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Internal colonialism offers numerous advantages to governments looking to preempt violent
secessionist campaigns, but it can also be used for interstate conflict prevention. Territory territory
can offer significant strategic value to governments concerned about foreign aggression. Examples
abound of governments manipulating populations in strategically important territories such as Israel’s
settlement of the Golan Heights within a year of the Six Day War (Harris 1978), Poland’s settling of
veterans in Kresy, its easternmost territory won from the Soviet Union in WWI, to provide a buffer
for its more central territories (Eichenberg 2010, Linkiewicz 2014), or the influx of Han Chinese
to border provinces after the Sino-Soviet Split (McNamee & Zhang Forthcoming). While external
threat sometimes motivates internal colonialism, qualitative case studies can help identify primary
motivations by detailed study of government actions and statements.
That 4 references Aceh extensively should suggest that demographic engineering and smaller-
scale preemption efforts are by no means mutually exclusive. Governments can employ both
strategies to make secession less attractive and simultaneously more difficult to achieve. In fact, as
this discussion of China’s activities in Xinjiang in Chapter 3 indicates, expanding the presence of
security forces in a region can naturally lead to a level of migration from the center. To police a
region, security personnel must reside there, and while they may be assigned on rotation and live in
government barracks, they can also relocate there more permanently. When security personnel bring
their families with them to these assignments, they participate in internal colonialism. This is doubly
true in Xinjiang as China has pursued a strategy of “integration by immigration” in the region since
the 1950s (Gladney 1998, 51).
In the following section, I conduct in-depth case studies of internal colonialism in Sri Lanka
and Iraq to explore whether and how concern over maintaining access to resources motivated
governments.
5.2 Case Studies
To investigate these hypotheses, I conduct in-depth qualitative case study analysis of two long-
running large scale internal colonization programs. Case studies are the best tool for analyzing this
phenomenon for several reasons. Many of these efforts have been underway for decades, with some
of them even beginning in the late 19th Century. Trying to find quantitative data the span this entire
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time-series is an exceptionally difficult task. Even when data do exist, they are limited to certain
cases and this data availability is not random, so any statistical results will be certainly biased.
Motivation is a central concern to this research question as states can have many reasons for
engaging in internal colonialism. As the historical internal colonialism literature demonstrates, states
may simply be interested in exploiting populations they view as inferior or extracting rents from
far-flung primary commodity producers. By constructing historical narratives around these cases,
I can get at not only what happened in what order, but use sources like statements by government
officials and individual internal colonial migrants to get at motivations for many different types of
actors engaged in these projects.
Qualitative case studies also allow much more nuance than large-N cross-national quantitative
analyses. Chapter 3 uses nighttime light emissions as a measure of government investment in
ethnic group territories. While this measure is available globally, it is unable to indicate whether
governments choose to employ carrots, sticks, or a mix of both in any given territory. While Chapter
3 is focused on less involved prevention measures than internal colonialism, internal colonialism
often goes hand in hand with these less intense practices and studying it will incidentally provide
more insight into them.
Finally, every case is idiosyncratic in varying ways, and studying multiple cases in-depth helps
with identifying the commonalities between them. This exercise can help identify scope conditions
for the broader theory as well.
In the following section, I conduct in-depth case studies of internal colonialism in Sri Lanka and
Iraq to explore whether and how concern over maintaining access to resources motivated governments.
To evaluate the relationship between the resource component of a territory’s governability and
internal colonization, I employ a most-different case selection strategy (Gerring 2008, Seawright
& Gerring 2008). This approach maximizes differences in explanatory variables across cases that
nevertheless both exhibit internal colonization. Sri Lanka is a postcolonial democracy while Iraq has
been characterized by military junta rule and autocracy. Iraq’s Kurds have TEK in Turkey, Syria,
and Iran, while the Tamils are isolated on Sri Lanka with the Sinhalese. By identifying similarities
between the two cases, I can determine what factors make states more likely to engage in internal
colonial practices when faced with an independent-minded minority.
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I trace the history of internal colonial practices in each case and examine the effectiveness of
individual policies in meeting their stated goals. Viewed holistically, these evaluations highlight
when official reasons for supporting these practices are not borne out by their implementation. These
discrepancies can shed light on why governments actually engaged in these practices.
5.2.1 The Sri Lankan Dry Zone
Sri Lanka’s population is largely composed of a Buddhist Sinhalese majority and a Hindu Tamil
minority. The country’s Tamil population, dissatisfied with its marginalization in political and
economic life, coalesced behind the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and fought a failed
three decade war of independence against the Sinhalese government in Colombo. Many Tamils have
given the encroachment of Sinhalese migrants into Tamil territory as a reason for the conflict. While
this migration is regarded as a cause of the conflict, it also represented an attempt to prevent such a
conflict from occurring.
Internal colonization within Sri Lanka has primarily involved movement of people from the
country’s southwestern Wet Zone to its northeastern Dry Zone. The Dry Zone suffers from rampant
malaria, low and irregular rainfall, inadequate soil, and dense jungle that has to be cleared before
agricultural cultivation or development can proceed (Farmer 1957, 19-39). The Wet Zone is largely
free of these concerns and was thus both more populated and more densely populated at the start of
the 20th Century. Under British rule, significant numbers of Tamils from India migrated to the Dry
Zone to work on plantations during the 19th Century, and their descendants make up the majority of
Tamils in the region today (Peebles 1990, 31).
Since the end of the 19th Century, the Sinhalese majority has engaged, with varying intensity over
time, in a campaign of mass migration into the Tamil-dominated Dry Zone. One major motivation for
this migration in public discourse has been the popular perception of a long ago Sinhalese ‘golden
age’ in the Dry Zone (Smith 1979). There is substantial archaeological evidence of an ancient
Sinhalese civilization in the Dry Zone from the 3rd Century BCE to the 12th Century including
large monuments and extensive former reservoirs and irrigation works (Ray 1959). These sites gave
rise to an image of a fallen Sinhalese civilization in the Dry Zone (Farmer 1957, 14-18) and myriad
popular explanations for its decline in the 12th Century. Many public statements around resettlement
efforts in the Dry Zone explicitly reference these understandings and express a desire to restore
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Sinhalese civilization in the Dry Zone to its former glory before the collapse (Manogaran 1987, 78-
88). However, it is possible that these statements may use public yearning for a Sinhalese restoration
in the Dry Zone instrumentally to accomplish other policy objectives.
The earliest colonization attempts began in the late 19th Century when peasants from neighboring
areas in the Wet Zone were enticed to relocate to Battacaloa in the 1890s with the promise of
government assistance (Farmer 1957, 112-115). These movements were justified by claims that
they would alleviate population pressure and overcrowding in the urban areas of the Wet Zone.
Colonization began in earnest with the passage of the Land Development Ordinance of 1935 which
allowed alienation1 of crown land to landless peasants, and this land went primarily to Sinhalese
peasants living in the Wet Zone (Manogaran 1994, 99). These resettlement efforts were accompanied
by irrigation projects in the Dry Zone to increase the productivity of the land given to the Sinhalese
transplants, making resettlement even more attractive to landless peasants living in the Wet Zone.
Both the transfer of land and the irrigation and infrastructure projects that supported them were
framed in explicitly revivalist terms by D.S. Senanayake, the chairman of the Agriculture and Lands
Executive Committee under British Colonial rule and the first Prime Minister after independence
(Moore 1985, 44-46).
These efforts accelerated with the start of the Gal Oya project in 1949. The project involved
damming the Gal Oya river for hydroelectric power, building numerous irrigation reservoirs, and
settling Sinhalese peasants in the surrounding area and was completed in 1953. The project’s architect
K. Kanagasundram framed it in explicitly colonial terms and viewed crown land in the Dry Zone as
land stolen by British and settled with “alien Indian Tamil Labourers” (Kanagasundram 2016). This
perspective was commonly held by Sinhalese who believed that Indian Tamils who lived in the Dry
Zone were complicit in the alienation of Sinhalese lands to British interests by laboring on the farms
located on the land (Samaraweera 1982, 107). This attitude paved the way for widespread public
support for the development and relocation efforts.
1Writers discussing seizure and redistribution of land in Sri Lankan colonization efforts typically use the legal
term alienation regardless of the coerciveness of the transfer. Alienation accurately describes the redistribution
of crown (government) land, but later efforts that transferred ownership from (usually Tamil) smallholders to
Sinhalese newcomers are more accurately described as expropriation given the limited compensation these
landholders typically received.
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While the project enjoyed high levels of popular support, getting people to actually move to
the new settlements was another matter. People brought to land around Gal Oya in 1953 received
“two acres of high land and five acres of paddy land — together with cooking utensils and farm
implements” from the government (Kanagasundram 2016). These private goods represented an
increase in state support for colonization from previous efforts which provided “domestic water,
irrigation water, roads, schools, hospitals, community halls and colonization officers” in newly
created settlements (Amerasinghe 1976, 622) beginning in 1939. Eventually, government support for
these settlements escalated to the point that
the government provided assistance to the colonists for clearing forest, ridging,
fencing, construction of toilets, and construction of wells. In new projects associated with
major river basin projects, peasants are settled on land with irrigation facilities. Lowlands
are even machine-cleared, stumped, ridged, and rippled by the Land Development
Department. Settlers are also given additional allowance for a temporary structure,
seed paddy, cash for the purchase of implements, and eighteen months of food aid
(Manogaran 1987, 88)
These programs were extremely capital intensive and required a significant investment from the
government.
While the government justified these plans on the ground of improving the nation’s food
production capacity, some scholars have argued that increasing yield in existing paddies would have
been a more effective way of achieving this goal, and that the government was more concerned with
increasing the area under cultivation than diversifying the crops in production (Ponnambalam 1981,
21-23). This possibility further suggests that the government had demographic manipulation in mind
when conceiving the projects and was not primarily motivated by increasing agricultural output.
Even when agricultural policy shifted towards increasing paddy yield in the 50s, colonization of the
Dry Zone continued apace (Ponnambalam 1981, 36). Table 5.1 details the amount of land alienated
to smallholders in the period from 1936 to 1966.
In this 30 year period, over 1.26 million acres of land was alienated from the government to
landless peasants, roughly evenly divided between new developments and expansions of existing









Major Colonization 287 59.7 4.8
Paddy (182) (3.0)
Highland (105) (1.8)
Highland Colonization 31 8.8 3.5
Youth Settlement 7
Middle Class 147 11.6 12.7
Special Leases 58
Marginal Land 70
Village Expansion Schemes 664 504.2
Total Land Alienated 1,264 587.4
Table 5.1: Land Alienated Under Land Development Schemes, 1936-66 (Report of the Land Utilisa-
tion Committee, August 1967, S.P. 11, Government Press as cited in Amerasinghe (1976, 623))
Lanka 2019). This constitutes a significant transfer of land to Sinhalese settlers which continued
after 1966. Internal migration in the 1940s and 1950s consisted primarily of rural to rural movement
(Jayewardene 1979, 52) as these Sinhalese relocated from agricultural land in the Wet Zone to newly
irrigated land in the Dry Zone. Accordingly, the government justification that resettlement programs
were designed to alleviate population pressure in crowded urban areas should be viewed with some
skepticism.
These relocation schemes had considerable impacts on the demographics of the targeted regions.
The government did not record ethnicity on census responses, so it is impossible to know conclusively
how these efforts reshaped the ethnic composition of each district. Manogaran attempted to estimate
the demographic effect of Sinhalese migration to Tamil-majority districts by using the national
population growth rate as a benchmark, and then calculating the difference between this projected
change in population and the observed one (1987, 96).
The Sri Lankan government does not provide statistics on the changes in demographic compo-
sition in the Dry Zone over time. However, by using the population growth rate for the island as
a whole, it is possible to construct a counterfactual for each Tamil district. Comparing the actual
change in population with this counterfactual can provide a very rough estimate of the number of
Sinhalese migrants from the Wet Zone. In every Tamil district except Jaffna, this estimated Sinhalese
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population growth is positive (Manogaran 1987, 96), indicating that significant numbers of Sinhalese
have been relocated to Tamil majority areas in the Dry Zone.2
Mannar Trincomalee Vavuniya
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Figure 5.1: Actual versus projected population increases in Tamil districts, 1953-1983 (multiple
sources, as cited in Manogaran (1987, 96)).
Figure 5.1 presents these differences graphically. In every Tamil-majority district except Jaffna,
the actual population growth far exceeds estimates. These disparities are likely due to the in-
migration of Sinhalese from the Wet Zone, indicating that Sinhalese became a much larger share of
the population in each district.
The difference between actual and projected population slightly increases after 1963 for most of
the panels in Figure 5.1. This growing divergence reflects a shift in the priorities of the settlement
efforts around this time, expressed through two major developments.
First, a plan to develop irrigation, hydroelectric power, and water management for the Mahaweli
Ganga river was drafted in 1968 and implementation began in 1977 (Hewavisenthi 1992). Where
2See Table D.1 for a full presentation of these estimates.
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earlier schemes, including the Gal Oya project, primarily settled Sinhalese peasants on unoccupied
land and improved irrigation in existing Tamil villages (Kanagasundram 2016), the Mahaweli
Programme explicitly targeted Tamil villages for resettling by Sinhalese and did not provide any
improvements to Tamil villages. Water produced by the project went primarily to Sinhalese areas
and excluded Tamil settlements (Manogaran 1987, 107).
Second, the introduction of the “Special Leases Scheme in 1965” granted up to 1,000 acres of
land at a time in the Dry Zone to private companies (Amerasinghe 1976, 625) greatly accelerated the
pace of Sinhalese migration as many of these plots were given to Sinhalese companies.
Despite overcrowding in Dry Zone districts due to the absence of irrigation, land and water
from new projects in the Dry Zone were given to peasants who already owned land in the Wet Zone
(Manogaran 1987, 90). More Sinhalese from the Wet Zone were selected for Allai, Kantalai, and Gal
Oya settlements than local Tamils already living in the vicinity (Manogaran 1987, 91).
Given these inequities, it was perhaps inevitable that Sri Lankan Tamils would see the massive
migrations of Sinhalese into the Dry Zone as an intrusion into their alleged “homelands,” and as
attempts to swamp them (Tambiah 1992, 69). “Tamil politicians have claimed that preference was
given to Sinhalese over Tamils in the selection of allottees for colonization schemes that are located
in Tamil districts” (Manogaran 1987, 88), a claim which is not particularly controversial in light of
the demographic changes the settlement programs resulted in. “Since Sinhala settlements in the north
central and eastern provinces occurred under direct state sponsorship, it appeared to many Tamils as
a deliberate attempt of the Sinhala dominated state to marginalize them further by decreasing their
numbers in the area” (Perera 2001, 18).
These grievances were understandable as Sinhalese squatters were often permitted to remain
on government land in the Dry Zone while Tamil squatters were frequently evicted from settlement
projects (Manogaran 1987, 93). Emerging from this environment of unequal treatment in 1976,
the LTTE found no shortage of recruits for their campaign of violence against the government. In
short order, “resettled groups have become regular targets of violent and brutal attacks by many of
these militant groups, particularly the LTTE” who aimed to “eliminate the Sinhala presence in these
areas and to destroy their infrastructure in order to prevent future resettlement” (Perera 2001, 19).
These early clashes quickly escalated into a full-scale secessionist campaign with LTTE leadership
demanding an independent state for Tamils in the island’s northeast.
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Such a hostile response to Sinhalese settlement makes even more sense when considering their
colonial nature. The development of agricultural land in the Dry Zone was frequently justified
as a way to increase the food production of the nation, and this was a major objective during
the planning phase of the Mahaweli Programme (Peiris 1978, 611). Yet many of the individual
settlements in the Programme cost significantly more than they contributed in terms of increased
agricultural yields (Nithiyanandam & Gounder 2004, 222). One evaluation of the earlier Gal Oya
project estimated that even if the capital for the project was obtained interest-free, it would have lost
money (Ponnambalam 1981, 22). These assessments cast serious doubt on the settlement schemes as
simple economic development projects.
One straightforward interpretation of these resource negative projects is that the government
viewed them as a security concern, and was willing to pay the cost to attain increased security.
Another interpretation is that the government viewed these efforts as an economically driven project,
but was willing to pay their short-term costs for the promise of longer-term rewards from developed
agricultural lands in the future. Whatever the motivation, they were not fully effective in asserting
control over Tamil areas of the Dry Zone. Although the government eventually triumphed over the
LTTE, the conflict lasted for 25 years and claimed upwards of 100,000 lives (Ganguly 2018).
Despite the failure of Sinhalese colonization schemes to prevent the emergence of armed Tamil
secessionist groups, they represented a clear attempt by the government in Colombo so assert control
over the Dry Zone. By relocating large numbers of Sinhalese, the government’s primary supporters,
to the region, they were able to extend their influence into previously uncontrolled territory, providing
a justification for violent resistance to Tamil secessionist efforts.
5.2.2 Iraqi Kurdistan
Iraq’s Northeast has been historically inhabited by the Kurds since before the emergence of the
modern Iraqi state in the aftermath of World War I (WWI). Large Kurdish populations also existing
in neighboring regions of Iran, Turkey, and Syria. While the Kurds under Mustafa Barzani’s
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KPD) engaged in multiple separatist conflicts with the government in
the 1960s and 1970s, today the KDP shares power with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in
the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (Owtram 2019, 305-308). Despite
the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the Kurds have not seized the opportunity to fight for
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independence in the intervening years. To understand why regime change has proved insufficient to
spur an independence struggle, it is necessary to study a policy of deliberate demographic change
that dates to well before Saddam Hussein came to power. This process of Arabization was active for
most of the 20th Century and had a profound impact on the region.
Iraqi Kurdistan has long been characterized by patterns of demographic changes. After the
discovery of oil in the early 20th Century, the Turkish Petroleum Company3 brought in large numbers
of Arab and Assyrian employees beginning in 1925 rather than hiring local Kurds to fill positions
(Anderson & Stansfield 2009, 32-33). Importing labor from elsewhere in Iraq continued throughout
the 1930s, increasing the ethnic diversity of Kurdish-dominated Kirkuk (Talabany 1999, 12).
While migration from outside of Kurdish territory began with the petroleum industry, it did
not stop there. The government developed an irrigation project in the 1930s near the Hawija plains
where Kurds typically grazed, but gave plots of land to nomadic Arab families who occasionally
passed through instead of Kurds who lived there more permanently (Anderson & Stansfield 2009,
35). If the government’s main objective was to maximize agricultural production on the land, then
it should have gone to the Kurds who already cultivated some crops there instead of Arab nomads
who intermittently used it as grazing land. Throughout the 1940s the government encouraged “Arab
settlement in the rural areas southwest of Kirkuk city, with tribes brought from less fertile areas west
of the Tigris,” which lead to a major increase in Kirkuk Governorate’s Arab population by the 1950s
(Knights & Ali 2010, 2). These new arrivals were frequently offered water from recently completed
irrigation projects for their land.
After the February 1963 coup against Abd al-Karim Qasim, resettlement efforts took on a much
more confrontational character. The new military government razed Kurdish villages in Kirkuk
Governorate, evicted Kurds from other villages, and resettled them with Arab tribes (Talabany 1999,
19; Anderson & Stansfield 2009, 35-36). To facilitate even greater migration to the region, the
government promised Arab military members that they would receive formerly Kurdish lands in
the area (Knights & Ali 2010, 4). The net effect of these demographic manipulations was to vastly
increase the Arab population of Kirkuk relative to its Kurdish population.
3Later renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company.
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During this period, the Ba’ath government sought to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict with
the Kurds, but Barzani, unsatisfied with the government’s initial overtures, resumed attacks in early
1969. With material support from Iran, the KDP was able to fight the government forces to a standstill
[323-327](McDowall 2004). Faced with a well-supplied Kurdish force, the government came to the
bargaining table. Despite intense negotiations around Barzani’s autonomy demands, the government
walked away from the talks and unilaterally declared a Kurdistan Autonomous Region in 1974, but
this region encompassed substantially less land than Barzani claimed and excluded the oilfields
outside of Kirkuk (Human Rights Watch 2004, 8). By doing so, the government hoped to weaken the
Kurds’ claim to the oil producing region around Kirkuk. After this recognition, the Iraq Petroleum
Company fired numerous Kurdish employees or transferred them out of Kirkuk Governorate, a fate
shared by many low-level Kurdish civil servants (Talabany 1999, 19). Transferring Kurdish civil
servants not only reduced the level of Kurdish influence over local government, it also removed
highly educated Kurds from the region.
Concurrently, the government began incentivizing nomadic Arabs from the al-Jazeera Desert to
relocate to formerly Kurdish lands by offering free irrigated land. Some Arabs living in Southern
Iraq were promised both housing and benefits by the government (Black 1993, 35). Testimony from
these migrants illustrates other incentives they received as well:
We went to Hin Djok at the end of 1974, October or November. Before this, we used
to live like shepherds with our sheep, south of Mosul. We had no lands, and we used
to take our sheep [grazing in the desert.] In 1974, the government came and asked if
we wanted lands in the north. We were very grateful and voluntarily went to the north.
. . . We built our own houses, all of our families built new houses, and we also dug water
wells. Each farmer got sixty dunums4 of irrigated land. (Sulaiman Muhammad Ibrahim
al-Hadidi (2003) quoted in (Human Rights Watch 2004))
We came to Suhaila in 1974. We came from Salahuddin governorate, from the
al-Jazeera desert. The government and the Ba‘th moved us from al-Jazeera to this
village. The government came to us, and announced that there were lands in these
4An archaic unit of measurement used throughout the former Ottoman Empire. The size of a dunam varies by
country, but Iraq’s is equivalent to 2,500m2.
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villages, and if we wanted to register [for land], we could. We registered, and one day
they brought vehicles to transport us. Before this, we were living like bedouin in tents.
They assigned each farmer 100 dunums. (Muhammad Hassan Alawi al-Hadidi (2003)
quoted in (Human Rights Watch 2004))
The transfers gave significant tracts of land to previously landless nomads, resulting in many
volunteers for relocation.
Not content to chip away at the Kurdish character of Kirkuk via demography, the government
renamed many streets, neighborhoods, schools, and businesses in Kirkuk city with c names (Talabany
1999, 20). The Kirkuk Governorate itself was renamed al-Ta’meem (nationalization) in 1976,
referring to the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972 (Talabany 1999, 24). Arab
men were even offered financial rewards for taking Kurdish wives, to further shift the region’s identity
from Kurdish to Arab (McDowall 2004, 340).
To attract Arab replacements for dismissed or displaced Kurdish employees, the government
constructed numerous housing developments in and around Kirkuk, while also offering government
subsidized housing to Arabs who joined the local police forces (Talabany 1999, 19-22). Settlements
were often accompanied by army camps to protect the new arrivals from violence by armed Kurdish
groups (Anderson & Stansfield 2009, 38-39). This defensive posture resulted in a vast increase in
the size of the security forces in the region (Harris 1977, 121). By protecting Arab migrants from
Kurdish violence, the government also increased its capacity to respond to more sweeping violent
challenges for autonomy or secession from the Kurds.
Migration continued into the early 1980s with thousands more homes constructed throughout
Kirkuk, many being deserved for the families of those killed in the Iran-Iraq war (Anderson &
Stansfield 2009, 40). Other migrants were commonly referred to as “10,000-dinar Arabs” given
the incentives they received for relocating to Kurdish-majority areas, such as public housing which
continued to be built into the 1990s (Knights & Ali 2010, 4).
Kurdish displacement culminated in the al-Anfal campaigns of the 1980s which destroyed
hundreds of villages in Kurdish territory and killed thousands (Black 1993, Talabany 2001). The
third and fourth al-Anfal campaigns in 1988 destroyed 121 villages, razing even the foundations
of structures to prevent resettlement (Knights & Ali 2010, 3). The Arabization campaign took a
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turn after the Gulf War in 1991, narrowed its focus even more intently on Kirkuk. The government
pressured Kurds, Turkmens, and Assyrians living in the city to sign “ethnic identity correction”
forms to officially register as Arabs, and threatened anyone who refused to do so (Human Rights
Watch 2004, 15).
Taken together, each of the individual aspects of the government’s Arabization policy has had
a significant impact on the demographics of Kirkuk. To illustrate this, Table 5.2 shows changes in
the ethnic makeup of Kirkuk Governorate from 1957 to 1997. While any census figures are suspect







Kurds 187,593 48 184,875 38 155,861 21
Arabs5 109,620 28 218,755 45 544,596 72
Turkmens 83,371 21 80,347 17 50,099 7
Total 388,829 483,977 752,7456
Table 5.2: Comparison of 1957, 1977, and 1997 Kirkuk Governorate Censuses (Anderson &
Stansfield 2009, 43)
Central to Arabization was a need to expropriate land from Kurdish owners that could then be
transferred to Arab settlers. The government accomplished this through a variety of legal means. The
Qassim government passed the Agrarian Reform Act of 1958 which limited private land ownership
to 2,000 dunums, then the Ba’ath Agrarian Reform Act of 1970 reduced this limit to 1,000 dunumns
which was later reduced to 300 dunums in the north (Human Rights Watch 2004, 15-16). The seizure
of Kurdish land allowed it to be granted to Arabs from the south, and these incentives were largely
responsible for the massive demographic shifts Kirkuk experienced over the second half of the 20th
Century.
In addition to physically moving Arabs and Kurds, the government also redrew political bound-
aries, adding Arab majority districts and removing Kurdish majority districts from Kirkuk Gov-
ernorate to further decrease the Kurdish population of the region. This gerrymandering added so
many Arab dominated districts to the west and subtracted so many Kurdish districts to the east that
it actually shifted Kirkuk Governorate significantly to the west and away from the Kurdish east
5Christians registered as Arabs
6Includes other minorities
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(Anderson & Stansfield 2009, 27-30). Figure 5.2 illustrates the shrinking and shifting borders of
Kirkuk over time. Figure 5.2a depicts them in 1968 while Figure 5.2b does so in 2002.
(a) 1968 (b) 2002
Figure 5.2: Boundaries of Kirkuk Governorate over time (Anderson & Stansfield 2009, 29,31)
If Arabization was intended to dampen Kurdish efforts towards secession, it gained new urgency
following the Gulf War in 1991. Coalition forces declared a no fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan in
1991 (Wrage & Cooper 2019), and Iraq worried that Kurdish dreams of an independent state might
soon come to pass. To try and quash these hopes, the government intentionally followed a policy of
overproduction in Kirkuk oil fields during the 1990s (Anderson & Stansfield 2009, 45) to extract as
much oil as possible. To maintain these elevated production levels the government even reinjected
crude oil into reservoirs to preserve the pressure needed to continue elevated extraction levels, a
largely unheard of practice (Gerth 2003). This accelerated production schedule may have caused
irreparable damage to Kurdish oil reserves, permanently reducing the ultimately recoverable yield
(United Nations 2000).
This strategy had the double benefits of recovering as much oil as possible before potentially
losing the Kirkuk oil fields to a separatist movement while simultaneously deterring that separatist
movement by degrading the quality of the oil fields. With future extraction made costlier by
intentional mismanagement of the oil reservoirs, a hypothetical Kurdish state would suffer from
decreased revenue due to the degraded condition of the reserves. This overproduction policy is an
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example of extreme measures that a government can take to reduce the governability of a minority
group’s territory.
While drastic, this scorched earth strategy should not be surprising given the stakes. Multiple Iraqi
governments viewed any concessions to the Kurds as the start of a process that would inexorably lead
to secession, leading them to view the status of the Kurds as a national security issue (Yesiltas 2014,
42). Thus, any challenge to the Iraqi identity of Kirkuk, let alone any concrete military threat,
was viewed as a national security issue with existential implications for the state (Anderson &
Stansfield 2009, 26). While Arabization employed population as a tool, it was ultimately about
asserting control of Kirkuk and its valuable oil reserves. When it seemed like retaining control of
those reserves was in danger, the government was willing to sacrifice them to deny the Kurds access.
This seemingly reckless attitude toward oil reserves illustrates the fact that Arabization was
always about retaining control of Kirkuk’s petroleum reserves. The Iraqi government was willing
to destroy some of the oil to keep control of all of what remained, rather than risk losing access to
oil rents in the case of Kurdish independence. While population was the tool the government used,
the ultimate goal was denying a rival group access to the same resources the Iraqi state needed to
function.
5.3 Discussion
The actions of the Iraqi and Sri Lankan governments reveal their concern over maintaining control
over their respective minorities’ territory. In each case, the government’s supporters were composed
primarily of a single ethnic group, Sinhalese in Sri Lanka and Sunni Arabs in Iraq. Ethnic tensions
led the minority in each country to ultimately view the government’s actions through a lens of
replacement and seizure. A careful examination of the commonalities and divergences between the
strategies employed and the ultimate outcome in each case highlights the ways in which internal
colonialism functions as a method of secession preemption.
To accomplish their goals of transferring land from the regionally powerful minority to the
nationally dominant group, both Iraq and Sri Lanka passed land reform laws limiting the maximum
land that could be owned by an individual and then expropriating any land in excess of this amount.
By giving this land to settlers from the dominant group, the government increases the legitimacy of
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its claim to the land as it is transferred from the government to the settlers, and not merely directly
claimed by them. While ownership was granted to Sinhalese migrants from the Wet Zone, Arabs who
relocated to Kirkuk remained tenants who rented land directly from the government (Human Rights
Watch 2004, 17-18). As a result, the government remained a much larger player in the everyday lives
of Arab transplants than Sinhalese ones.
Outside of land, the incentives the governments used to encourage dominant group-members
to relocate were noticeably different. Colombo provided mainly agricultural services including
irrigation and mechanized land clearing, with the end goal of creating a population of independent
smallholders in the Dry Zone. While Baghdad also provided farming land and irrigation, its focus was
considerably less regional. Driven by a desire to increase Arab migration to Kirkuk, benefits often
included employment in the oil industry or government jobs as minor civil servants. Though both
programs provided housing, many Sinhalese settlers had to work to build their dwellings themselves
in contrast with Arab arrivals who frequently moved into government constructed public housing
complexes. Just as with the status of their land, the types of incentives used by the Iraqi government
insinuated it into the daily lives of migrants.
While Arabization resulted in drastic changes to the culture and character of Kurdish communities
in Kirkuk, Sri Lankan settlement efforts had a much smaller effect on Tamil areas. Many of the
new Sinhalese villages never developed horizontal relationships with neighboring Tamil or Muslim
communities and remained “ethnic colonies” among a largely Tamil landscape (Perera 2001, 18).
This isolation did not facilitate the deep integration of Sinhalese migrants into the everyday life of
the divisions they relocated to in the way that Arab migrants transformed Kirkuk and its outlying
Kurdish villages. Arabization many have been a more successful conflict deterrent due to its more
complete reshaping of everyday life.
An explanation for these differing patterns of government-individual relationships lies in the
type of resource each government sought to assert its control over. The Sri Lankan schemes were
highly agricultural in nature, and the end result they pursued was increased agricultural production.
The programs were costly and not the most effective approach to increasing agricultural yield, which
is puzzling if we assume that the goal was simply to increase national production as efficiently as
possible. Instead, the settlement projects represent an effort to increase agricultural output as much
as possible for Sinhalese Sri Lankans. While costly in the short-term, these land grabs ensured
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that in the long-run, Sinhalese people would control the majority of agricultural production. Non-
mechanized agriculture is not heavily capital dependent, so after the initial land clearing and irrigation
development, the government would not be heavily involved in the Sinhalese agricultural expansion
project.
Conversely, Arabization represented an effort to dominate an incredibly capital-intense sector of
the economy. Petroleum extraction and refining requires extensive infrastructure and skilled labor. It
is also geographically concentrated and thus vulnerable to sabotage efforts. To support and protect
their effort to retain control over Kirkuk’s oil reserves, the Iraqi government was required to take a
very active and visible role in the lives of the citizens it had relocated to Kurdish territory. The Sri
Lanka government built irrigation works that settlers could use for their personal cultivation, while
the Iraqi government built clinics staffed by Arabs and schools that worked to create an Arab identity
in their students (McDowall 2004, 340).
The actions of both governments pursued the goals of internal colonialism in broad strokes, but
they differed greatly in execution. Each used the tools of government persuasion (McGarry 1998),
but the results were very different. More importantly, their effectiveness as conflict prevention tools
varied significantly. Tamil resentment led to small scale riots, the emergence of multiple armed
groups, and ultimately a 25 conflict against the separatist Tamil Tigers. Although Iraq has a history
of violence with Kurdish nationalist groups dating back to the 1940s (Owtram 2019, 305), neither
the PDK or PUK have pushed for formal independence since the 1970s. Even the Gulf War and Iraq
War have failed to spark an armed independence challenge from the Kurds.
While the type of resource the government seeks to secure plays a role in the effectiveness
of internal colonization as a separatism prevention strategy, the Kurdish and Tamil cases differ
on another key dimension. Sri Lankan demographic engineering consisted primarily of programs
and policies that brought Sinhalese peasants into Tamil territory. Iraq relocated many Arabs to
Kirkuk, but they also displaced vast numbers of Kurds and dispersed them throughout the rest of the
country. In doing so, they significantly weakened the power base of Kurds in their native Kirkuk.
This bidirectional movement of people is mirrored in the Breton experience where 533,267 Bretons
relocated to other parts of France between 1945 and 1975 and were replaced by 442,565 people from
the rest of France who migrated to Brittany during that time (Reece 1979, 285-286). France has yet
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to experience any major organized violence by Breton separatists, so it appears that simply importing
members of the dominant group is insufficient as a prevention strategy.
As the Iraqi government increased the presence of security forces in Kurdistan throughout the
1970s and 1980s, it hired many Arabs from elsewhere in the country rather than Kurds or local
Arabs. Oftentimes these Arab migrants were directly employed by the security forces as police
or intelligence officers (Talabany 2001, 97) This decision highlights the difficult of empirically
disentangling the more limited conflict prevention strategies, like increasing the size of security
forces, discussed in Chapter 3 from the more drastic ones that characterize internal colonialism.
China is similarly inducing Han Chinese police to relocate from elsewhere in the country to Xinjiang
with high salaries and housing allowances (Radio Free Asia 2017). Their co-occurrence in these
cases is consistent with the finding in Chapter 3 that governments invest more attention in territories
that overlap with the dominant group’s territory. This could be due to both the government directing
public goods to its supporters in these areas, and to increased security force presence to protect those
supporters. While cross-national quantitative analyses cannot asses what mix of positive and negative
inducements governments use to preempt secession, the Iraqi and Sri Lankan cases suggest that, at
least in these cases, governments employ far more sticks than carrots.
Internal migration is often figured as a cause of low level peripheral violence. These “sons of the
soil” wars (Weiner 1978) may continue for decades (Fearon 2004) as locals react to the arrival of
more prosperous migrants (Côté 2015) from the center (Fearon & Laitin 2011). If internal migration
can spark these intractable conflicts, why would states engage in internal colonization as a conflict
prevention strategy? Once again, the Iraqi and Sri Lankan cases provide an answer. Given that
the Iraqi Kurds possess immense oil reserves and have TEK in three neighboring states, the fact
that the Kurds have not employed violence on a large scale in pursuit of independence since the
Gulf War suggests that Arabization has been remarkably effective in stymieing Kurdish separatist
ambitions. Barzani fought for independence in the 1960s (McDowall 2004, 315-320), but by the
1980s the KDP was content to push for autonomy, and the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional
Government in 1992 has seemingly further reduced violence. While the vast majority of Kurds still
desire independence with 92% voting for it in a 2017 referendum (Chulov 2017), the KRG peacefully
accepted the central government’s invalidation of the referendum (Rasheed & Jalabi 2017). The
relative absence of secessionist violence following the end of the Gulf War indicates that while the
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Ba’ath regime’s Arabization efforts were unable to stamp out Kurdish independence desires, they
were successful in deterring violence in pursuit of those aims.
Although Sri Lanka failed to prevent the emergence of the LTTE and fought a bitter war
against it, the government did not do so from a position of weakness. The extensive Dry Zone
colonization schemes meant that there were Sinhalese inhabitants throughout the Tigers’ territory,
and the government did not have to be concerned about the loyalties of civilians in Sinhalese areas..
More directly, the security infrastructure of the region was already well-developed due to the need to
protect Sinhalese settlers, with more than 100 army camps established in Tamil-majority divisions
by the 1980s (Manogaran 1994, 116), so they were well prepared to respond to the escalation of
hostilities. The government eventually emerged victorious over the LTTE in 2009, and throughout
the fight was aided by the Sinhalese presence in the island’s northeast.
5.3.1 Alternative Explanations
While briefly addressed at various points throughout the case narratives, it is important to explicitly
discuss the shortcomings of alternative explanations for these patterns of internal colonialism.
Multiple analyses found that the Sri Lankan colonization schemes cost considerably more money
than they produced in increased agricultural yield, even in the medium to long-term. This revenue-
negative situation suggests that economic development was not the primary motivation for the
irrigation and settlement campaign. Governments are often willing to tolerate enormous costs in the
name of national security, and given longstanding tensions with the Tamils, Sinhalese concern over
maintaining control of the Dry Zone was rational.
Similarly, Baghdad’s actions in Kurdistan cannot be explained simply by a desire for petroleum
rents. The majority of revenues already went to the central government instead of local authorities,
so the decision to import non-Kurdish workers from elsewhere in Iraq for the IPC was not the
result of a mere attempt to increase a favored group’s share of rents. Similarly, the cartographic
manipulation that resulted in Kirkuk Governorate shrinking and moving south is puzzling if we
limit our explanations to purely economic or patronage driven ones. By redrawing the boundaries of
the governorate, Baghdad was able to reduce the amount of territory they could plausibly claim as
Kurdish in the event of a secessionist revolt.
110
The strongest evidence for a non-economic motivation for internal colonialism comes from
Iraq’s handling of Kurdish oil fields during the Gulf War. A purely economic policy would have
extracted as oil from the reserves as quickly as possible if the government feared losing access.
Instead, the government employed techniques that degraded the reserves and ultimately lowered
the total recoverable yield. While this strategy is suboptimal from a purely economic standpoint,
it is highly rational if the goal is to deter secession and weaken any potential newly independent
state. Iraq could afford reduced production in the northern oil fields due to reserves elsewhere in
the country, but these degradations would have a significant impact on a hypothetical Kurdish state
with no other reserves to turn to. These drastic measures are unsurprising given “some Iraqis feared
ceding such areas would undermine Iraq’s strategic security” during negotiations with Barzani’s
KDP in the 60s and 70s (McDowall 2004, 327).
In both cases, the benefits of agricultural improvements went primarily to members of the favored
group living far from the area. These programs were not simple agricultural infrastructure projects
because if they were, the people already living on the newly irrigated and tilled land would have been
the beneficents of it. Instead, both governments also implemented expensive incentive campaigns
to induce their supporters to relocate to these areas. If improving outcomes for supporters was the
primary goals, the governments could have improved areas where they already lived. The actions of
both governments align with a desire to assert control over less ‘governed’ spaces within the state’s
borders. Baghdad already controlled oil revenues from Kirkuk, and Colombo gained precious little in
agricultural production from the Dry Zone, so the resettlements make little sense from an economic
or clientelistic perspective.
Another potential explanation for these internal colonial behaviors is the desire to build a buffer
against foreign subversion composed of loyal populations. While people can be resettled to support
this aim (McNamee & Zhang Forthcoming), such external concerns are unlikely to play strong roles
in both cases. Sri Lanka is an island, so the need to establish a buffer against a neighboring state
was not present. These concerns are more relevant in the Kurdish case where Iran supplied arms and
supplies to the KDP in the 1970s, but Arabization continued well after Iran agreed to stop supporting
the Kurds. While maneuvering against foreign rivals can contribute to internal colonialism, it is
clearly not a necessary condition as Sri Lanka engaged in this practice without the presence of a
neighboring rival.
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Fear of a secessionist threat is not the only reason why states engage in internal colonialism.
Sometimes it can be driven by a desire to ensure that supporters reap the benefits of new economic
activity or simply efforts to develop underdeveloped regions within a state. However, it can just
as easily be an attempt to swamp the local political of an aggrieved minority with designs on
independence.
5.3.2 Demographic Engineering as a Conflict Management Strategy?
Both Iraq and Sri Lanka failed to fully prevent the emergence of an armed secessionist group, but
neither has had to permanently cede any territory to their respective movements. Internal colonization
may thus be less of a conflict prevention strategy than a conflict management strategy. Although
it runs the risk of sparking territorial violence by transplanting settlers into minority territory, this
conflict will never come as a surprise. In the most effective scenario, internal colonialism overwhelms
and fractures local political movements, preventing the emergence of an armed challenger. Even
when it fails to do so, it establishes infrastructure the government can use in the fight against the
group and eliminates the element of surprise.
This long-term success through short-term failure dynamic is embodied by American westward
expansion in the 19th Century. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 represented a reversal of previous
policy that recognized Native American nations in the Southeast as sovereign political entities. In
doing so, the government reneged on treaties previously signed with the Cherokee, Chickasaw,
Choctaw, Creek (Muscogee), and Seminole nations (Perdue 2012), signaling a shift from viewing
native groups as sovereign nations to subjects of the United States, living within its borders.
Following this decision, the government forcibly relocated native American nations into reserva-
tions (Foreman 1953) while simultaneously encouraging white Americans to settle in areas formerly
or currently occupied by natives via the promise of ‘free ’ land, just as the Iraqi government relocated
Arabs to Kurdistan with the promise of government jobs and housing. And just as Baghdad had to
increase and strengthen the security forces protecting these new arrivals, Washington had to protect
its investment in the railroads (White 2011) and white settler communities.
Although there were violent clashes until the early 20th Century as native nations tried to resist
the westward expansion of European settlers (Tucker, Arnold, Wiener, Pierpaoli Jr. & Coffey 2008),
US government policy was ultimately effective in deterring future secessionist conflict. American
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internal colonialism was a conflict management tool since it did not prevent violence entirely, but
did prepare the US government to respond to native challenges to its authority from a position of
superiority.
5.4 Conclusion
While states are more likely to engage in internal colonialism when minority groups inhabit territory
with exploitable resources, the nature of those resources appears to affect the form the colonization
takes and its ultimate effectiveness as a conflict management strategy. Extractive industries result in
a more concentrated and intense state presence than more agricultural ones, which leads to a larger
role for the state. This increased role may lead to higher initial friction with the local population, but
aggressive intervention seems to more effectively deter secession in the long-run.
Long-running low intensity conflicts where core meets periphery may actually be evidence of
conflict management. In essence, states are trading the risk of facing a well organized secessionist
army unprepared in the future for the near certainty of facing disorganized and scattered resistance
now. Based on the case evidence, it seems that internal colonial efforts where the state is more directly
engaged are more effective in preventing conflict. Given the heavy hand of Beijing in Xinjiang, an
organized mass violent Uyghur separatist movement is unlikely to emerge anytime soon.
The importance of government involvement in conflict prevention suggests that the informational
mechanism may be more important than either the credibility of retaliation or increasing ethnic
diversity. The mass migration of Sinhalese drastically affected the demographic of the Dry Zone but
was insufficient to prevent the emergence and popularity of the Tigers. The presence of large numbers
of Sinhalese that Colombo would fight to protect similarly failed to deter the LTTE. As the Dry
Zone colonization schemes were primarily rural-agricultural, the government played a much more
hands off role than they did in Kirkuk. Accordingly, the central government in Iraq was much more
informed of local developments than in Sri Lanka. This heightened information flow contributed to
conflict prevention efforts.
Internal colonialism is ultimately a conflict management strategy. At its most effective, it can
prevent secessionist violence or limit violent conflict to autonomy seeking groups. When less
effective it can fail to prevent the emergence of armed separatists, but still give governments an upper
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This dissertation makes multiple contributions to the study of peace and conflict. It links post-
independence state building, and the early modern state building literature, with conflict onset in the
present day. It gives information a central role in explaining when and where secessionist conflicts
are likely to occur, and it explores the many ways in which governments work behind the scenes to
prevent the emergence of armed separatist groups within their territories.
The role of information in this argument is marginally, but importantly, different from the way
it is typically operationalized in signaling models. Many signaling models are one shot games
where actors either learn or fail to do so, and then stable equilibria are reached. In this dissertation,
information is treated differently. Updating an intelligence estimate after changes in a situation
can be a slow, incremental process. This multiple step model of information updating allows for
a second shock to occur while governments are still adjusting to the first one. This conception of
information captures the reality for many resource-strapped states that lack access to satellite imagery,
ICT monitoring, and other costly tools of surveillance.
One of the most important implications of this research concerns conflict duration rather than
onset. The conflicts we witness are likely not started by the most capable dissident groups because
those groups arouse too much suspicion from the state. This selection effect could explain why
many civil wars drag on for decades; if a government is not willing to invest the capital needed to
prevent the emergence of secessionist groups in a territory, then it will be unlikely to commit the
military resources necessary to quickly defeat the group if it does emerge. Similarly, if the groups
that do emerge are weak, then they will face great difficulties defeating the state or forcing them to
the negotiating table. These dynamics could help explain why civil wars some civil wars last for such
long amounts of time.
The potential dependence of conflict duration on preemptive efforts highlights the importance of
viewing civil war holistically no matter the specific aspect of interest in a given analysis. Failing
to do so robs actors of their strategic agency in our understanding of conflict. If governments and
dissidents can make reasonable predictions about the future and plan accordingly, then failing to
include this behavior from in models of conflict means that we are likely to reach biased inferences
as were omitting important interactions between opponents.
This research seeks to find a synthesis between geographic and political explanations for conflict
and peace. Theories of politics often ignore the geographic, territorial, concrete environments that
actors and movements exist in and must contend with. Conversely, geographic theories of peace
and conflict often overlook the cleavages behind the conflict and seek to explain how combatants
confront one another over time in an exogenously driven clash.
This dissertation represents a first effort at combining these two forces, geography and politics,
so it naturally focuses on the start (or failure to start) of conflicts. This is a necessary precondition
for understanding how these factors shape the trajectory of conflicts at the macro and micro level
throughout their duration.
Chapter 2 advances a broad theory of the relationship between geography, state building, and the
goals that rebel groups fight for, and Chapter 3 details why the patterns suggested by this theory are
not empirically observable in a cross-national annual dataset. Although the preemption argument in
Chapter 3 provides an explanation for why we do not observe these predictions, it cannot directly
test the proposed mechanism of preemption.
To overcome this limitation, Chapters 4 and 5 directly investigate the ways in which governments
try and sometimes fail to prevent conflict. Concerted preemption efforts stop separatist rebel groups
from organizing and mobilizing, but they rely on accurate information. When that information is
geographically derived and hence relatively static, conflict is rare. When conditions on the ground in
minority group territories shift, governments that are slow to adapt may face a secessionist crisis.
Even geographic conditions can change on short time scales, as with the discovery of extractable
commodities or the destruction wrought by natural disasters.
Chapter 5 provides a detailed exploration of two governments’ attempts to manipulate human
geography to their benefit. These case studies reveal that while governments engage in internal
colonialism to try and preserve their control over valuable resources, the nature of those resources
has a large impact on what the program will look like. Moreover, different internal colonial programs
differ vastly in their effectiveness as conflict prevention tools. Efforts where governments are more
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directly involved in the lives of their citizens seem to be more effective at preventing and managing
conflict.
One striking through-line that emerges is the centrality of information in successful conflict
prevention efforts. Chapter 4 develops a theory of prevention failure that emphasizes the importance
of up to date information. When governments are unaware of changes in the governability of a
minority group’s territory, they can not properly update their portfolio of prevention strategies. If
their information is seriously out of date, or if they lack the resources to adapt quickly enough,
then marginalized minorities may seize their moment and use the element of surprise against their
oppressors.
Similarly, the experiences of government directed settlement in the Sri Lankan Dry Zone and
Iraqi Kurdistan in Chapter 5 highlight the importance of information. While both governments
relocated massive numbers of their supporters from the dominant group, the government was much
more closely involved in Kurdistan. These close ties provided more information on happenings in
the region and allowed the government to channel separatist desires into satisfaction with simple
regional autonomy. In contrast, the Sinhalese expansion into the Dry Zone appears to have given
birth of a violent secessionist insurgency where only mild discontent existed before.
Another lesson from these cases of internal colonization is the danger of incomplete conflict
prevention strategies. Baghdad committed to breaking the will of the Kurds by dispersing them
throughout Iraq, whereas Colombo limited itself to supporting Sinhalese transplants. However, the
LTTE was eventually defeated, so even governments which cannot afford to commit wholeheartedly
to internal colonialism may experience benefits in the form of advantages in combating a secessionist
group.
There are many avenues to further develop and refine this research agenda. The overall argument
of geographic governability relies on a conception of ethnic group territorial homelands that can
serve as the basis for new states. Data limitations in the cross-national analyses require relying on
broad, inaccurate measures of where groups live. These measures provide no way of knowing the
breakdown of population by ethnic group when two more groups overlap. Newly available data
harness machine learning methods and household survey data to produce more granular estimates
of population numbers by ethnicity (Müller-Crepon & Hunziker 2018), but at present only cover
limited spatial and temporal ranges. Future work can apply these approaches with historic survey
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data to obtain more accurate measures of ethnic groups throughout time, improving the measurement
of population beyond the methods currently available.
Another important line of inquiry involves exploring when governments offer carrots, and when
they wield sticks in their secessionist preemption efforts. While security forces can be effective in
disrupting the formation of dissident military organizations, a heavy hand may spark backlash as in
Aceh and the Sri Lankan dry zone. Positive strategies like public goods are not without their own
pitfalls. If the government substantially improves infrastructure and the capital base in a minority
group’s territory without addressing the underlying grievances, they may make secession more
attractive by increasing the resources available to fund a future independent state. As discussed in
Chapter 4, incorporating grievances and multiple strategies of prevention into an agent-based model
of informational conflict onset may be a promising avenue.
Understanding how governments select a mix between these two strategies, and how they adjust
them in response to changing levels of grievance and nationalist desire, can offer insight into the
causes of preemption failure. The nightlights data used to measure government investment in Chapter
3 cannot distinguish between appeasement and preemption and thus cannot provide any insight
into this question. One plausible explanation is that more politically excluded groups will be more
likely to be targeted with repressive strategies as they lack access to the political process and the
government will pay a minimal political cost for this exclusion.
Even within the appeasement half of the set of preemption strategies, there is considerable
variation. Increasing education may reduce the desire for secession by providing concrete benefits
to minority members. However, it would be difficult to retain these benefits during the transition to
an independent state as they are funded by the central government. In contrast, improvements to a
region’s physical infrastructure — paving roads, building hydroelectric dams, upgrading electrical
grids — will be considerably harder for governments to take back in the event of a secession crisis.
This difference could potentially explain the divergent outcomes in Sri Lanka’s Dry Zone and
Iraqi Kurdistan. The Sinhalese colonization schemes significantly improved irrigation Baghdad
mainly built housing for transplants who worked in a preexisting oil industry. Did substantially
improving the Dry Zone’s agricultural infrastructure contribute to Tamil secessionist desires? Future
work should answer this question by investigating the differential effects of different types of public
goods.
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Given the importance of information as an explanatory force, spending more time theorizing
the sources of misinformation is warranted. Thus far, I have largely elided this important topic, and
largely assumed that poor quality information is either due to a lack of resources or transparent
political institutions. However, there are a wealth of other potential sources of bad information.
Confirmation bias may lead governments to be slow to update in the face of new information, and this
effect may be especially large when members of the dominant group hold negative stereotypes about
the minority. Domestic politics could also play a role; if small members of the winning coalition
enjoy significant veto power, then monitoring minority groups far out in the countryside may fall
low on the government’s priority list. Just as language and cultural barriers can be an impediment
to intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency, they can also negatively affect efforts in peacetime.
Understanding the sources of informational weakness that can lead to conflict onset may also help us
better understand the role information plays in active conflicts and conflict resolution.
This informational theory of secession also has implications for conflict management practition-
ers. If secessionist conflict results from a mismatch between government expectations and conditions
on the ground in minority group territories, then improving the flow of information from the periphery
to the center should reduce the likelihood of violent secessionist conflict. The model developed in
Chapter 4 almost never predicts conflict when governments can perfectly update their information
after a shock. Any conflicts that it does predict under these conditions are due an exceptionally
large positive shock to the governability of a group’s territory that overwhelms the resources the
government can commit to preemption.
It is important to note, however, that this formulation only suggests that improved information
flows can contribute to the barest definition of peace. Information only ensures negative peace, with
positive peace requiring more to be achieved (Galtung 1969). China’s surveillance state in Xinjiang
will likely give Beijing the information it needs to prevent any large-scale, popular armed movement
for independence from emerging in the region. However, the conditions reported in Xinjiang — the
ubiquity of surveillance cameras, the biometric tracking of gasoline purchases, the monitoring of
household electricity usage, the numerous re-education camps — clearly indicate that the region’s
Uyghur citizens fail to enjoy the benefits of positive peace.
In other cases, increased information flows may lead to more responsive governance for minori-
ties. Central governments can reduce separatist desires by providing the specific services and goods
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that members of a minority group want. However, information alone does not determine what form
the peace will take. The only constant across cases is that more information should lead to a lower
chance of armed contention between the government and non-state actors.
While these policy implications may strike a pessimistic tone, the overall picture is less distress-
ing. By focusing on the role of information, and bad information, in conflict onset, this dissertation
advances us beyond the self-proclaimed defeat of accepting that war is in the error term. By drawing
on potential post-conflict concerns, it acknowledges the strategic thinking of rebel movements and
provides new insights into conflict onset. Continuing to probe the causes and differential effects of
different sources of information bias in conflict prevention may yield conflict management strategies
with more uniformly positive outcomes.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Missing Data
I multiply impute missing values using the mice package (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn
2011). I generate five imputed datasets, run four chains on each, and then perform inference on
all 20 chains pooled together, averaging over the uncertainty in different imputed values (Little &
Rubin 2002, 217-218). Although it is possible to employ a model that jointly specifies the probability
of an observation’s absence alongside the parameters of interest, doing so is unnecessary in this
case. When the proportion of missing information in a dataset is low, this “uncongeniality” between
separate imputation and analysis models does not affect inference of imputed data (Meng 1994). The




GDP per capita 6.60
Table A.1: Missingness of explanatory and control variables.
A.2 Population Considerations
Using the ‘cookie cutter’ approach (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009, Cederman, Weidmann &
Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Weidmann & Bormann 2015) requires correcting for cells where multiple
group territories overlap. I do this by dividing the cell value by the number of group polygons that
cover it for each cell in the raster data. For example, the settlement areas of Slovaks and Hungarians
overlap in Southern Slovakia. Each raster cell in these areas has its population value divided by
two before aggregation to the group level, so the Slovaks and the Hungarians each receive half of
the cell’s population. While equal distribution of population between overlapping territories is a
strong assumption, it introduces less bias than ignoring the problem. Doing nothing double counts
the population of overlapping cells, resulting in ‘extra’ population in a state. Figure A.1 illustrates
this downweighting for population in Nigeria.





















Figure A.1: Population weighted by overlapping ethnic group territories in Nigeria
A.2.1 Population Concentration
The population Gini measure is calculated by treating each grid cell in the population data as an
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(A.1)
Each grid cell with no population contributes to a higher Gini coefficient because between two
territories with equal population, the one with more unoccupied areas will have a more concentrated
population overall. This excellently captures the theoretical concept of population concentration.
While Weidmann (2009) uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure population concen-
tration, his unit of analysis is ethnic group territory polygons, not grid cells within a polygon. Thus,
his data will have no instances of a unit with zero population. As the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is






where si is the market share of firm i (Rhoades 1993). In this case, si represents the population
share of grid cell i of the total population in a group’s territory. As such, cells with zero population
are not included in H . Substantively this means that two territories with the same number of equally
populated grid cells have an identical H , even if the second territory has several additional empty
grid cells. We would say that the population of the latter territory is more concentrated within its area,
so the Gini coefficient is a better measure of population concentration when measuring population at
the grid cell level. This property is inappropriate when many observations have zero population and
these unpopulated grid cells indicate a more concentrated population.
A.3 Capital Distance
Distance to the capital is measured using geodesic (straight line) distance. While geodesic distance
underestimates the ‘on the ground’ travel distance, this measurement error is less relevant at the
national level distances under study than in analyses of smaller areas. I use the CShapes dataset
(Weidmann, Kuse & Gleditsch 2010) which provides the locations of national capitals and records
any changes in their location such as the 1960 move of Brazil’s capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brası́lia
A.4 Nested Logit Model
There are numerous potential strategies that can be used to analyze the relationship between territorial
governability and initial rebel group goal. The simplest would be to estimate a logistic regression
of goal choice as a function of territorial governability and a set of control variables. However, this
approach risks producing biased inferences because it represents a type of selection bias due to
omitting groups which do not turn to violence (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 129-136). A better
approach is to include the lack of violent conflict as a possible outcome in the model. As there is no
natural ordering of the set of outcomes {nonviolence, secession, autonomy}1, multinomial logistic
regression is the best way to estimate these relationships (McFadden 1984).
Unfortunately, multinomial logistic regression is subject to the independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption, which states that the odds of one alternative over another are inde-
1I use the term nonviolence instead of status quo because there are a multitude of ways that self-determination
groups can work for change without employing violence against the state(Chenoweth & Stephan 2011,
Cunningham, Dahl & Frugé April 1,3 2017), and status quo implies an acceptance of the current conditions.
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pendent of the presence or absence of any other irrelevant alternatives (McFadden 1974). Given
the potential costs and gains associated with militarily confronting the state, nonviolence cannot be
treated as an irrelevant alternative to secession and autonomy.
To deal with this violation of the IIA assumption, I employ a nested logit model. Nested logistic
regression is appropriate when clusters of alternatives are likely to share unobserved attributes
(Fischer & Aufhauser 1988), and can be thought of as analogous to multilevel models which account
for dependence caused by unobserved factors at the group level (Gelman & Hill 2007). As secession
and autonomy-seeking civil wars are both forms of violent conflict, they are likely to share several
unobserved attributes. The structure of a nested logit can absorb much of this dependence, freeing
me from the need to try and include every relevant variable they have in common, leading to a more
parsimonious and interpretable model (Achen 2002).
A further advantage of the nested logit model for my analysis is the ability to include different
predictors across choice sets, and for the decision between choice sets. This allows me to use
variables such as horizontal inequality (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Buhaug
& Gleditsch 2013) and demographic balance (Cederman, Buhaug & Rød 2009) to explain the decision
to engage in violent conflict or not, and then, conditional on a group turning to violence, the effect of
territorial governability on the choice between secession and autonomy.
Equation 2.1 presents the general form of the nested logit model, where i indexes observations,
j indexes alternatives, and m indexes the choice sets that alternatives are nested under. The vectors y
and c denote the alternatives chosen by each observation, and the choice sets that they fall within.
The matrices Z and X represent the predictors that determine which choice set an observation falls
into, and the choice of alternatives within that choice set, respectively. The model can have different
predictors Zm within different nests m, but as written below, it uses the same predictors within each
nest. Iim is called the inclusive value and represents the expected utility for all alternatives within
choice set m. The parameter λm
Since there are only two alternatives in the violence choice set, I replace the categorical distri-
bution with a binomial one. Multinomial logistic regression requires the omission of a reference
category, so with only two alternatives, the interpretation of regression coefficients is the same. A
binomial specification is also more computationally efficient and numerically stable.
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Equations A.3-A.15 present the simplified version of the nested logit model that I use to explain
the choice of goal by rebel groups, including all priors and hyperpriors. Here I replace the more
general notation of m choice sets with n to denote the degenerate nonviolence choice set and v for
the violence choice set. I select the violence choice set as the omitted category for the upper level
multinomial logit. Although this means that the β coefficients for the violence choice set are 0, and
thus ηiv = 0 the probability of it being selected is not 0 because λv and Iiv are still included in πiv.
yi ∼ binomial(δi/λv) (A.3)
ci ∼ categorical(πim) (A.4)
πim =
exp(ηim + λm + Iim)∑M
h=1 exp(ηih + λh + Iih)
(A.5)
Iin = log [exp(ηin/λn)] (A.6)
Iiv = log [exp(δi/λv)] (A.7)
δi = γzi (A.8)
ηin = βxi (A.9)
ηiv = 0 (A.10)
β ∼ N (µβ, σβ) (A.11)
γ ∼ N (µγ , σγ) (A.12)
µβ, µγ ∼ N (0, 5) (A.13)
σβ, σγ ∼ hcauchy(0, 5) (A.14)
λ ∼ beta(2, 2) (A.15)
This modeling choice offers two advantages. Second, the nonviolence choice set is degenerate
with only one alternative, so δin = ηin and I replace δin with ηin in the model. This reduces the




Estimation in the Bayesian framework via Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling also avoids the
numerous computational issues present with likelihood based estimation of nested logit models. Full
information maximization of the joint likelihood is asymptotically efficient and produces consistent
parameter estimates, but the likelihood is not necessarily concave, so convergence is not guaranteed
(Fischer & Aufhauser 1988, 53-54). Conversely, sequential estimation of the upper and lower
likelihood is computationally feasible but inefficient, although it produces consistent estimates. The
larger issue is that the variance-covariance matrix has to be separately estimated, otherwise standard
errors will be biased downwards (McFadden 1981). MCMC can simultaneously estimate the full
model because it explores the entire posterior distribution instead of searching for a maximum. I
estimate the nested logit model using the Stan programming language (Carpenter, Gelman, Hoffman,
Lee, Goodrich, Betancourt, Brubaker, Guo, Li & Riddell 2017) in R (R Core Team 2019) via the
RStan interface (Stan Development Team 2017).
A.6 Alternate Models
This section presents results from multinomial logit models of rebel group goal in territorial civil war
and nested logit models without an interaction between population and distance.
A.6.1 Multinomial Model
The multinomial models replicate the analysis in Chapter 2, but instead model rebel goal as a
multinomial logit between the choices of {nonviolence, autonomy, and secession}. In these models
I include all governmental conflicts in the nonviolence category, so they do not account for the
violation of the IIA assumption caused by the similarity between governmental and territorial forms
of conflict. Results from these models are similarly null and suggest that the lack of evidence of a
relationship between territorial governability and rebel group goals in territorial conflict is less likely





[−0.19; 2.34] [−1.31; 0.33]
Lost Autonomy −0.40 −0.33
[−3.02; 2.02] [−2.33; 1.34]
ln(Inequality)2 −1.12∗ −0.41∗
[−2.20; −0.23] [−0.88; −0.04]
ln(Balance) −1.46∗ 0.50
[−3.01; −0.04] [−0.32; 1.33]
Polyarchy 0.91 0.47
[−0.27; 2.11] [−0.24; 1.19]
ln(GDPpc) −0.21 −0.18
[−1.75; 1.32] [−1.32; 1.10]
ln(Area) 0.72 −0.52
[−0.37; 1.89] [−1.06; 0.01]
ln(Population) 0.72 −0.07
[−0.45; 2.00] [−0.77; 0.65]
Capital Distance −0.09 1.01∗
[−1.10; 0.98] [0.26; 1.78]
ln(Population) × Capital Distance −0.50 −0.22
[−1.29; 0.23] [−0.64; 0.19]
Polynomial Time X X
Observations 11551
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table A.2: Multinomial logit results of the choice of goal in territorial civil conflict. The omitted
category encompasses all other forms of political activity, including acceptance of the status quo,
nonviolent resistance, governmental conflict, or political violence below the intensity threshold
required for inclusion.
A.6.2 Unconditional Model
Table A.3 presents results from a nested logit model that replicates results in Table A.3 without an
interaction between capital distance and group population. This specification assumes that the effects
of distance and population are constant regardless of how far a group’s territory is located from the
capital or how populous it is. The relationship between both distance and population and group goal
is inconclusive, providing further evidence of the lack of consistent relationship between territory
and choice of group goal.
A.7 MCMC Diagnostics
Figures A.3 and A.4 present traceplots from the main model presented in Chapter 2.
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Autonomy Secession













Figure A.2: Marginal effect of population on autonomy and secession as a function of capital distance
from Table A.2.






[−0.78; 0.56] [−0.39; 0.32]
Capital Distance 0.68∗ 0.05
[0.02; 1.59] [−0.36; 0.51]
Area −0.64 −0.23














[−40.53; 0.53] [−0.33; 15.60]
Polynomial Time X X
Observations 11529
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table A.3: Nested logit results for the onset and choice of goal in territorial civil conflict. Onset
coefficients represent the effect of a variable on a group remaining peaceful. Goal coefficients
represent the effect of a variable on a group fighting for secession over autonomy, conditional on
choosing violence.
Figure A.4: Marginal effect of population on autonomy and secession as a function of capital distance
from Model 1.
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APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure B.1 presents descriptive statistics for all predictors included in the various models. Due to
their skewed untransformed-distributions, nightlights, population, capital distance, area, and GDP
are log-transformed. Figure B.1 depicts these transformed distributions. Continuous predictors are
centered and scaled before analysis.
Nightlights Population Total Polyarchy
Excluded Lost Autonomy GDP
Area Capital Distance Dominant Group Presence
−1 0 1 2 −4 −2 0 2 −1 0 1 2
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 −2 −1 0 1 2










































Figure B.1: Distributions for predictors included in analysis. Continuous predictors are shown cen-
tered and scaled. Demographic balance, horizontal inequality, GDP, population density, nightlights,
accessibility, and area are log transformed.
B.2 Missing Data
Table B.1 presents the missingness of explanatory and control variables. Due to the fact that no
variable has more than 10% of data missing I treat these observations as missing not at random and
multiply impute them (Rubin 1987) using the mice package (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn
2011), generating five imputed datasets. For all models with missing data, I estimate two chains on




GDP per capita 6.49
Table B.1: Missingness of control variables.
B.3 Nightlights Considerations
One of the main downsides of the DMSP OLS data is that they are unable to distinguish variation
within urban areas where light levels are high due to saturation from neighboring pixels (Hsu,
Baugh, Ghosh, Zhizhin & Elvidge 2015). In these cases, all pixels in a saturated area receive the
maximum value. This phenomenon can be clearly seen in the area around Seoul in Figure B.2. I am
interested in variation between entire ethnic group territories, not within individual cities, so this is
less problematic for my analyses.
Another shortcoming of these data is that the units of brightness are not inherently meaningful
and are not stable over time. In addition to sensor drift within a satellite over time, values are not
comparable across satellites. The maximum value in the data is 63, but that does that not mean that
63 in two years of the same satellite is equivalent, or that 63 between two satellites is equivalent.
Users of the data have developed an intercalibration method to deal with these issues (Wu, He, Peng,
Li & Zhong 2013). Essentially, geographic regions that do not vary over time are identified, one year
of data is chosen as a reference raster, and then a model is fit using all other years to explain the
invariant region in reference year. The coefficients of this model represent the difference between a
given satellite-year and the reference raster. Once this model is trained, it is applied to the rest of
the world, adjusting estimates for all other years so that they can be compared to the reference year.
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Figure B.2: Nightlights in North and South Korea in 2006.
Following Wu et al. (2013), I select the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa, the American territory of
Puerto Rico, and the nation of Mauritius as invariant regions to calibrate the DMSP OLS data.
B.4 Political Status
I also estimate models explaining the level of nightlights in a group’s territory using two different
subsamples of ethnic groups: one that leaves out groups with a monopoly on political power and
dominant groups, and another that only includes politically excluded groups.
B.4.1 Non-Dominant Groups
Table B.2 replicates Table 3.2 using a subsample that omits groups that hold a monopoly on political
power or are dominant in a political system. The results are substantively similar, with the distribution
of lost autonomy being significantly more uncertain and centered around zero.
Figure B.3 displays a similar pattern of an increasing marginal effect of population on nightlights
as distance from the capital increases, in line with the effect in Figure 2.3.
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Model 1 Model 2
Population 0.74∗ 0.74∗
[0.72; 0.76] [0.72; 0.76]
Capital Distance −0.16∗ −0.16∗
[−0.18; −0.14] [−0.17; −0.14]
Population Total × Capital Distance 0.02∗ 0.03∗
[0.01; 0.03] [0.02; 0.04]
Area 0.05∗ 0.05∗
[0.04; 0.07] [0.03; 0.07]









[−0.20; 0.25] [−0.24; 0.15]
σα 0.67
∗ 0.45∗
[0.60; 0.76] [0.40; 0.51]
σγ 0.50
∗ 0.45∗
[0.37; 0.68] [0.34; 0.61]
WAIC 10990.06 10822.71
5-fold RMSE 0.38 0.38
Observations 11930 11930
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table B.2: Linear models explaining nightlights as a function of non-dominant ethnic group popu-
lation and capital distance. The standard deviation of the country and year random intercepts are
represented by σα and σγ , respectively. Continuous variables logged and standardized.
B.4.2 Excluded Groups
Table B.3 replicates Table 3.2 using a subsample limited to politically excluded groups. The results
are substantively similar, with the distribution of lost autonomy being significantly more uncertain
but still largely positive.
Figure B.4 displays a similar pattern of an increasing marginal effect of population on nightlights
as distance from the capital increases.
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Model 3 Model 4























Figure B.3: Marginal effects of non-dominant ethnic group population on nighttime light levels,
conditional on distance to the capital.
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Figure B.4: Marginal effects of excluded ethnic group population on nighttime light levels, condi-
tional on distance to the capital.
B.5 Out of Sample Accuracy
Due to the stratified nature of the data, I conduct grouped k-fold cross-validation. In this modification
of k-fold cross-validation, entire states of ethnic groups are included or excluded from the folds
at a time. The reported RMSE of each model thus captures its ability to predict nightlight levels
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Model 3 Model 4
Population 0.76∗ 0.76∗
[0.73; 0.78] [0.73; 0.78]
Capital Distance −0.15∗ −0.15∗
[−0.18; −0.13] [−0.18; −0.13]
Population Total × Capital Distance 0.03∗ 0.04∗
[0.02; 0.05] [0.03; 0.05]
Area 0.04∗ 0.03∗
[0.01; 0.06] [0.01; 0.05]









[−0.29; 0.26] [−0.29; 0.16]
σα 0.78
∗ 0.54∗
[0.69; 0.88] [0.47; 0.62]
σγ 0.54
∗ 0.47∗
[0.40; 0.73] [0.35; 0.65]
WAIC 7776.37 7597.13
5-fold RMSE 0.42 0.41
Observations 7076 7076
∗ 0 outside 95% credible interval
Table B.3: Linear models explaining nightlights as a function of excluded ethnic group population
and capital distance. The standard deviation of the country and year random intercepts are represented
by σα and σγ , respectively. Continuous variables logged and standardized.
in countries it has not seen before. In doing so, it provides a more honest estimate of out of
sample accuracy than the random split into training and test sets provided by traditional k-fold
cross-validation.
B.6 Random Forest
The random forest model is fit using the randomForest package (Cutler & Wiener 2018) in R.
The model is fit using the default parameters of 500 trees, p3 = 1 variable randomly chosen to make
each split, 23 of the data randomly sampled for each tree, minimum terminal node size of 5, and no
cap on the number of terminal nodes in a tree. Partial dependence is assessed using the pdp package
135
(Greenwell 2017) in R as a function of capital distance and population, marginalizing over the effect
of area.
B.7 Prior Sensitivity Analysis
As with any Bayesian analysis, one possible concern is that the results are driven more by the choice
of prior than the information provided by the data. This possibility is unlikely given the use of
diffuse hyperpriors rather than directly specified priors and the large number of observations. To
assuage these concerns, I reestimate the full controls model from Table 3.2 with narrower and wider
hyperpriors. For the narrow priors model, I set:
µα, µβ ∼ N (0, 2.5) (B.1)
σα, σβ, σ ∼ half-Cauchy(0, 1) (B.2)
and for the wide priors model I set:
µα, µβ ∼ N (0, 10) (B.3)
σα, σβ, σ ∼ half-Cauchy(0, 5) (B.4)
Figure B.5 replicates the marginal effects from the full controls model for both the narrow and
wide priors.
There is no substantive difference between either of the marginal effects plots and the one in
Figure 2.3. In neither specification does the 95% credible interval cross zero. The results in Chapter
3 are thus not likely to be a result of prior choice rather than relationships in the data.
B.8 Estimation and MCMC Diagnostics
I estimate the models using the Stan probabilistic programming language (Carpenter et al. 2017) in
R (R Core Team 2019) via the RStan interface (Stan Development Team 2017). Due to missingness
in the variables, I multiply impute the missing values using the mice package (van Buuren &
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Figure B.5: Sensitivity analysis for narrower and wider priors for marginal effects for Model 4 in
Table 3.2
Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011). I generate 5 imputed datasets, run two chains on each, and then perform
inference on all 10 chains pooled together, averaging over the uncertainty in different imputed values
(Little & Rubin 2002, 217-218).1 I run four chains for 2,000 warmup iterations followed by 2,000
sampling iterations. All inference is based on the sampling iterations. Standard diagnostics indicate
good convergence of the chains.
This section presents diagnostics of MCMC samples for Model 6. Figure B.6 displays the
traceplots for the regression coefficients β. Each shade of grey represents a different chain, and the
overlap between them provides evidence that the chains have converged to the stationary distribution.
Figure B.7 presents a plot of the Geweke diagnostic statistics for β. The diagnostic tests whether the
chain has converged to the stationary distribution by comparing the means of the first 10% and final
50% of the samples in each chain. Almost all estimates are within ± 1.96 standard deviations of the
mean, offering further evidence that the chains have converged to the stationary distribution.
1Although it is possible to employ a model that jointly specifies the probability of an observation’s absence
alongside the parameters of interest, doing so is unnecessary in this case. When the proportion of missing
information in a dataset is low, this “uncongeniality” between separate imputation and analysis models does
not affect inference of imputed data (Meng 1994). The percentage of missing data in the data is .24%, so this
should not affect the validity of my inferences.
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Figure B.6: Traceplot of samples for β in Model 4. Each shade of grey represents samples from one
chain initialized at different starting values.
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Figure B.7: Geweke diagnostic plot for β in Model 4. Dots are z-scores of the difference in means of
the first 10% and final 50% of the samples in each chain.
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Figure C.1: Duration to secessionist civil war onset in the baseline onset model. Results from 1,000
simulations at different parameter combinations, marginalizing over all parameters except the slope
of the logistic curve, government resources, and surveillance capabilities. The line represents the
average number of simulations that experience civil war, while the shaded region represents the 95%
confidence interval.
Figure C.1 presents the average duration of a simulation prior to secessionist civil war onset.
The average duration appears to be monotonically increasing in σ, indicating that governments that
are more capable of suveilling their territories are less likely to experience a secessionist conflict.
Similarly, as the number of ethnic groups that governments must keep in check increases, the average
iterations before civil war decreases. As the government’s resources increase, the average duration
similarly increases.
C.2 Model Details
for i = 0 to iterations do
if ∀ governabilityperceived > 2 × allocation then
end simulation
else
update government threat as governabilityperceived × distance
normalize threat
allocation = resources × threat
for g = 0 to groups do
if U(0, 1) > .95 then
g’s governability = max(g + Cauchy(0, .5), 0)
end if
end for




Algorithm 1: Algorithmic representation of the model.
C.3 Extensions to the Model
Cederman (1997) develops a basic model of actor competition and state formation, and then increases
the complexity by introducing dynamics such as defensive alliances and core-periphery dynamics,
evaluating how each addition changes the implications of the model. I follow a similar procedure
and consider three additions to my model, each of which introduces new parameters:
1. Changing the variance of the random shock that that groups can experience to their territory’s
governability i.e. changing the scale of the Cauchy distribution.
• New parameter: β the scale in the Cauchy distributed shock
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2. Allowing the effectiveness of government surveillance to vary probabilistically i.e. σ becomes
the mean of a normally distributed random variable instead of a fixed weight to the information
update.
• New parameter: ε the variance of the truncated normal distribution used to modify the
government’s update of ι
C.3.1 Variance of the Shock
Altering the variance of the shocks that groups can experience to the governability of their territory
has the effect of changing the predictability of the system. When the of shocks is constrained to be
small, even when governments are slow to update their information on the new governability of a
group’s territory, this new governability is unlikely to be large enough to tip the group into open
rebellion. In contrast, when the variance of the distribution of the shocks is higher (when the scale
of the Cauchy distribution is larger), governments are confronted with a more unpredictable world.
Learning about developments in a far-flung province could represent the majority of the change that
has occurred, or it could be just the first drip in a flow of new information about a radical change.
To modify the variance of the shocks, I introduce the new parameter β which is the scale
parameter of the Cauchy distribution the shocks are drawn from Cauchy(0, β). Where the scale of
this Cauchy distribution is 0.5 in the baseline model, β varies in this extension.
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Figure C.2: Probability of secessionist civil war onset in the varying shocks model. Results from
1,000 simulations at different parameter combinations, marginalizing over all parameters except
the scale of the shock, government resources, and surveillance capabilities. The line represents the




Introducing a stochastic component to the government’s information update on ι further increases
the uncertainty around new information about groups’ territories. News of a small increase in
governability in group g’s territory could be an accurate assessment of a minor shift, or it could be
just a small part of a larger picture that represents a significant shift in a territory’s governability.
Where above σ is simply a modifier that slows down the government’s updating of a territory’s
perceived governability iota, now it is the mean of a truncated normal distribution bounded at 0 and
1. Thus, at each iteration the government may learn very little about the changes in a territory, or it
might almost entirely close the gap between ι and γ. To vary the consistency of the government’s
domestic surveillance efforts, I introduce a new parameter ε which is the variance of this normal
distribution:
σi ∼ N[0,1](σ, ε)
where σi is the value used to weight the information update at iteration i. Larger values of ε represent
less certain monitoring efforts whose effectiveness may vary over time, while smaller ones denote
professionalized operations that operate consistently over time.
Table C.1 presents the additional parameters introduced in each extension of the model. Collec-
tively, they decrease the certainty of the state’s perspective
Symbol Meaning Range
c Onset probability curve steepness (0,∞)
β Scale of the shocks (0,∞)
ε Variance of information update effectiveness (0,∞)
Table C.1: Extended model-level parameters.
The results for this extension indicate that weakening the link between ι and γ reduces the
curvilinear relationship between surveillance capability and conflict onset. In the left panel of Figure
C.3, this curvilinear relationship is still observable, but as the variance of the shock increases from
left to right, it is replaced by a largely linear and slightly negative relationship between surveillance
capacity and conflict onset.
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Figure C.3: Probability of secessionist civil war onset in the stochastic surveillance model. Results
from 1,000 simulations at different parameter combinations, marginalizing over all parameters except
the scale of the shock, government resources, and surveillance capabilities. The line represents the
average number of simulations that experience civil war, while the shaded region represents the 95%
confidence interval.
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APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 5
D.1 Sri Lanka
This section presents the full numeric estimates used to construct Figure 5.1.
District 1953 1963 1971 1983
Jaffna
Actual 491,148 612,955 701,603 868,000
Projected 644,320 772,539 937,146
Difference -31,365 -70,936 -69,146
Mannar
Actual 43,689 60,095 77,780 113,000
Projected 57,235 68,624 83,364
Difference 2,860 9,156 29,636
Vavuniya (1953-1978)
Actual 35,112 68,712 95,243 111,000
Projected 45,996 55,149 61,656
Difference 22,716 40,094 49344
Trincomalee
Actual 83,917 137,878 188,245 274,000
Projected 109,931 131,807 160,119
Difference 27,947 56,438 113,881
Batticaloa




Actual 212,100 272,605 411,000
Projected 254,308 308,933
Difference 18,297 10,2067
Table D.1: Actual versus projected population increases in Tamil districts, 1953-1983 (multiple
sources, as cited in Manogaran (1987, 96)).
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Özsu, Umut. 2015. Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers. The
History and Theory of International Law first edition. ed. Oxford; New York: Oxford University
Press.
Paine, Jack. 2016. “Rethinking the Conflict “Resource Curse”: How Oil Wealth Prevents Center-
Seeking Civil Wars.” International Organization 70(4):727–761.
Peebles, Patrick. 1990. “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka.” The Journal
of Asian Studies 49(1):30–55.
156
Peiris, G. H. 1978. “Land Reform and Agrarian Change in Sri Lanka.” Modern Asian Studies
12(4):611–628.
Perdue, Theda. 2012. “The Legacy of Indian Removal.” The Journal of Southern History 78(1):3–36.
Perera, Sasanka. 2001. The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline.
Technical Report Background Paper The World Bank.
Phillips, Tom. 2018. “China Testing Facial-Recognition Surveillance System in Xinjiang – Report.”
The Guardian .
Pinderhughes, Charles. 2011. “Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism.” Socialism and
Democracy 25(1):235–256.
Pohl, Otto. 2010. The False Charges of Treason Against the Crimean Tatars. Report International
Committee for Crimea.
Ponnambalam, Satchi. 1981. Dependent Capitalism in Crisis: The Sri Lankan Economy, 1948-1980.
London : Westport, Conn., U.S.A: Zed Press ; Distributed in the United States of America by L.
Hill.
Powell, Robert. 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization 60(1):169–203.
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